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
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

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
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ROME UNDER THE OLIGARCHS:

A HISTORY OF ROME, 202—133, B.C.

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§. 1 THE deadly struggle known as the Second Punic War lasted for seventeen years, and when the battle of Zama (202 B.C.) at length gave Rome the victory, it left her and her Empire well-nigh exhausted. For the first three years of Hannibal's attack no Roman army had been able to stand against him, and Fabius Cunctator's policy of defence was seemingly a policy of despair. Nevertheless, the half-hearted action of Philip of Macedon and the political jealousies of the Carthaginian government gave time for it to prove its value; Rome showed herself still unconquered and still retained the allegiance of most of the Italian peoples, while Hannibal waited in vain for the reinforcements which would have turned the scale in his favour. When at last his brother Hasdrubal entered Italy and it seemed that his hopes were about to be realised, the disaster at the Metaurus ruined all (207 B.C.). Thereafter Rome's victory was but a question of time: in five years

more, thanks to the brilliant energy of the elder Africanus, the war was ended: Hannibal had been driven back to Africa and there defeated in the open field, Carthage had bought peace on the Roman terms, and her richest possession, the entire peninsula of Spain, had been added to the Roman Empire.

§ 2. The conclusion of the Second Punic War marks the close of one period of Roman history. Thus far the State has advanced through long internal struggles and perilous wars at her very gates to concord at home and sovereignty abroad. Henceforth there dates a period of decline. The inevitable march of events led her from one conquest to another, and compelled her to assume a world-wide mastery in place of a merely Italian supremacy, and the growth of her power rendered no longer possible the old democratic government of the comitia. The Senate took into its own hands the entire executive administration, and for seventy years stands as an unfettered Oligarchy ruling the destinies of all by the will of its few members—a bad Oligarchy, because it ruled the many in the interest of the few. Henceforth, too, arises a new struggle of orders within the State, not the struggle of patricians against plebeians, as in the old days, but the deadlier struggle of the rich with the poor. Henceforth, finally, commences that altered state of things which led within a hundred and sixty years to the establishment of monarchy, an alteration of which cause and effect alike were the disappearance of the old burgess middle-class, the honest and frugal yeomanry whose one motive in life was duty and whose disappearance carried with it the old style of life—that Roman *virtus et gravitas* which had enabled the State to overcome alike the Etruscans and the Greeks of Pyrrhus and the Carthaginians, and those stubborn Samnites whose *virtus* and *gravitas* were scarcely second to her own. We shall have to trace then the decline of morals and religion; the decay of the old rural population and the substitution of slave-labour for free toil; the growth of a wealth that enriched but a few; the monopoly of all State usufructs by these few; the ever-widening gulf between these and the starving populace; the misgovernment which always attends upon an autocratic

oligarchy when morality decays; the growing spirit of insubordination whereby the oligarchs' monopoly of government brought about its own ruin; the establishment of war no longer as a necessity of defence, but as a means of livelihood and plunder; the decay of discipline and courage and humanity and generalship;—in a word, the brief course of universal deterioration whereby Rome grew de-Romanised and monarchy became her only salvation. Of all of which the causes lie in this, the so-called First Period of Foreign Conquest.¹ The monotony of seventy years of ceaseless campaigning will be conveniently broken by the following threefold division:—

(i) Those wars which were undertaken for the security of what was already conquered by the year 201 B.C.—that is, wars for the establishment of a practicable Italian frontier and for the maintenance of Roman influence in Spain.

(ii) Wars whose object was to forestall attacks by foreign powers upon Italy—wars which resulted in no further extension of territory to Rome, lasting down to the close of the third Macedonian War (168 B.C.).

(iii) Wars of annexation, of which the only aim was the extension of Roman territory. These commence with the fourth Macedonian War of 148 B.C.

§ 3. Although mistress of Italy in 201 B.C., Rome was by no means rid of enemies within the peninsula. Already before the advent of Hannibal she had been engaged in the effort to drive out or reduce to inactivity the Gallic tribes which, from long before the days of Brennus, had settled about the Padus (*Po*) and now reached from the Alps to the district about the rivers Rubico and Aesis. The battle of Telamon (225 B.C.) had been followed by the settlement of colonists at Placentia (*Piacenza*) and Cremona in 218 B.C., symbolical of the submission of the Boii and the advance of the Roman power to the Padus (*Po*); but the arrival of Hannibal in the very same year had interrupted the scheme, and the Gauls had, in a dilatory way, assisted the Carthaginians. The whole of this wide region, by far the widest

¹ So called to distinguish it from the later period inaugurated after the fall of the Gracchi by the conquest of Numidia, and continued by Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompeius in Asia, and by Caesar in Gaul.

plain of Italy and one of the most fertile, was still Gallic: it was to the Romans of that day *Gallia par excellence*.

North of the Padus the Insubres were the leading tribe, reaching from the foot of the range of Mount Rosa to the neighbourhood of Cremona, and having as their capital Mediolanium (*Milan*). Between these and the Veneti lay the Cenomani, about Verona and Mantua (*Mantova*) and Lacus Benacus (*L. Garda*). To the west, the Taurini occupied the lowlands between the Insubrians and the Graian Alps, their capital being the town which was colonised by Rome at a later date as Augusta Taurinorum (*Turin*). The Veneti were not Gauls, but immigrants of quite different race who came from the direction of Epirus. They were in a state of feud with the Gallic invaders of the west, and eager for alliance with Rome.

South of the Padus, as far as the Apennines, lay the territories of the Boii, bordered on the east by the Lingones of the modern Romagna, on the west by the Anamani (around Placentia). Both Lingones and Anamani were practically dependent upon the Boii, while the Senones of the seaboard of Umbria, from the Rubico (*Fiumicino*) to the frontiers of Picenum near Ancona, never more than a small tribe, were controlled by the colonies of Ariminum (*Rimini*), Firmum (*Porto Fermo*), and Castrum Novum (at the mouth of the *Salinello*).¹ For the rest, the natural boundary of the Apennines was the only barrier between the Italians and the Celts.

§ 4. In the nature of things Rome could not tolerate such neighbours in a state of independence, for they commanded the whole of Italy as long as they held the passes of the Alps, and Hannibal had shown the necessity of closing these passes more securely. Secondary reasons for destroying once and for all the independence of *Gallia Cisalpina* were, firstly, the desire to appropriate the fertile plain of the Padus; secondly, the constant dread that the Gauls of Italy might invite across the Alps further bodies of their kinsmen of Transalpine Gaul. But, above all, Italy must have for a political frontier the natural barrier

¹ Ariminum was founded as early as 268 B.C.; Firmum and Castrum Novum in 264 B.C.

of the Alps. It must be made impossible for any foreign foe to invade her by land.

The Gauls, especially the Boii, were fully alive to the purport of the two colonies recently founded at their expense, and their national restlessness was aggravated by the presence of these standing symbols of defeat. Nevertheless, they remained mostly passive while Hannibal was in Italy, losing the golden opportunity of destroying their great foe forthwith. It was not until the Second Punic War was ended that, dreading the arrival of further colonists, conscious of aid given to the defeated Carthaginians, and seeing perhaps their opportunity in Rome's exhaustion, the Boii and Insubres rose in arms (200 B.C.) They found an able leader in one Hamilcar, an officer left in Italy by Hannibal for this very purpose of fanning the discontent of Gaul. The two colonies were the first objects of attack: Placentia (*Piacenza*) was stormed and sacked; the victorious Gauls set themselves to besiege Cremona, receiving further reinforcements from the Cenomani, allies of doubtful fidelity.¹

§ 5. The Senate, though taken by surprise, was able to put into the field under the praetor L. Furius an army sufficiently strong to rout Hamilcar's forces, kill that general and thirty-six thousand of his men, and so relieve Cremona. Leaving the Boii for the present alone, the legions were directed against the Transpadane Gauls. The first campaign (199 B.C.) was signalled by the complete defeat of the Romans by the Insubres, and it was only in the fourth year of the revolt (197 B.C.) that the consul C. Cornelius triumphed over the combined Insubres and Cenomani. His colleague Q. Minucius likewise claimed a triumph for his successes over the Boii and the Ligurians of the Etrurian Apennines: and as the Senate declined to allow his claim, he amused himself with a triumphal ceremony on his own account on the Alban Mount "by virtue of his rights as consul, and in accord with frequent and illustrious precedent."² The consul Marcellus, hurrying to complete the Transpadane

¹ The Cenomani had sided with the Romans in the Gallic rising of 226—222 B.C.

² Livy xxxiii. 23. So again, xlii. 21, the praetor C. Cicereius did the same for a petty success in Corsica (172 B.C.)—"in Monte Albano, quod iam in morem venerat, ut sine publica auctoritate fieret, triumphavit."

war, lost three thousand men by surprise at the hands of the Boii, but redeemed this disgrace, thanks to the treachery of the Cenomani who turned upon their late allies, by a victory near Comum (*Como*), which put that town into his hands and finally ended the Insubrian War (196 B.C.). The whole of Transpadane Gaul was forthwith organised as a free state under the protectorate of Rome. No colonies were founded within its limits; the Celts were suffered to retain their national constitution and division into cantons (*pagi*); no tribute was imposed upon them, but they were by the terms of peace precluded for ever from attaining the Roman franchise—an early and striking instance of the new policy of exclusion. The old Celtic character had indeed been thoroughly enervated by their life in Italy. Their final revolt had been marked by even greater incapacity for cohesion and foresight than was usual with their race. They had shown no unity in their action, and had not even brought to their aid the ever-ready forces of the Transalpine Gauls. Having neglected their kin, they now disowned them, and henceforth they stood pledged to guard the passes of Northern Italy alike against friends of their own and enemies of Rome. Within a century they had lost all traces of their Gallic origin.

§ 6. The Boii were still in arms. In the year which ended the Insubrian War (196 B.C.) they had been reduced to a sullen submission by the other consul, Furius Purpureo, but they again rose in 195 B.C., when they were defeated by the consul L. Valerius Flaccus, and came within an ace of cutting off a consular army under Tib. Sempronius, near Placentia (194 B.C.). Their desperate courage communicated itself to the Ligurians, their neighbours of the northern Apennines, and in the following year (193 B.C.) twenty-thousand of that people assaulted Pisa and Placentia, and summoned the Boii to yet another effort. So alarmed was the Senate at this seemingly inextinguishable struggle, that it declared a state of martial law and ordered out more than fifteen thousand men. Even thus the consul Merula had difficulty in routing the Boii near Mutina. For two years more the work of extermination dragged on, and then, in 191 B.C., the remnant of the nation laid down their

arms before the consul P. Scipio Nasica, and submitted finally. One-half of their territory was at once given up to Rome; its people disappeared silently but wholly, and it was said that those Boii who gave their name to Bohemia were the fugitives from Cispadane Gaul. The vacant lands were parcelled out to colonists settled at Felsina (189 B.C.) under the new name of Bononia (*Bologna*), at Mutina (*Modena*) and at Parma (both in 183 B.C.); which three fortresses, together with Placentia and Cremona (now refounded, 190 B.C.), formed the outposts against the Gauls beyond the Padus. They were connected by a new strategic road, the *Via Aemilia* (187 B.C.), a continuation of the *Via Flaminia* beyond Ariminum (*Rimini*). In 184 B.C. colonies were also settled at Potentia in Picenum and at Pisaurum on the *Via Flaminia*, a few miles to the south of Ariminum.

§ 7. The new frontier was completed towards the north-east by the foundation of Aquileia (*Aquileia*) in 184 B.C. at the head of the Adriatic, blocking the narrow plain between the Julian Alps and the sea.¹ A road from Bononia (*Bologna*) through Patavium (*Padua*) connected it with the other Roman outposts, and henceforth the Senate could rest secure from the possibility of an overland invasion from the east such as Philip had designed at Hannibal's suggestion.

The establishment of Aquileia met with no opposition from the Veneti, who had submitted together with the Cenomani in 186 B.C., but the Istrians were less tractable. They were a nation of pirates, a branch of that people which, under the names of Liburnians (*Croatia*) and Dalmatians, occupied the whole of the east coast of the Adriatic as far as Epirus,—the narrow but indefinite district known to the Romans as Illyricum. Istria itself is the small peninsula still so called, between the gulfs of Tergeste (*Trieste*) and Tarsatica (*Fiume*). The chastisement of the Illyrian queen Teuta (229 B.C.) had not put down that national habit of piracy to which, as much as to the threats of invasion from Macedonia, was due the establishment of a permanent fleet in the Adriatic. Repeated complaints of injury done to the colonists and traders of Aquileia led to the despatch thither of both the consuls for 178 B.C., there being at the moment

¹ It was the last of the "Colonies with Latin Rights." See p. 94.

no other field for the exercise of the nobles' now confirmed lust for war and its distinctions. The Istrians so utterly defeated these forces as to cause some consternation at Rome. The defeated consuls resumed operations in the spring with so much better success that C. Claudius, to whom as consul for 177 B.C. the province of Istria had fallen, fearful of losing his opportunity of attaining a triumph, hurried to the scene without even staying to take the auspices and ordered his predecessors to quit the province at once. The latter, supported by their troops, refused to obey the orders of an imperator who had neglected to take the auspices: Claudius was compelled to return to Rome and perform the usual ceremonies. Again entering Istria, he stormed the stronghold of Nesactium (near *Dignano*), and concluded the war. There was the usual wholesale slave-auction and looting, whereby the consuls could report the district "pacified" (177 B.C.).

§ 8. Meantime the Senate was intermittently occupied in similarly securing the north-western frontier of Italy. From *Faesulae* (*Fiesole*) westward the Apennines skirt the head of the Gulf of Genoa, and, running upwards into the Maritime Alps, form the labyrinth of heights and valleys known to us as the *Riviera*. Covered with forests, and presenting nothing to tempt aggression beyond an occasional badly-worked gold-stream, this region was the last refuge of those Ligures who had possibly preceded the Celts as the dominant people of western and southern Europe. Far inferior in physique, in intelligence, and in civilisation, to the Celtic and Italian races, they remained a peculiar people refusing all receptivity, and only betraying their existence by occasional raids upon the territories of *Massilia*, the lowlands of Etruria, and the valley of the Po; but they were of the same character, if not the same in race, as those Alpine tribes which occupied the passes from Italy into Gaul, and if the new Italian frontier was to be secured it was necessary to reduce the Ligurians to a state of permanent quiet. Their more easterly tribes interrupted the line of communication between Etruria and *Placentia* (*Piacenza*), while throughout its whole course they overlooked the coast-road from Central Italy to Gaul by way of *Genua* (*Genoa*)

and Massilia (*Marseilles*)—the only practicable land-route beyond the western Alps. Massilia, since an early date an ally of Rome, gave a secure port for the sea-route to Gaul; but to establish and control the land-route also was a prime necessity if a second Hannibalic invasion was to be made impossible.

§ 9. It has been said that 20,000 Ligurians attacked Pisa and Placentia in 193 B.C.: both places were relieved in time, but the attack was the commencement of a war which lasted on and off for thirty years. Incapable commanders suffered themselves to be surprised again and again in the recesses of the Ligurian mountains, and so many were their reverses that it became difficult at times to induce the legions to face these half-armed foes.¹ The foundation of the colony of Luna (*Carrara*) in 177 B.C. (in lands won from the Apuani Ligures, whom the Senate caused to be deported to the number of 40,000 of all ages and sexes, to the desolated neighbourhood of Beneventum), and the construction thereto of the *Via Aurelia*, marked the final conquest of the Eastern Ligurians, and it soon rose to prosperity as the usual port for the sea-trade with Massilia, Gaul, and Spain. At a somewhat earlier date Latin colonies were established at Pisa, 180 B.C., and Luca (*Lucca*).

The supposed conquest was not yet complete, for in the same year as the foundation of Luna (177 B.C.) the Ligurians captured the new *colonia* of Mutina (*Modena*) and ravaged the lands of Luna and Pisa. The rising was soon punished, and Liguria was entrusted to the ruthless mercies of consular armies for three years more. In the fifth year (173 B.C.) the consul M. Popilius received it as his province, and his conduct is worth recording as a striking instance of oligarchic procedure. Finding none of the hostile tribes in arms, he made an unprovoked attack upon the Statiellates Ligures, in the neighbourhood of *Acqui* north of Genua (*Genoa*), who had hitherto remained quiet. He slew half

¹ Thus the *Saltus Marcius* obtained its name from the defeat of the consul Q. Marcius Philippus with the loss of 4000 men and 3 legionary standards, 186 B.C. In 181 B.C. Aemilius Paulus, the conqueror of Pydna, was surrounded by Ligurians, and only extricated his forces by a desperate sally, which luckily for him proved successful.

the tribe, and sold the rest as slaves. A tribune denounced such a flagrant act of injustice, and procured a senatorial decree that the consul should restore alike the people and their goods before quitting his province. Popilius replied by hurrying to Rome, denouncing the Senate to their face in the Curia, and demanding both the erasure of their recent vote and the declaration of a public thanksgiving¹ for his successes. The Senate refused his demands: he must remain in Liguria as proconsul until he had restored the Statiellates. Thereupon one of the new consuls (172 B.C.), a brother of the culprit, announced his intention of vetoing any senatorial decree affecting his brother's dignity. There followed a complete governmental deadlock: the Senate ordered both of the new consuls to proceed to Liguria instead of to Macedonia, the special and lucrative province which they desired,² unless they would remove their veto; the consuls retorted by declining to initiate any public business. Presently came despatches from the proconsul Popilius announcing that he had defeated and killed sixteen thousand more of the outraged Statiellates, with the effect of rousing anew the remaining Ligurian tribes. Still the consuls refused to act, and it was not until threatened with imprisonment by the Tribunes that they suffered the latter officers to move and carry a bill in the comitia demanding the appointment of a commissioner to try M. Popilius. Popilius declined to present himself at Rome until a second bill was passed threatening him with condemnation by default. Thereupon he returned: and this disgraceful affair ended in an equally disgraceful fashion by the connivance of the commissioner who conducted the case for the prosecution. He postponed the hearing of the defence until the day upon which he should, as praetor, resign office, being aware that he would at that date cease to have any jurisdiction.

When the commanders were such men as Popilius, it was small wonder that the Ligurians gave trouble. The war

¹ *Supplicatio*. For this story see Livy xlii. 7, 8, 10, 21.

² It was a favourite senatorial engine thus to relegate intractable consuls to some dangerous and unprofitable province. Liguria was the subject of similar quarrels in 187 B.C. (Livy xxxviii. 42).

lingered on until 165 B.C., when the suppression of a combined revolt of the western Ligures and the adjacent Alpine tribes put an end to the dishonourable story. The desired coast-road was thrown open, Roman proprietors inherited the scarce-remunerative gold-washings, and the Italian frontier was completed.

§ 10. During the years of the Ligurian Wars there was constant trouble also in Sardinia and Corsica, whose native peoples were of a kindred race to the Ligurians. Ceded to Rome by Carthage in 238 B.C., and united as one province under the administration of a praetor (231 B.C.), the islands had little to offer, and the sole reason for annexing them was originally the necessity of ousting the Carthaginians. The ambition of would-be commanders furnished a new reason, and it had to be satisfied by constant assaults and massacres. Tib. Sempronius Gracchus put an end to the struggles of the Sardinians by the slaughter and enslavement of 80,000 of them (179—177 B.C.), whenceafter *Sardi Venales*, "Sardinians for sale," was a proverb for anything which was a drug in the market. No further rising occurred for more than fifty years (126 B.C.). Corsica resisted longer, but in 173 B.C. it was "pacified" by C. Cicereius,¹ and laid under a tribute of 200,000 pounds of wax—almost the sole product of the island. Cicereius also slew or took prisoners the usual multitude of natives. It had become the rule to measure the value of a victory by flesh and blood.

¹ See the note on p. 5.

CHAPTER II.

THE SPANISH WARS.

§ 1. Commercial Value of Spain.—§ 2. The Native Tribes.—§ 3. The Settlement of 197 B.C.—§ 4. The Campaign of Cato.—§ 5. History of the War from 195—179 B.C.—§ 6. The Measures of Gracchus.

§ 1. THE primary clause in the peace (201 B.C.) dictated to Carthage transferred to her conquerors the possessions of Carthage in Spain and the Balearic Isles. Rome had wrung from her enemy the richest mineral-producing country in the world, one of its most fertile croplands, and the centre of the world's trade in wool. Her troops had, through some eighteen years of varied service, become well acquainted with its natural features and the character of its inhabitants. Her merchants, following in the wake of her armies, had learnt its commercial value. The Greek or semi-Greek ports of the east coast reciprocated the feelings of the Roman traders, and moreover looked to Rome for that protection from molestation by the wild tribes of the interior which had thus far been afforded to them by Carthaginian efforts. It was now for the Senate to choose whether they should annex the Spains, or should rather leave them independent, merely protecting them from renewed Carthaginian interference. Had no political or strategic reasons weighed with them, the commercial interest was too strong in the Senate to allow of their relinquishing so rich a conquest. For the present, however, as if undecided, they were content to send yearly officers to take over the command of the veterans still unrecalled, but no steps were taken towards the establishment of a province. Rome was, as yet, half afraid of asserting an Empire beyond the sea.

§ 2. The Spanish Peninsula (Hispania) was divided among many peoples. The wild mountain region, which occupies the north-west angle from the foot of the Pyrenees to the river Minius (*Minho*) was peopled by wholly savage tribes of indomitable courage and unapproachable independence—Gallaeci in the west (*Gallicia*), Astures next to these (in *Asturias* and *Leon*), Vascones (*Basques*) in *Vasconia* and *Navarre* and on the adjacent coast; and between the two latter tribes lay a narrow strip of coast and mountain occupied by the Cantabri (in parts of *Asturias* and *Vasconia*). These were the true Iberians, a population related to the Ligurians and belonging to the old Ivernian stock of which the Basques are possibly the only remnant. Scarcely less warlike and uncompromising were the Lusitani of modern *Portugal* and *Estremadura*, and the Celtiberi of *Old* and *New Castile*. The latter people, a half-breed race sprung from invading Celts who had intermarried with the aboriginal Iberians, gave to the central mountain-region between the *Sierra Morena* and the *Cantabrian Mounts* their own name of Celtiberia. South and east of them lay the late Carthaginian territories (*Andalusia*, *Granada*, *Murcia*, and *Valencia*), and these again bordered upon the plain of the Iberus (*Ebro*) and the north-eastern region (*Catalonia* and *Arragon*), inhabited by various tribes whose native savagery and courage had disappeared before the superior civilisations of Carthage and the numerous Greek colonies on the coast. Chief of these were Emporiae (*Ampurias*) and Saguntum (*Murviadro*); but there were large numbers of Greeks in the great Punic marts of Valentia (*Valencia*), Tarraco (*Tarragona*), Carthago Nova (*Cartagena*), and Gades (*Cadiz*). Upon the peoples of these lowlands the Lusitani and Celtiberi made ceaseless forays: they were professional cattle-lifters, with no other means of subsistence. They despised agriculture, and they could not live in the lowland atmosphere, but they would fight to the last for their own hill-fastnesses, although they possessed scarcely a settlement worthy of the name of town. Even the comparatively civilised lowlanders, such as the Turdetani about the mouths of the Anas (*Guadiana*, and Baetis (*Guadalquivir*), and the Editani of *Valencia*, still prized their independence: they had sub-

mitted to Carthage, but they had paid no tribute. Of the Celtiberi, the chief tribes were the Vaccaei north of the *Sierra Guadarama*, the Oretani of *La Mancha*, and the Carpetani in the middle district ; but though two or more tribes frequently combined for a time, there was no bond of union beyond that of the moment. The hand of each was against every other, and to this they owed their conquest—a conquest which was not completed within a century and a half.¹

§ 3. For four years the Senate remained undecided how to deal with Spain. Officers went out year by year, finding plenty to do in coercing the forays of the mountain tribes, but it was only in 197 B.C. that a definite course was taken. In the previous year two commanders had paid into the treasury, as proceeds of their successes, more than 1500 pounds weight of gold, 35,000 pounds weight of silver, and the same amount of coined *denarii*. The desire for booty was irresistible, if policy was lost sight of. In 197 B.C. were created six praetors,² two of whom were ordered to proceed to Spain with commission to lay down the boundaries of two provinces there. They were also to take with them 8000 infantry and 400 horse apiece, to relieve the veteran troops on service there.

To one of these, Sempronius Tuditanus, was allotted the nearer portion of the Roman occupation, what was henceforth to be known as Hispania Citerior: to the other fell the western portion, Hispania Ulterior. The two provinces met at a point a little west of Carthago Nova (*Cartagena*); and while their seaward limit was determined by nature, their extension towards the interior rested with the praetors. The praetor of Further Spain had to win his province at the expense of the Lusitani; Tuditanus had to wrest Nearer Spain from the Celtiberi.³

§ 4. The news that their land was to be permanently occupied caused an immediate rising of the Spanish tribes. The new levies, none of them Roman legionaries, were no

¹ Spain was *finally* pacified by M. Vipsanius Agrippa, the minister of Augustus, in 19 B.C., by the deportation of the Astures and Cantabri to the lowlands.

² Heretofore the number had been four—the *praetor urbanus*, *praetor peregrinus*, and one each for Sicily and Sardinia.

³ Roughly, Hispania Ulterior = Andalusia; Hispania Citerior = Valencia, with parts of Catalonia and of Arragon.

match for the natives, and Tuditanus was defeated and killed. In 196 B.C. came two new praetors, with a force of two Roman legions, 8000 allies, and 600 horse. They made no progress in checking the revolt, and in 195 B.C. matters were so bad that M. Porcius Cato, consul for the year, was despatched to Spain with an additional force of two legions, as many allies, and a fleet of twenty-five sail. He proved himself worthy of his reputation. He would "make the war support itself,"¹ he said, although on his landing at Emporiae (*Ampurias*) he found scarce half a dozen positions still in the holding of the Romans: he gave battle to the Spaniards near that port, and left a great number of them dead upon the field of his victory. The whole province thereupon professed submission. Cato returned to Ampurias, and the revolt broke out at once anew. Thereupon he sent simultaneous orders to four hundred of the Spanish towns to disarm on that very day, under penalty of Roman vengeance. The stratagem succeeded: none knew but that they alone were marked out for destruction, and all obeyed the summons. He then attacked and reduced the tribes of the extreme north-east angle of Spain. By the close of the year Cato could lay down his consulate and leave Hither Spain in peace, while in Further Spain Q. Manlius gained some small successes over an army of 10,000 mercenary Celtiberians in the service of the unwarlike Turdetani of the south-west. An annual tribute was fixed, mainly from the mines of iron and silver; and so peaceful did the country seem, that the Roman army was disbanded. Cato triumphed on his return to Rome, and his trophies included upwards of 50,000 pounds weight of silver, coined or uncoined, and 1500 pounds of gold.

§ 5. At the very moment of Cato's triumph his successors were again struggling with a rising of the whole peninsula. Half an army was destroyed in Hither Spain; the consul Scipio Africanus was more successful in Further Spain, taking four hundred towns so called, and in the second year²

¹ *Bellum se ipsum alit* (Livy xxxiv. 9).

² It was the rule for praetors to be appointed for the two Spains in every second year, remaining each as propraetors until relieved (by the *Lex Bobia*)—often for close upon three years, if their successors were at all disinclined for the severe Spanish service, and therefore slow in arriving in their provinces.

of his command (193 B.C.), gaining a great victory at Ilipa, south of Hispalis (*Seville*). M. Fulvius Nobilior took over the command from Scipio in 192 B.C., and pushing at once into the heart of Celtiberia and the mountains of Toletum, overthrew the combined forces of the Vaccaeï, Vettones, and Celtiberi. In the next year he crushed the Oretani, took Toletum (*Toledo*), and subdued for the moment all the country as far as the Tagus. His colleague of the Hither province, C. Flaminius, was compelled to raise what troops he could (*tumultuarii*) to replace the veterans carried home by Cato, enlisting volunteers even from Sicily and from the veterans of the great Scipio's army now scattered about Africa. Nevertheless his command was a distinct success: the province had peace for three years (192—190 B.C.). On the other hand the Bastetani (in *Murcia*) defeated the great Aemilius Paulus with the loss of 6000 legionaries in 190 B.C.—a loss which Paulus redeemed in the next campaign by the slaughter of 18,000 Lusitanians.

So the struggle dragged on: there was no such thing as a reliable pacification of the natives, and there was no end to the thousands who revolted only to be massacred or enslaved. Triumphs and ovations brought prodigious sums into the treasury, but they had no other result. The propraetor C. Atinius was killed before Asta in Further Spain in 187 B.C.—a year in which the whole mass of the Lusitani and Celtiberi were again in arms; and the armies of C. Calpurnius Piso and L. Quinctius Crispinus only avenged his death by a brilliant and effective victory on the Tagus (185 B.C.) after suffering a great reverse between Hippo and Toletum (*Toledo*). Thirty thousand Spaniards fell in the battle, and for three years the country had something like peace. In 181 B.C. Q. Fulvius Flaccus, propraetor of Hispania Citerior, defeated the largest Spanish force yet put into the field, near Aebura in the Carpetanian territory (*New Castile*), and slew 17,000 more in the Saltus Manlianus (*Old Castile*); and these victories were followed by the temporary submission of the hitherto indomitable Celtiberians. Whereupon the legions declined further service, and declared that, if they did not receive the discharge which they had long ago earned, they would betake themselves home unbidden.

§ 6. However, the Romans had now pushed their way into the very heart of Celtiberia, and their stubborn persistence had its effect. The propraetors of 179 B.C. were L. Postumius and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. While the memory of Fulvius' victories was still green the new commanders pushed up the country. Postumius twice routed the Vaccaei, while Gracchus took town after town of the Celtiberi and Carpetani, and sealed his successes by a victory at Mons Chaunus.

He was more than a good general: he was a statesman, and the peace which he established endured for five-and-twenty years. His method was simple: the natives would fight at all costs, so he induced them to serve in the Roman ranks; they had no towns, and therefore nothing to lose in the event of defeat, so he gradually led them to adopt civic life. His justice in making and observing treaties with those who submitted had the desired effect, and when he left the province, in 178 B.C., he had achieved what Roman generals had been fighting for for twenty years. The two provinces were at last a reality, paying a fixed *stipendium* annually, and moreover furnishing to their conquerors a large and increasing force of fearless troops. A few cities, mainly on the coast, such as Gades (*Cadiz*) and Tarraco (*Tarragona*), became free and independent allies; and if it cost much to conquer and to keep the Spains, yet they furnished enormous mineral wealth and the richest commercial produce, they formed a valuable school for the training of the legionaries and a seminary for new enlistments, and they could never again fall as of old under the terrible hand of a Hannibal.

CHAPTER III.

CONDITION OF THE EAST IN 200 B.C.

§ 1. The Empire of Alexander.—§ 2. The Diadochi.—§ 3. The Gauls in Asia.—§ 4. Asia.—§ 5. Pergamus.—§ 6. Bithynia.—§ 7. Pontus.—§ 8. Rhodes.—§ 9. The Achaean League.—§ 10. The Aetolian League.—§ 11. Macedonia.—§ 12. Egypt.

§ 1. IN 323 B.C. died Alexander the Great. By birth heir only to the throne of Macedon and her precarious hegemony in European Greece, he had in the course of his brief reign overthrown all the kingdoms of the East which were recognised as anything more than barbaric, and had united in his one grasp the lands from Elis to the Indus, from the Euxine to the cataracts of the Nile. Still more, he had carried with him the civilisation of Hellas; and though after his death his conquests fell at once asunder, and continued for ever more or less segregated, yet the moral effects of his victories went far to make one people of all that had felt his power. From this date the Hellenic tongue and Hellenic ways of living and thinking ruled over the Orient of the Mediterranean peoples.

Alexander's half-brother Philip Arrhidaeus, a youth of weak intellect, was declared king under a guardian, while the provinces of the empire were partitioned amongst Alexander's chief officers. Amongst these were Ptolemy of Egypt, Antigonus of Greater Phrygia, Laomedon of Syria, Lysimachus of Thrace, Eumenes of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia. Macedonia and Greece went to Craterus and Antipater, of whom the former was the guardian of the young king, while the latter was commander-in-chief in in Europe. Perdiccas enjoyed a sort of control over the rest

by virtue of his chiliarchy or command of the horse-guards. The satrapies of the remote east remained under their several dependent native princes.

§ 2. The rival rulers of the more western nations quarrelled at once and continually, until in 311 B.C. a fresh partition was agreed upon: Macedonia was given to Cassander, son of Antipater; Antigonus, whose power had been steadily growing since the first partition of provinces, received the whole of Asia;¹ Ptolemy and Lysimachus retained their respective kingdoms of Egypt and Thrace; Babylon was now in the hands of Seleucus. These heirs of Alexander, and their successors, are commonly known as the Diadochi.

Still the quarrel went on. The kingdom of Egypt alone retained its royal house, the Ptolemies, in unbroken sequence,² albeit constantly at war with their powerful neighbours in Asia for the possession of the regions known as Palestine and Coele-Syria. In 301 B.C. Antigonus was slain at Ipsus in Phrygia by a coalition of Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, who forthwith partitioned amongst themselves the empire of Asia. The bulk of it fell to Seleucus. Antigonus' son Demetrius Poliorcetes expelled the sons of Cassander from Macedonia, and there his descendants reigned until the days when the Macedonian empire finally fell before the Romans, albeit for a few years (287—277) the attacks of Pyrrhus king of Epirus, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, interrupted the Antigonid rule.³ That line was restored by Demetrius' son Gonatas in 277 B.C., and from him the third king in succession was that Philip V. whose alliance with Hannibal led to the first interference of Rome in Grecian affairs (215 B.C.).

¹ See below, § 4, for the limits of "Asia."

² The names are: (1) Ptolemy Soter (son of Lagus), 323; (2) Philadelphus, 285; (3) Euergetes, 247; (4) Philopator, 222; (5) Epiphanes, 205; (6) Philometor, 181; (7) Euergetes II. (surnamed the Fat), 146-117. Egypt became a Roman province in 31 B.C.

³ The names are: (1) Antipater, 323; (2) Polysperchon, 319; (3) Cassander, 316; (4) Philip IV. (son of Cassander), 297; (5) Succession disputed by Antipater and Alexander (brothers of Philip IV.), 295; (6) Demetrius Poliorcetes, 294; (7) Pyrrhus (King of Epirus), 287; (8) Lysimachus (King of Thrace), 286; (9) Seleucus (King of Syria), 281; (10) Ptolemy Ceraunus, 280; then anarchy, 280-277; (11) Antigonus Gonatas (son of Demetrius Poliorcetes), 277; expelled by Pyrrhus, 274-272; (12) Demetrius II., 239; (13) Antigonus Doson, 229; (14) Philip V., 220; (15) Perseus, 179-168.

§. 3. Meantime the Syrian empire under the Seleucidae,¹ far too large and heterogeneous to be held together by any but the strongest will, soon split up into a number of states more or less independent of the central power and of each other—Bithynia, Cappadocia, Pontus, Pergamus, Galatia, Armenia, and the maritime confederacy of Greek towns and islands of the Asiatic coast under the headship of Rhodes. This disruption was hastened by the extraordinary events of 280 B.C., when, amidst the quarrels of the Diadochi, there descended upon European Greece a host of Gauls, kinsmen of those Senones who had burned Rome 110 years before. After overrunning Macedonia and Thrace in 280 B.C., they in the next year pressed southwards into Greece, and even assaulted Delphi. Some of them separated from the main body and crossed through Thrace into Asia Minor, where they established themselves in the heart of Anatolia, in the region which was thenceforward known as Galatia²—the land of the Asiatic Gauls.

§ 4. The kingdom of Asia properly so called consisted of those portions of the interior of Anatolia which include Phrygia and Lydia, and in more or less reality, the whole of the country from thence to the Indus; but while Egypt encroached upon it from the south and the Gauls from the north, the coast districts on all hands asserted their independence, or acknowledged only a nominal obedience to the "King of kings"; and in the farthest east and north-east the half-wild peoples of Bactria and the Caspian basin were in a constant state of war. Thus, though in name the heirs of Seleucus ruled over the empire of the Persian Xerxes, in reality they maintained a precarious existence by dint of incessant fighting, which had little result but to consume their resources to no purpose.

§ 5. Chief amongst the minor states was the kingdom of Pergamus. When the Gauls swept over Asia (279 B.C.) one Philetaerus, who had the charge of the fortress of

¹ The names are: (1) Seleucus Nicator, 312; (2) Antiochus Soter, 280; (3) Antiochus Theos, 261; (4) Seleucus Callinicus, 246; (5) Seleucus Ceraunus, 226; (6) Antiochus the Great, 223; (7) Seleucus Philopator, 187; (8) Antiochus Epiphanes, 175; (9) Antiochus Eupator, 164; (10) Demetrius Soter, 162-150. The kingdom was overthrown by Tigranes of Armenia in 79 B.C.

² Or Gallogrecia.

Pergamus, took advantage of the general disorganisation to revolt from the Seleucid monarchy, on which he had till then been in dependence. His power passed to his nephew Eumenes (263 B.C.). To the latter succeeded Attalus I., who now received the actual title of king (241 B.C.), transmitting it in turn to his son Eumenes II. (197 B.C.), and he to his son Attalus II. (159 B.C.). The last of the dynasty was Attalus III. (138—133 B.C.), who died without heir, and left his kingdom by will to Rome. The policy and fortunes of Eumenes II. and his successors will be of primary importance in the history of Rome's conquest of Greece and Asia.

§ 6. Bithynia assumed a position analogous to that of Pergamus, but far less important, at much the same date,¹ and was formally recognised as an independent state under Prusias upon the conquest of Asia by Rome (189 B.C.). The same may be said of Greater and Lesser Armenia, under the dynasties of the Artaxiads, who came forward with the Parthians at a later date as the chief power in Asia and a formidable foe to Rome. At the same date also the kings of Cappadocia were accorded the independence which they had long usurped. In each of these cases, however, the term independence must be understood to signify not so much freedom as separation from the control of the Seleucids. All became clients of the Romans, holding their kingdoms only under Roman protection and upon Roman sufferance. The Galatians, on the other hand, were actually free and independent, even after their chastisement by Rome in the same year (189 B.C.). They were divided into three cantons—the Tolistoboi, the Trocmi and the Tectosages; and each of these was again divided into four parts called Tetrarchies. The government was in the hands of twelve Tetrarchs, who were to some extent controlled by a Senate of three hundred. This constitution lasted until the third Mithradatic War, when Pompeius raised Deiotarus to the royal dignity.

§ 7. Pontus which had been elevated to the rank of an independent kingdom as early as 400 B.C., does not come into connection with Rome until a later epoch. At the present

¹ The line of kings is usually said to begin with Zipoetes (about 287 B.C.) or his son Nicomedes I. (278 B.C.).

date her princes ruled from the river Halys along the coast of the Black Sea eastwards, and were usually at feud with the princes of the two Armenias. The favourite name of the dynasty was Mithradates, and it was the sixth prince of this name, surnamed the Great, whose overthrow cost Rome a warfare of nearly thirty years (90-63 B.C.).

§ 8. Rhodes, by nature destined to be a commercial centre, had thrown off the yoke of Macedon immediately upon Alexander's death, and had made itself the head of a confederacy of the Greek towns which fringed the coasts of Asia Minor, and of many of the Aegean isles. Not aspiring to any territorial possessions, and aiming solely at liberty of trade, the Rhodians were on good terms with all the leading states of the East, and profited by their security to acquire a naval force which to some degree swayed the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Policy made them especially close allies of Egypt, which had no navy of its own, and of Pergamus. Amongst the members of the confederacy were Sinope, Smyrna, Samos, Abydos, and Mitylene. The whole constituted "a formal Hanseatic association; and at the head of it was Rhodes, which negotiated and stipulated in treaties for itself and its allies." The annual customs dues of Rhodes alone were upwards of a million of *drachmae* (£40,000), at the time of the third Macedonian War.

§ 9. The various cities and petty states of continental Greece were in a constant condition of feud in which only two leading ideas are traceable—the encroachments of Macedonia upon the liberties of all, and the efforts of the Achaean League to make itself co-extensive with Greece. Originally formed about 280 B.C. to resist the tyranny of Macedon, the first constituents of the League were but four townships¹ of the district of Achaëa, lying along the southern coast of the Gulf of Corinth. Its growth was but slow until, in 251 B.C., Aratus of Sicyon surprised and expelled the Macedonian garrison which occupied that town, as every other important post in Greece, and united it to the

¹ Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae. They were joined in 275 B.C. by Aegium, Bura, and Ceryneia. These, with Leontium, Aegeria, Pellene, formed the original ten towns of the league.

League. The act gave a new impetus to the confederates; and so successful were they that within five-and-twenty years their League comprised virtually all Peloponnesus with the exception of Sparta and Elis, and embraced in addition Athens, Salamis, and Aegina. Sparta resolutely maintained its independence, and when attacked by Aratus, now the general of the League, pressed its assailant so hard that he found himself compelled in sheer self-defence to invite foreign aid. He promised to put the League under Macedonian control, if Antigonos Doson would assist him in coercing Sparta. In the battle of Sellasia (221 B.C.) the forces of Sparta were utterly defeated and her king Cleomenes forced into exile. But though the League was now made the servant of Macedon, it did not attain its purpose, for Sparta was seized by a succession of tyrants, who still resisted successfully all efforts to reduce the city.

§ 10. There was indeed another power in Greece which the League could never constrain—that of Aetolia, which had risen from the ruins of old Greece as a nation of freebooters, half-Hellenic and half-Albanian. The Aetolians formed a loose confederacy, whose representatives met at Thermon to choose their annual Strategus, or Marshal; and their one bond of union was their habits of pillage and robbery. After the battle of Sellasia they invaded Peloponnesus, and assaulted the Achaean League-cities to such purpose that nothing but the recently-bought protection of Macedonia saved the League from destruction. The Macedonian king, Philip V., avenged his clients by harrying Aetolia and burning Thermon; and to the last days of Macedonia the feud between the two nations was inextinguishable. To crush their rivals, the Aetolians scrupled not to make alliances with Rome, nor to break them when dissatisfied with the lenity of Rome's dealings with Macedonia.

§ 11. The one Eastern nation which maintained its integrity and strength was Macedonia. Small in size, thinly peopled, and of comparatively poor soil, it was nevertheless a formidable power. Like the Romans, the Macedonians were a military state, and their phalanx was in the East what the Roman legion had shown itself in the West, for it was still as redoubtable as when Alexander had by its

means conquered his world. It numbered the whole male population of full age; its weapon was a long and heavy spear; and its arrangement was such that the spears of all the seven posterior files projected beyond the breasts of the foremost, and presented an eightfold *cheval-de-frise*, which was impenetrable when at rest and irresistible when at the charge. But its usefulness depended upon level ground: on rough ground it could not maintain its order, and when once the line was broken the entire phalanx was lost. This secret the successors of Alexander refused to bear in mind, and it was this which gave to the Roman legions the victory over the phalanx.

§ 12. Most independent alike in position and in policy was the mercantile state of Egypt under the descendants of Ptolemy Lagus, whose entire aim was to possess so much maritime power as should secure them free trade and suffice to protect them from any attack by sea. By land they had little to fear, and their protracted wars with Syria for the possession of the shores of the Levant were prompted less by any danger which might result from the proximity of so ambitious a neighbour than by the wish to have possession of the great ports of Syria and Phœnicia. In a similar spirit they annexed Cyprus and Cyrene and outlying members of the Archipelago: but their main reliance was upon the friendship of Rhodes and Pergamus; indeed, the league of these three States was a standing grievance both to Syria and Macedonia, for it deprived both of any power in the Mediterranean, profited by whatever commerce there might be in those states, and formed a continuous and formidable barrier separating the two greater powers. We shall find Antiochus and Philip uniting against the League. Egypt, however, was not a warlike state, any more than were its allies, for commercial governments are always pacific: each could, and would, fight for its rights and privileges, but (with the exception of Pergamus, whose alliance was prompted more by necessity than choice) they had no idle hopes of territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, the three states of this League fostered all that was still brilliant in Greece. The libraries of Pergamus and Alexandria had no rivals, and Rhodes was the centre of the

philosophy, art, and science of the day, and it was the policy of the Ptolemies to encourage literature and art, and to exercise a cosmopolitan tolerance which soon made Alexandria the most populous and wealthy city of the East.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIRST AND SECOND MACEDONIAN WARS.

§ 1. Italy and Macedonia during the Second Punic War.—§ 2. The Partition Treaty between Macedonia and Syria.—§ 3. Conquests of Philip V. in Asia.—§ 4. Foreign Policy of Rome.—§ 5. Causes of the Second Macedonian War.—§ 6. Declaration of War.—§ 7. Campaign of 200 B.C.—§ 8. Campaign of 199 B.C.—§ 9. Battle of the Pass of Aous. First Campaign of Flamininus.—§ 10. Second Campaign of Flamininus and Battle of Cynoscephalæ.—§ 11. The Treaty of Peace.—§ 12. Flamininus and the Liberation of Greece.

§ 1. IN the year after the battle of Cannæ (215 B.C.), Hannibal appealed to Macedonia for aid wherewith to crush the power which was dangerous alike to Carthage and to the East. Philip V. dallied awhile, then made the alliance, blundered in the attempt to seize the Roman dependency of Apollonia (214 B.C.), and thereupon forgot Hannibal: he spent eight years more in a successful war with his hereditary enemies the Aetolians, and finally (205 B.C.) made peace. It had seemingly been in his power by one bold effort to throw an army across the Adriatic into Southern Italy and thereby to crush Rome. Even when the first golden opportunity was lost, he might still have fulfilled his promise to Hannibal and perhaps have helped him to victory. At the first alarm of hostilities from Macedonia, Rome had stationed a fleet in the Adriatic and had stirred up the Aetolians to bar the ports of Western Greece to Macedonian troops; but there was nothing to have prevented Philip's marching overland and invading Italy by way of the open gate where afterwards was built the fortress of Aquileia. But Philip, with the ambition of

an Alexander, had no resolution and little courage. The Senate was able with little more than fair words to keep the Aetolians in arms until all hope of a successful invasion was gone by; and when at last she suffered them to make terms with Macedonia, she did so because she had determined to concentrate her strength for the crushing of Hannibal in Africa.

§ 2. Having made and marred one ambitious scheme, Philip at once took up a second with the same result. In the year of the peace (205 B.C.) died Ptolemy Philopator of Egypt. His successor, Ptolemy Epiphanes, was but a boy, and not likely to prove a formidable antagonist. It seemed an excellent opportunity for the two territorial powers of Macedonia and Syria to crush their maritime and mercantile rival, to divide between them the inheritance of the Ptolemies, and to put an end for ever to their ancient quarrel. They formed a Partition Treaty: Antiochus of Asia was to take Syria, Egypt itself, and the island of Cyprus; Philip was to annex to Macedonia the dependency of Cyrene, with such of the islands of the Greek Archipelago and the adjacent towns of Ionia and Thrace as belonged to the Ptolemies and to the kingdom of Pergamus.

§ 3. Without waiting for an excuse for war, Philip seized the fortress of Lysimachia (*Hexamili*) and the town of Perinthus (*Eregli*) on the Propontis (*Sea of Azov*), and so mastered the passage into Asia from the northern side. On the southern shore he had control by reason of his alliance with Prusias, King of Bithynia, but, to make assurance surer, he took Chalcēdon, opposite to Byzantium (*Constantinople*), and rased Cius, both of them Hellenic trade-centres preserving their independence on the Bithynian coast (201 B.C.). After a brief but unsuccessful attempt upon Pergamus (*Bergama*), the capital of Attalus, he rejoined his fleet, which was coasting southward, and commenced to attack the islands. After capturing the Egyptian island of Samos, he was encountered at Chios (*Cio*) by the combined fleets of the Rhodians and Attalus, whose old alliance and present interests made them resolutely opposed to any extension of Macedonian power by sea. The battle was indecisive, but Philip overran Caria, taking Miletus and

other towns of the Rhodian league. A second naval battle, off Lade near Miletus, had no better result; it was only the want of supplies and the impracticable nature of the country which at length compelled Philip to retreat in the autumn (201 B.C.).

It was at this juncture that a Roman embassy sailed eastward to represent the interests of the Senate. At the head of the envoys was M. Aemilius Lepidus.

§ 4. When Rome concluded the Second Punic War she was probably without any intention of territorial aggrandisement; she had crushed Carthage because events had shown that that power threatened her safety, but she had taken to herself no part of the African possessions of Carthage. Spain she had been compelled to occupy through fear of its reverting to the Carthaginians, but at this date (201 B.C.) there was probably no fixed intention of permanently annexing it, although the moneyed interest had possibly even then begun to talk of such a thing. But had such annexation been Rome's aim from the first, it was defensible enough, for Spain and the intervening islands encircled with Italy that westward sea, the freedom of which was necessary to Roman prosperity. The protracted wars which followed in Northern Italy only aimed at making Italy invulnerable, not at extending her Empire. It is perfectly true that "it is not enough to say that the Battle of Zama ended the second Punic War; it commenced the conquest of the world," but thus far Rome's wisest statesmen were ignorant of the fact.

Neither had Rome any reason to fear Macedonia as such: the two powers had already crossed swords, and the Senate could rest secure in the sense of its superiority. But a Macedonian Empire, enriched by the wealth and trade and resources of the Archipelago, the rich cities of the coast of Asia Minor, and the equally rich oasis of Cyrene, was a different thing, especially if allied with all the power of Antiochus and the Asiatic Monarchy. If the Partition Treaty were to be carried out the Eastern Mediterranean would become a Macedonian lake, for Greece was already under Philip's rule, and the proposed treaty would annihilate at once the powers of Egypt, Pergamus, and the Rhodian

League, which had thus far conjointly preserved the balance of power in that quarter. Quite apart from any considerations of statecraft, recent events had shown that the freedom of this eastern basin was of high value to Rome, for it gave to her the produce of the cornlands of Egypt, and the trade of the East generally. Macedonian supremacy would be synonymous with the expulsion of Roman traders: the moneyed interest was at stake, as well as political security.

Nevertheless, the Senate was in a dilemma; it had no ground for interference, for those Eastern powers which had most to dread from Macedonian or Syrian aggression were as keenly alive to the results which would follow an appeal to Rome. Neither Egypt nor Rhodes, nor even Pergamus, long an ally of Rome, would willingly call in the Italian power which, they clearly saw, would cause, sooner or later, their own overthrow. Rome could only resort to diplomacy, and she accordingly despatched Lepidus to Alexandria. The boy Ptolemy could not help himself, for the Partition Treaty threatened his crown; but nevertheless he did no more than authorise the Romans to protect his interests in Greece. In Syria things were to take their own course. Had Philip and Antiochus but acted upon their agreement they might have realised their aims without affording Rome either time or excuse to interfere: unfortunately for them, each acted selfishly instead of for the common good. Philip's campaign of 201 B.C. put him indeed in possession of much that was, by the treaty, to be his; but it gave Egypt a respite, and it moreover furnished Rome with her excuse for war.

§ 5. The Acarnanians hated the Aetolians, and were therefore allies of Philip. In the autumn of 201 B.C. the Athenians, enemies of Macedonia from the earliest days of the monarchy, put to death two Acarnanians on the plea that they had profaned the Mysteries. The Acarnanians appealed to Philip for redress, and he thereupon resolved to attack Athens. The Athenians formed an alliance with Rhodes and Attalus of Pergamus, and at the same time invited Roman aid. The Senate was delighted to have an excuse for war and quite ready to attack Philip.

Philip was fully alive to the impending war with Rome. His chief weakness lay in the want of a fleet, and his first aim was therefore to neutralise as far as possible the maritime superiority of the allied powers of Rhodes, Pergamus, and Egypt, under cover of which he expected the Romans to attack Macedonia. Accordingly, while his general, Philocles, undertook to chastise the Athenians, Philip in person set himself to make still more secure his hold over the Hellespont and his communications with Antiochus. The capture of Abydos (*Nágara*) after a protracted siege (200 B.C.) and the occupation of Sestos (*Boghazlı*) gave him full control over the southern outlet of the Hellespont, and the line of communications was completed by the seizure of Elaeus at the extremity of the Thracian Chersonese (*Peninsula of Gallipoli*), Aenus (*Enos*) at the mouth of the Hebrus (*Maritza*), and Maronea (*Maronia*) a little farther west. A Roman fleet under M. Valerius Laevinus found itself able to effect nothing. No effort was made even to relieve Abydos by force of arms, though that town resisted Philip in the most desperate fashion: Lepidus, the envoy to Alexandria, endeavoured to do so by diplomacy, but in vain.

§ 6. It was however already far on in the spring¹ when the consuls summoned the *Comitia Centuriata* to make the necessary and constitutional declaration of war upon Macedonia. It was not surprising that the Centuries flatly refused to do so. They had had enough of war during the the past eighteen years, and not the magnificence of Scipio's triumph nor the liberal distribution of corn could blind them to the pleasures of peace. It was only when the consul P. Sulpicius Galba, summoning them a second time, declared that they must choose between the invasion of Italy by Philip and their own invasion of Greece, that they yielded. Galba and the Senate knew perfectly well that Philip would never set foot in Italy, but it was to their interest to make him out the aggressor, and a formidable one to boot. To convince the Centuries the more easily, they declared that the veterans of the past war should be exempt, that only two legions should be taken for trans-

¹ At this period the consular year began upon the Ides of March (15th).

marine service, that these should consist of volunteers only, and that the burden of garrisoning Italy—it required four legions—should fall solely on the allies and the *Nomen Latinum*. This is the first public manifestation of the policy which was to throw upon the allies the burden of unprofitable wars, while the citizens reaped the profits and glory of conquest.

§ 7. Late in the autumn of 200 B.C. Galba stationed himself between Apollonia and Dyrrhachium (*Durazzo*); his subordinate Centho hurried with a small fleet to Attica. Before Philip could come up from Abydos, Centho had surprised the garrison of Chalcis (*Erripis*) in Euboea, one of the three fortresses whose natural strength won for them the names of the “Fetters of Greece,”¹ but not having troops to occupy it, had passed on to Attica. In revenge Philip marched from Demetrias on Athens, wasted such of the surrounding country as he could, and after an ineffectual attempt to induce the Achaean League, assembled at Argos, to join him against the Romans, finally collected his troops amongst the uplands of Mount Bodus (*Mount Grammos* in *Albania*), where flying columns of the Romans had already taken a number of fortresses. One or two skirmishes followed, and then the Macedonians were withdrawn to check the incursions of the Illyrian tribes into Macedonia.

These tribes had always been enemies to Philip’s house, and though they did not form any close and united alliance with Rome, individual members of their body, such as Bato, a chief of the Dardani, and Pleuratus, prince of Scodra, sided definitely with the consul. The Aetolians wavered, but might be easily induced to resume their old hostility of the first Macedonian War; while in the Peloponnesus, the only states of importance, with the exception of the Achaean League, which remained neutral—that is, Elis and Sparta—were decidedly anti-Macedonian. Philip had no other allies than the Boeotians and Acarnanians, too weak to be of much assistance; Thessaly, which had long been a part of his kingdom; and the three fortresses of Demetrias, Chalcis,

¹ The others were Demetrias (*Gorizia*) at the head of the Sinus Pagasaens (*Gulf of Volo*), and Corinth. All three were garrisoned by Macedonian troops.

and Corinth. Epirus only gave him half-hearted assistance. Outside Greece Antiochus made no effort to support his ally,¹ for he had been secured by the Romans with the bait of Palestine and Coele-Syria; Rhodes and Pergamus were only so far for Rome as they were against Macedonia, and neither power really wished to see Roman troops or fleets in the Eastern Mediterranean, any more than did Egypt.

§ 8. In the following spring Galba, proconsul, pushed his way up the valley of the Apsus (*Beratinó*), crossed Mounts Tomarus (*Tomaros*) and Bodus (*Grammos*), and descended into the western parts of the Macedonian plain. Simultaneously the Aetolians, who were now allied with Rome, overran Thessaly, the Illyrian tribes poured across the north-western mountains and plundered Paeonia, and the fleets of Pergamus, Rhodes, and Rome united to threaten the sea-board of Macedonia and her connections with Antiochus by way of the Hellespont. Nevertheless Philip, although beset by four attacks at once, and unable to collect more than 25,000 men, manœuvred so skilfully as greatly to endanger Galba's army, and finally to compel it to retreat without achieving anything beyond the ravaging of a portion of south-western Macedonia. The Aetolians and Illyrians were soon disposed of, and the enemy's fleet effected little or nothing. At the close of the year (199 B.C.) Philip was much in the same position as at its outset.

The winter was spent by him in strengthening his interests in Southern Greece, where he made fresh overtures to the Achaean League, and in collecting the entire levy of Macedonia. The Roman commander, Villius Tappulus, who arrived in Greece in the autumn of 199 B.C. to supersede Galba, found himself in a camp of mutineers. The legions levied in 200 B.C. declared that their so-called voluntary service had been in reality forced upon them by Tribunician intimidation, and demanded to be disbanded at once. Villius temporised until the arrival of the next year's consul with new troops, and his only act was to occupy an entrenched position on the upper valley of the

¹ He was busy in Syria, where Scopas the Egyptian was endeavouring to prevent its annexation. It was not until 199 B.C. that this Syrian war was settled; and even then Antiochus continued to further his own interests only, without assisting his ally in Macedon.

Aōus (*Viosā*), where Philip established himself in the early spring (198 B.C.).

§ 9. The new consul was T. Quinctius Flaminius, a man of different stamp to his precursors in this war: he lost no time in leaving Italy, so that it was yet early spring (198 B.C.) when he relieved Villius. He declined to assault Philip's well-chosen position; but after six weeks of inaction he was able, thanks to treachery on the part of some Epirots in the Macedonian ranks, to traverse the almost impassable mountains which beset the valley, and thus to direct a picked force against the rear of the Macedonian lines at the moment when their attention was fixed upon the long-expected attack in front. Philip's position was turned: the Aetolians and Romans at once overran Thessaly, while Philip entrenched himself a second time at Tempe (Valley of *Lykóstomon*), the one point where, between the mountains of Olympus and Ossa and the sea, the river Peneus (*Salamvria*) presents a practicable entrance into Macedonia. Flaminius, however, did not press his pursuit, but set about destroying Philip's power in Southern Greece. The mere presence of the Roman troops was sufficient to win over the Achaean League, in return for which they were promised possession of Corinth, if they could wrest it from its Macedonian garrison. South of Olympus, Philip was left with no allies but the Boeotians and Acarnanians, no towns but the three "Fetters" and Argos, which his general Philocles had just taken: he felt himself worsted, and obtained an armistice for two months with a view to effecting a peace with the Senate. The latter, however, would do nothing without the unconditional evacuation of Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias; the negotiations failed. Flaminius was continued in command as proconsul, and heavy reinforcements were sent out to him (197 B.C.). He was able to seize Thebes, and to reduce the Acarnanians to the defensive, before Philip could come to their relief.

§ 10. Philip made a mistake: he should have maintained his invulnerable position at Tempe, but he preferred to advance again into the heart of Thessaly. The two armies, each about 25,000 strong, met unexpectedly on the hills of Cynoscephalae near Scotussa (*Supli*), west of Demetrias

(*Goritza*). The battle was bloody, but short. Dividing his troops into two bodies, Philip led the right phalanx in person and routed the Roman left. The left phalanx, under Nicanor, fell into disorder upon the rough ground and was routed by the Roman right, which at once threw off a detachment to fall upon the rear of the other and victorious phalanx. Philip's army was destroyed: it left one-half of its numbers dead or captive—one-half of Macedonia's total fighting population (summer of 197 B.C.). Further reverses to the Macedonian arms were at the same time announced from Caria and the Peloponnesus, where the garrison of Corinth lost 1800 out of 6000 men in a battle with the forces of the Achaean League.

§ 11. Philip had no choice but to accept what terms the Senate might dictate. That body was content to disable Macedonia from further aggressions by demanding an alliance of offence and defence with Rome, limiting Philip's army to 5000 men and his fleet to five vessels, and forbidding him to make war outside the bounds of Macedonia proper except against the barbarians upon his northern, eastern, and western frontiers. He was to surrender all that he held in Greece, Thrace, Asia Minor, and the Aegean Sea, and just so much of the Macedonian territory as should put the passes of the south-west into the control of others: his duty was to guard the Greeks from barbarian invasion. Rome took for herself no territory whatever—nothing but an indemnity of 1000 talents.

Flaminius, assisted by ten commissioners of the Senate, spent three years in arranging the affairs of Greece. His instructions were, to hamper Rome with no new transmarine possessions, but to restore the Greeks to freedom in so far as this could be done with any hopes of permanence. It was this message of liberty restored which Flaminius delivered at the great Pan-Hellenic conference of Corinth, 196 B.C. The various towns which had been in Philip's power were distributed amongst a number of confederacies (thus Thessaly was divided as of old into four federal divisions); Corinth and Argos were restored to the Achaean League. To effect this in the case of Argos necessitated a war with Sparta, now for some years under the despotism of a savage

named Nabis. Philip had surrendered Argos to him to purchase his alliance, but without avail. He was the natural enemy of the Achæan League, which shared with him the mastery of the Peloponnesus; and Flaminius had no mind, by removing Nabis, to make that League too powerful. He was satisfied to cripple the tyrant's power and liberties, and so leave him as a counterpoise to the Achæans; but to do this he was compelled to levy an army of 50,000 men, and keep it for some months in the field (195 B.C.). The Boeotians clung loyally to the side of Philip, and here also armed compulsion was necessary (195 B.C.). Pleuratus of Scodra was rewarded with some small territorial concessions in Illyria, and the Aetolians were allowed to count Phocis and Locris as members of their confederacy. They grumbled, for they believed Philip's defeat to have been due to themselves alone, and they fancied themselves now flung aside like tools which had served their purpose. The enthusiastic support of the Athenians was rewarded with the islands of Paros, Scyros, and Imbros. In 194 B.C. Flaminius evacuated the "Fetters," handed them over to their several recipients, and returned to Rome to triumph. At this very date Antiochus of Syria, Rome's next adversary, was annexing Thrace, intriguing in Greece, and, in fine, putting himself into the place from which Philip had so lately fallen.

§ 12. Doubtless Flaminius did but represent the Senate in the sincerity of his desire to "liberate" Greece, but the Romans had yet to learn that, though liberty can be destroyed, it cannot be created by any but spontaneous agency. Never since the battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.) had Greece known the spirit which nurses liberty, and it was useless for the Senate to attempt to revive it. The Senate was attempting for Greece what Cato was attempting for the Senate—the arbitrary restoration of the irrevocable, the rejuvenescence of decrepitude. Cato failed, as will be seen, and so did Flaminius, yet he was a well-meaning man:—

"A good general, a better statesman, pliant and crafty, a Greek rather than a Roman, he represented that new generation who were abandoning ancestral traditions and adopting foreign manners. Flaminius was the true author of that Machiavellian

policy which gave up Greece defenceless into the hands of the legions. He has been called a second Scipio, but he has neither the nobleness nor the heroic courage of Africanus. . . . It is already noticeable that the Roman leaders are less noble, just as the interests they serve become less worthy.”¹

The “liberty” of Greece endured but fifty years in name, not half that time in reality: indeed, it never did exist except in the eyes of Flamininus and his fellow enthusiasts. The pitiful representatives of states once great, communities which “neither knew how to act nor how to keep quiet,” had long forgotten how to make use of liberty.

“Political calculation suggested to the Romans the possibility of liberating Greece; it was converted into a reality by the Hellenic sympathies that were at that time indescribably powerful in Rome, and above all in Flamininus himself. . . . As things stood, it was really necessary at once to put an end to such a freedom, equally pitiful and pernicious, by means of a superior power permanently present on the spot.”²

Rome did away with the faulty, but still salutary, power of Macedon, and left in place of it, not a stronger power, but none at all; not the curb of good order, but the loose rein of chaos; and the penalty which she had to pay for her sentimental interference was the cost of her war with Antiochus.

¹ Duruy, vol. ii., p. 31 (*English Translation*).

² Mommsen, Book III., p. 252 (*English Translation*).

CHAPTER V.

THE SYRIAN WAR.

§ 1. Conduct of Antiochus after the second Macedonian War.—§ 2. Attitude of Rome.—§ 3. Hannibal in Asia.—§ 4. The Aetolians commence the War.—§ 5. Antiochus crosses to Greece.—§ 6. The Battle of Thermopylae.—§ 7. Africanus and the War.—§ 8. The Battle of Magnesia.—§ 9. The Settlement of Asia.—§ 10. Volso and the Galatians.—§ 11. Reduction of Aetolia.—§ 12. Death of Hannibal and Scipio.

§ 1. THE second Macedonian war had been undertaken owing to the hostile alliance of Macedonia and Asia: events had reduced it to a struggle with Macedonia alone, for Antiochus, instead of aiding his ally, took advantage of Philip's embarrassments not only to achieve much of the design embodied in the Partition Treaty (205 B.C.), but also to seize upon other possessions which Macedonia was by the peace of 196 B.C. precluded from retaining. Apart from the obligation of alliance, interest should have led him to prevent the disarming of Macedonia; for this removed the one barrier between his own kingdom and the Romans. But he did not even refrain from further acts calculated to bring him into collision with the Senate: he at once sacrificed his defences and stirred up his enemy.

Theoretically, Egypt had been the *casus belli* in 200 B.C., but Antiochus did not take warning thereby. His great aim was to reannex the Syrian coast-line to his kingdom, and, leaving Philip to fight alone the battles of both parties, he consummated this primary object in 198 B.C. by defeating the Egyptian army under Scopas at Mount Panium in the Lebanon range. So crushing was the blow that Ptolemy at once ceded Syria and Palestine as the price of

peace ; and further, as guarantee of his good faith, betrothed himself to Antiochus' daughter Cleopatra. Antiochus next proceeded to occupy those Greek cities of the Ionian coast which had been under the protectorate of Egypt ; and from this it was but a step to attack those which owed allegiance to Attalus of Pergamus (*Bergama*) or which were members of the Rhodian League (197 B.C.). Attalus at once appealed for aid to the Romans, for whom he had done good service in the war with Macedon ; the Rhodians did the same, and further declared war ; other important cities like Smyrna and Lampsacus also offered resistance. Flamininus however, busy with his dream of resuscitating Greece, took no pains to protect the Greek cities beyond the Aegean, and the Rhodians were unable single-handed to effect much. However, Antiochus did not push matters so far as to give place for Roman interference : he passed over into Thrace, where he occupied Lysimachia (*Hexamili*) and Aenus (*Enos*) and Maronea (*Maronia*), and in fact made himself master of whatever the Romans had, in this quarter, wrested by treaty from his so-called ally Philip.

§ 2. But still the Romans did not interfere. Their knowledge of Eastern affairs would be largely guided by Flamininus' views, and Flamininus did not care as yet to commence a second war. The reason is not easy to find : probably he was eager to appear in Rome, and there, while the event was fresh, to pose as the liberator of Greece ; possibly he foresaw in Antiochus' very evident designs on Greece the speedy occurrence of another opportunity of liberating that country with additional glory ; it is even conceivable that he purposely evacuated Greece in order to give another of his fellow-nobles the same opening for distinction as he had himself enjoyed. As for the Senate, it had no desire to be further involved in transmarine politics, especially with those of a land so far away as Asia ; and it had no excuse for interference now that Antiochus had made peace with Egypt and had desisted from his aggressions on Pergamus and Rhodes. Nevertheless, Flamininus was guilty of grave misconduct in neither trying to prevent, nor prosecuting forthwith, the war which he saw to be inevitable ; for at the very moment when he withdrew the legions (194 B.C.) he

was aware that Antiochus' emissaries were seeking to organise revolt throughout Greece itself, while others were constructing a wide-reaching coalition of which the object was the overthrow of Rome.

§ 3. The heart and soul of this coalition was Hannibal. Upon him had devolved the duty of reorganising Carthage after her late defeat, and he had done it thoroughly. The narrow and self-seeking oligarchy which had frustrated his attack upon Italy was swept away: in its place was established a democratic government, working cordially with Hannibal's spirit of reform, whereby the resources of the country were so speedily developed that the payment of the yearly war-indemnity was a matter of no weight. The trade of Carthage flourished as vigorously as ever, and the alteration of the constitution did much to secure her African power. But these matters did not escape the observation of the Senate: the deposed oligarchs, with the selfishness of their kind, preferred to be the servants of Rome rather than the equals of Hannibal; they laid before the Senate, charge after charge against their only statesman, and so worked upon Roman fears by prophesying the speedy advent in Italy of a second invading army under the "fell African" that as early as 195 B.C. an embassy was sent to Carthage, to demand the dismissal or surrender of Hannibal. Powerless against treachery at home, Hannibal looked about for a refuge. He had possibly already had from Antiochus overtures of alliance with a view to a joint attack upon Rome: to Antiochus, at any rate, he fled.

He set himself forthwith to prepare for the war which he foresaw would surely follow upon his reception at the court of Antiochus. With all Spain in revolt and needing one consul and four legions to coerce it (195 B.C.), with the Boian war still raging and the Ligurians restless, it seemed that Rome could ill cope with another enemy more powerful and distant than the rest. The task of organising the forces of the East was commenced forthwith. The kingdom of Cappadocia was drawn into alliance with Antiochus by means of a marriage compact; the Gauls of Galatia, the scourge of Asia, promised their support; Egypt was apparently glad to be at peace, and was in no way

desirous of seeing further advances of Rome in the East ; the Greek states were all more or less dissatisfied with their present condition, and were ready, so it was said, to welcome Antiochus ; Pergamus, the Rhodian League, and the cities of the Hellespont, were all treated with a consideration which it was hoped would secure their neutrality ; and finally Antiochus had apparently firmly planted himself in Thrace.

§ 4. It only remained to call out and organise the fleet and army of Asia ; but before this could be done the storm broke. The Aetolians considered themselves badly treated by Flamininus, and they viewed with jealousy the aggrandisement of the Achæan League in the Peloponnesus. They determined to seize Sparta : the attempt failed, and Sparta at once joined the Achæans. They next attacked Chalcis and Demetrias : the former fortress was saved by the advent of a Roman fleet then cruising in the Aegean ; Demetrias and the Magnetes of its neighbourhood welcomed the Aetolians. The latter thereupon sent pressing messages to Antiochus, bidding him come at once while Greece was ripe for revolt. The invitation came at the moment when a Roman embassy at Ephesus was delivering to Antiochus the Senate's tardy ultimatum, bidding him either quit Europe once and for all or permit a Roman protectorate over certain fortresses of the Hellespont and Ionia. Antiochus replied by crossing to Greece and occupying Demetrias, while a Roman army under the consul M'. Acilius Glabrio landed at Apollonia (autumn of 192 B.C.).

There was nothing of Hannibal's doing in this. That general found himself fettered by the jealousy of Antiochus' courtiers and deprived of any real direction of the war. He had to content himself with doing with success what little he was permitted to do, and for the rest to look on at his patron's blunders.

§ 5. How great his blunder was Antiochus soon perceived. Of all Greece only the Magnetes and Perrhaebi of Thessaly, the Boeotians, the Aetolians and Athamans, and the Eleans and Messenians of Peloponnesus, sided with him—all of them states rather spiteful than powerful. For the rest, his only supporters were Cappadocia and Galatia. On the other

hand Rome found allies on all sides : besides Rhodes and Pergamus,¹ and the coast towns of Asia, Egypt declared for her ; so did the Hellespontine city of Byzantium and Prusias of Bithynia ; while in Greece the Achaeans, Athens, most of Thessaly, and Philip of Macedon, followed suit. Philip had no cause to fight on behalf of the sovereign who had first abandoned him to his enemies and afterwards added the spoils of Macedon to his own kingdom of Asia.

Antiochus was admitted to Demetrias by the Aetolians, after which he secured Chalcis, and so mastered the whole of Euboea ; then attempted to reduce Thessaly, found himself obstinately resisted, and withdrew on the approach of Appius Claudius, the *legatus* of the praetor Baebius, whom the Thessalians at once admitted into their chief cities (192 B.C.). Winter interrupted further operations.

§ 6. In the spring of 191 B.C. Antiochus crossed from Chalcis and occupied the Pass of Thermopylae. He had collected no additional troops, and his army was demoralised by some weeks of idleness : besides his Asiatic forces he had but four thousand Aetolians at his command, and these were more disposed to dispute than to obey his orders. Glabrio, one of the consuls of the year, marched southward from Thessaly and encamped before the Pass. Both leaders were aware how the Persians had turned the flank of the Spartans under Leonidas at that same Pass in 480 B.C., by way of the mountain path over the western height of Callidromos ; and while Antiochus attempted to provide against a like surprise by ordering the Aetolians to defend the path, Glabrio despatched his *legatus*, the famous M. Porcius Cato, to force it and repeat the Persian manœuvre. The Aetolians made little resistance : Cato fell upon the rear of the phalanx while Glabrio attacked it in front, the Asiatic army was annihilated, and Antiochus only halted at Chalcis to find a vessel which should carry him back to Asia. Glabrio spent the remainder of the year in Greece. Epirus, Boeotia, Messenia and Elis all submitted quietly. The only people to give him any trouble were the Aetolians to whom, after a vain attempt to reduce their fortress of Naupactus

¹ Now under Enmenes II., who had succeeded to his father Attalus at the close of 197 B.C.

(*Epaktos, Lepanto*), he granted an armistice. This was on the advice of Flamininus.

§ 7. The Senate might have been satisfied with having so easily driven Antiochus from Greece. Mere insistence upon it would have secured his abandonment of all his recent acquisitions in Europe, and the Hellespont would again have formed the political boundary, as it is the geographical, between the two continents. But it is certain that there were plenty of ambitious nobles to advocate the continuance of the war in the hopes of military glory, pecuniary rewards, and the now vulgarised honour of a triumph. This is proved by the keen competition for the consulate of 190 B.C. and for the command in the East. The rivalry ran high, no exceptional favourite being there to command an assured majority in the elections; but when Scipio Africanus declared that he would go to the East as a *legatus* if the *imperium* were vested in his brother Lucius, all other competitors withdrew. Lucius was possibly "a man of straw,"¹ but Africanus was a tried favourite alike of the citizens, the army, and the gods; and he was essentially the man to deal with the genius of Hannibal in the East as he had dealt with it in the West. The consulate was given to Lucius, as also was nominally the command, but in reality it was in Africanus' hands. On the first announcement that he was to be with the army, five thousand of his African veterans enrolled themselves as volunteers for the new service.

§ 8. He granted to the Aetolians an armistice which enabled him to hurry on without loss of time, but it was already July when he reached the Hellespont. Antiochus had quite lost his wits: he evacuated Lysimachia and suffered the fortresses of Aenus and Maronea to fall into the hands of the Romans, and he made no effort even to prevent the passage of the legions into Asia. The fleet which should have made such a passage at any rate difficult, if not altogether impossible, had been destroyed: its northern squadron, stationed at Ephesus, after a victory over the Rhodian navy at Samos, had been itself annihilated at Myonesus by the Roman fleet under L. Aemilius Regillus,

¹ Mommsen.

the successor of Gaius Livius ; while even before this the southern squadron, sailing northwards from Lycia and Caria under the command of Hannibal, had been destroyed at the mouth of the Eurymedon (*Kopru-sü*) in Pisidia. Rome was now mistress of the Aegean, and the defence of the Hellespont was made entirely impossible by the failure of Antiochus to surprise Pergamus.

Scipio accordingly crossed into Asia in the autumn, and marched southward as far as the Hermus (*Gediz-tschai*) meeting with no opposition, and indeed cordially welcomed by many of the Greek coast towns. After fording the river, the army began to cross the outlying spur of Mount Tmolus (*Boz-dagh*) known as Mount Sipylus (*Mannisa-dagh*) south of the Graeco-Lyidian town of Magnesia (*Mannisa*). Here Antiochus met the invaders and offered to treat for peace : he was willing to abandon all his European interests, but must retain his Asiatic kingdom intact. The Roman replied by demanding the cession of all Asia Minor. Antiochus broke off the conference, and gave battle on the spot. His troops were to the Romans as two to one, but like all Asiatic armies of ancient times they were formidable only on paper. The entire force of 80,000 men was routed by the Roman light troops and cavalry, led by Eumenes of Pergamus, and though the legions never came into action, it was said that 50,000 Asiatics fell. The Roman losses were said to amount to three hundred foot and twenty-four horsemen. The battle of Magnesia ended the war.

§ 9. The settlement of the terms of peace was now no difficult matter. A commission under Cn. Manlius Volso, one of the consuls for 189 B.C., and the successor of L. Scipio, made the following arrangements. All Asia west of the Halys (*Kyzyl-irmák*) and Mount Taurus—*i.e.*, the ancient kingdom of Lydia—was declared forfeit, and was in the main annexed to the kingdom of Eumenes together with the Thracian Chersonese (*Peninsula of Gallipoli*), leaving to Antiochus only Cilicia. Such of the Greek cities as had sided with Rome received their freedom ; the Rhodians were rewarded with Lycia and Caria and the right of free trade in all the ports of the East. Cappadocia under Ariarathes, and Greater and Lesser Armenia, though

beyond the frontier, were purposely encouraged by Rome to declare themselves independent principalities. Antiochus paid down 3000 talents, and pledged himself to a further annual payment of 1000 talents for twelve years—a total of 15,000 talents; he reduced his fleet in perpetuity to ten vessels, gave up his war-elephants, and renounced the right of making war in the West. Last of all he undertook to surrender Hannibal, who forthwith fled to the court of Prusias, the king of Bithynia.

These arrangements were mostly made by the consul of 189 B.C., Cn. Manlius Volso, and the ten commissioners (*Decemviri*) sent from Rome. The outlines of the Senate's policy are in brief these: they created, in the kingdom of Pergamus, a state of known loyalty, sufficiently powerful to hold the balance between Macedonia on the one hand and the kingdom of Antiochus on the other; they continued the policy of fostering client kingdoms whose integrity depended upon, and therefore constrained, their loyalty to Rome;¹ and they got rid of a fleet which might have proved a formidable rival in the Mediterranean. They made no territorial acquisitions whatever.

§ 10. But Volso had no mind to return home without some kind of victory. His commission was already ended indeed by the victory of Magnesia, but he looked about on his own authority for a new and profitable war. He found one against the Gauls of Asia, who, while not allies of Antiochus, had yet furnished him with all the mercenaries he cared to levy. Moreover Volso chose to represent them as dangerous to Rome's client Eumenes, whose brother Attalus he summoned to act as a guide in the purposed campaign. Making the campaign support itself by unwarrantable and insolent exactions from the Asiatic states, he marched into the lands of the Tolistoboi, who collected their wives, children, and goods to a stronghold upon Mount Olympus. Here the Romans attacked them: the Gauls had no missiles, while the storm of arrows and sling-bullets from the Roman light troops prevented their coming to close quarters, and struck them down in multitudes. The result was a ghastly massacre, which was repeated a few days later in a similar

¹ Compare the position of Numidia in Africa.

assault upon the Tectosages entrenched upon Mount Magaba. The few that escaped made their way to the canton of the Trocmi, east of the Halys: the consul's plunder was the sum total of the booty which the Gauls had acquired from the cities of Asia in the course of years of pillage. To have rid Asia Minor of such a nation of freebooters was doubtless a desirable achievement, and the barbarities of a conquest never troubled a general of this era; but Volso's conduct was doubly criminal, for he had disgraced the Roman character amongst the peoples of the East by attacking a people in defiance of justice, and he had initiated a campaign of which the results might have been as disastrous as they were fortunate without authority from the Senate. Henceforth it becomes yearly more common for commanders to dispense with or even to defy the senatorial authority. To Volso is due the credit of first initiating that official disregard of forms which in a century transferred the government from the nobles to the army.

§ 11. In the same year (189 B.C.) the other consul, M. Fulvius Nobilior, ended for the present the war in Aetolia. After the expiry of the six months' armistice granted by the Scipios in 190 B.C., the Aetolians had resumed their former aggressions, harassing the seas with piracy, and raiding the lands of all their neighbours alike, more especially of Philip. Fulvius organised a united attack of the offended parties (Macedonia and the Achaean League) upon every side of Aetolia—an attack which became a slave-hunt after the capitulation of Ambracia (*Arta*). When terms were at last granted to the remnant, they were deprived of much of their territory and constrained to make Rome the arbiter of their future quarrels. They paid the usual indemnity, and ceded Cephallenia (*Cefalú*) and Zacynthus (*Zante*) to serve as additional naval stations for the Romans in the Adriatic.

§ 12. The last act of the Syrian war did not occur until the year 183 B.C., when a Roman embassy appeared at the court of Prusias of Bithynia, and requested that Hannibal should no longer remain there. The latter had probably expected such a message: at any rate he saved his host the

trouble of surrendering him, though he could not save him the disgrace of having offered to do so, by committing suicide. He was sixty-four years of age, and if he had failed in his life's object, if he was in truth bound to confess that Rome "rose ever stronger from her troubles,"¹ yet he had faithfully kept the oath of vengeance sworn five-and-fifty years before, and he had earned the proud distinction, accorded to no other, that Rome's statesmen, no less than her infants,² feared his very name. About this same time also died the man who alone had beaten him in fair field—Scipio Africanus, the hero of Zama. Upon him, too, had come Nemesis: he, too, like Hannibal, had lived to feel his country's ingratitude. For some unknown reason he had, immediately after the magnificent triumph of Lucius Scipio for the Syrian war, fallen into disfavour. Petty and malicious accusations had been made against him: his brother was charged with embezzling part of the spoils of his victory, and when Africanus scornfully tore up the documents containing the statement of accounts, he was personally attacked for his contempt of court. The prosecution was, indeed, for the sake of old times, temporarily dropped; but unfortunately for Africanus, foremost amongst his enemies was Cato, and no disappointment, no sentiment, could turn Cato from his purpose. To Cato, Africanus was the leader of that Hellenising movement which was changing the old Roman character; and while Cato was too obstinate to see the futility of his belief, and Africanus too proud either to argue with or conciliate his enemies, there were doubtless many of the nobles to whom Scipio's pre-eminence was galling. For all their boasted nobility, the nobles shared fully that narrow-minded spite which causes the mob to rejoice in the downfall of great men. Equally certainly, Scipio was too great to be a good citizen, and he showed it when, to escape his enemies, he retired into private life at Liternum (*Patria*) in Campania, and devoted himself to his books. He died there, probably in the same year as died Hannibal, at the early age of fifty-one.

¹ See Horace's famous Ode, Book IV. 3.

² His name was long used as a bugbear wherewith to frighten children.

CHAPTER VI.

THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR.

§ 1. Condition of Greece.—§ 2. Attitude of Philip V.—§ 3. Reign of Perseus.—§ 4. Outbreak of the Third Macedonian War.—§ 5. Progress of the War.—§ 6. Campaign of Philipppus, 169 B.C.—§ 7. Campaign of Aemilius Paulus. Disgrace of the Rhodians.—§ 8. Battle of Pydna.—§ 9. Settlement of Macedonia.—§ 10. Syria and Egypt.—§ 11. Roman Treatment of Rhodes and Pergamus.—§ 12. Greece.

§ 1. EIGHTEEN years elapsed before the legions were again called upon for service in the East. During that time Rome was busy with the incessant wars in Spain, Liguria, and Istria, which have been already detailed; the East, on the contrary, lay quiet. The quietude was external only, for inwardly party-spirit smouldered, and threatened to break out into flame. When it was too late, the states of Greece learnt that the foreign rule of Rome was less tolerable than the Hellenic domination of Macedonia: they found that the "liberty" given to them by Flamininus was a shadow, and they once again dreamt of that national unity about which Flamininus had harangued them. But if they were unfit for liberty then, they were doubly so in the after years. The whole land was in a condition little short of anarchy: scarce a state but was bankrupt, and in the endeavour to find money all law, whether private or international, was openly set aside. Society was divided into the two factions of the rich and the paupers, and the fatuous national spirit of *stasis* which had in other days pitted against each other the parties of Sparta and Athens, of oligarchy and democracy, lapsed now from politics to the purely social quarrels of those who had something with those who had nothing. In the

face of this vital struggle the questions of politics were but of small weight: the rich in the main favoured Rome, because manifestly Rome alone could guarantee their security; the poor, on the other hand, dignified themselves with the name of the patriotic party, and without at first having any very definite views beyond a dislike for Rome, gradually came to look upon Macedonia as their proper champion.

§ 2. Philip V. had aided the Romans in the Syrian war, and contributed very considerably to its almost bloodless, but complete success. To him was due the fact that the Scipios were able to march so rapidly overland to the Hellespont, and it was he who had kept open the line of communication between the Hellespont and the Adriatic coast. He had a right therefore to expect some substantial reward; and when, on the contrary, he found his own possessions left to him just as they had been before the outbreak of the war, when he saw his hated rival Eumenes elevated to the rank of a great Asiatic power, and even put in possession of much of those European territories which he had assisted to render untenable by Antiochus,—when, in fine, he found himself treated much like one of those Italian *socii* whose services were to be at any moment at Rome's call without prospect of reward, his temper naturally found it hard to bear. He made no protest, but he set himself, with a resolution hitherto quite unrecognised in his character, to prepare for one more struggle with his masters.

He was bound by treaty to arm no more than five thousand men: accordingly he kept his force within this figure, but by continually changing its constituents, by speedily discharging the efficient and enlisting fresh men, he virtually kept the whole male population of Macedonia in perfect military training. Moreover he called in numbers of warlike Thracians, and settled them upon his thinly peopled lands, thereby increasing at once the numbers and efficiency of his people. He thoroughly reformed his finances and replenished his treasury. To provide against those incursions of the Illyrians and Dardani which had so hampered him in previous wars, he constructed a regular frontier to the north and north-west, and in doing so found plenty of active service for the training of his soldiery. He

went further: he negotiated with the Bastarnae, a tribe of Scythians beyond the Danube, inviting them to drive out the Dardani and occupy the lands so won. Had the design succeeded, he intended to put himself and his army at their head, and to descend upon Italy, like a second Hannibal, by way of the Julian Alps and the open lands at the head of the Adriatic. Fortunately for Rome, the Bastarnae were worsted by the Dardani and this plan was frustrated; but the reality of the design is proved by the foundation of the fortress-colony of Aquileia (183 B.C.), to bar the path of the rumoured invasion.

The Senate kept a watchful eye upon these proceedings, finding a zealous spy in the person of the fawning Eumenes; and Flamininus, foreseeing that Macedonia might yet undo his work of "liberation" in Greece, stooped to intrigues with Philip's sons Perseus and Demetrius. The defeat of Antiochus had left the Thracian fortresses of Aenus (*Enos*) and Maronea (*Maronia*) independent, and Philip ventured to occupy them. Their inhabitants, and of course Eumenes, laid complaints before the Senate, and the latter body ordered Philip to withdraw at once. He did so—after burning Maronea—and was then told that he owed his impunity to the intercession of his son Demetrius, 183 B.C. Demetrius was the younger but legitimate son; Perseus was older, but illegitimate, and consequently the rival of Demetrius, the lawful heir and the favourite of the Macedonians. He took advantage of the cordiality which had been shown to Demetrius when a hostage at Rome to secure his arrest when in possession of despatches, purporting to be from Flamininus, which manifestly convicted the young prince of philo-Roman tendencies. Philip at once put the boy to death as a conspirator, and, dying shortly afterwards, left Perseus his heir (179 B.C.).

§ 3. Perseus continued his father's policy at home; abroad he was more active, if less cautious. He had one firm ally in Cotys, prince of the Odrysae, the most warlike tribe of Thrace, whose lands extended along the Danube from the frontiers of Macedonia to the Black Sea. He tried to conciliate the Illyrian princes, and came to a dubious understanding with Gentius, the successor of Pleuratus in

the principality of Scodra. He made marriage-alliances with Prusias and Antiochus. Moreover, throughout the Greek world he courted the favour of all alike. By holding up Eumenes to detestation as a traitor to the Hellenic cause he obtained a fairly general if indefinite recognition of his position as the champion of Hellenism. The Rhodians even made a naval demonstration in the Aegean in his honour: they had felt already a change of feeling in the relations of the Senate with themselves, and they were as little pleased with Rome as was Rome with them.

§ 4. The Senate was fully alive to the situation, and it was only the governmental deadlock caused by the affair of Popilius in 172 B.C. (*see pp.* 9, 10) which prevented the declaration of war in that year. The ostensible *casus belli* was Perseus' attack on a petty Thracian prince in alliance with Rome; but a further plea was forthcoming in the course of this year, when it was learned that Eumenes, on his way home from yet another mission as informer to Rome, had narrowly escaped assassination at Delphi. The assertion that the assassins were emissaries of Perseus was never disproved, but no one tried to disprove it. Eumenes was reported dead, and whilst the Senate may have been glad of his removal, they were none the less pleased to have the additional plea for war which was furnished them by this attack upon their client. In June 171 B.C. the consul P. Licinius Crassus landed at Apollonia and marched into Thessaly.

Forthwith Perseus' expected allies deserted him. The mere rumour of Roman interference sufficed to paralyse the Macedonian party in the states of Greece: the Aetolians elected as their strategus Lyciscus, a man whose sympathies were altogether with Rome; the Epirots remained passive, Thessaly deserted Perseus, the Achaean League did the same, and of the twelve towns of the Boeotian Confederacy only Haliartus and Coronea ventured to maintain their old Macedonian policy, until reduced to obedience by a handful of legionaries. Outside Greece, Carthage sent troops and elephants to Rome, both Rhodes and Pergamus made offers of ships, the Cappadocian prince followed suit, and Bithynia remained neutral, though its king Prusias was brother-in-law

of Perseus. Only Cotys and the Bastarnae offered to aid Macedonia; but they were prompted solely by the hope of high pay, and when Perseus refused their extravagant demands, most of them returned home. The boasted thousands of Cotys reduced themselves to 1000 foot and 200 horse.

§ 5. Had Perseus availed himself of the inactivity of the Romans in 172 B.C., he might have involved all Greece as his partisans and forced the consul Crassus to fight for the ground on which he pitched his camp. As it was, he entrenched himself in the front of the passes of Olympus and the Cambunian mountains and waited to be attacked.

Here, near Larissa, was fought the first engagement of the war, in which Crassus was worsted with the loss of 3000 men. Upon this the Epirotes went over to Perseus, but the latter had no courage to follow up the success which might yet have put him in possession of Greece. He evacuated Thessaly as if defeated, and busied himself in securing his eastern and western frontiers. He was right in not setting much value on the support of Hellas, but he was wrong in not rousing in Greece a general war which should have hampered the movements of the Romans. The latter spent the rest of the year in making impossible any such rising, especially in the direction of Aetolia and Acarnania (171 B.C.).

Crassus was an incapable: to him succeeded others, Appius Claudius and Aulus Hostilius, consuls for 170 B.C., who attempted to penetrate into Macedonia respectively from the west and the south. Claudius was so severely handled in the mountains of Illyria and Dassaretia that he was reduced to inactivity, while Hostilius was equally unsuccessful in his efforts to force the passes of the Cambunian hills.

§ 6. The Senate became alarmed. It decreed special vows to heaven in the event of no further reverses, and, what was more to the purpose, it sent out as consul for 169 B.C. Quintus Marcius Philippus. This man had been bearer of the ultimatum to Perseus in 172 B.C., and had acquired a reputation for diplomacy by the manner in which he had deceived the king into inactivity until the Senate was ready for action. He proved himself successful as a

commander, more by the help of good fortune than skill. After reorganising the demoralised troops and putting an end to the pillaging by which all ranks alike were busied in making profit out of the wretched Greeks whom they called their allies, he crossed the mountains which divide Thessaly from Macedonia by a successful march of surpassing difficulty, and thereby turned Perseus' impregnable position above the Pass of Tempe. The king had chosen his position with admirable skill, and the five-mile-long gorge of the Peneus, the so-called Vale of Tempe, the only road by which Macedonia could safely be reached from Thessaly, was absolutely unassailable; but when Philippus appeared in the lowlands near Heraclea, after traversing the reputedly impassable mountains and forests to the west of Tempe, Perseus was outflanked and forced to retire northwards towards Pydna. Nevertheless, had the garrison of the Pass but done their duty, Philippus' army was in a fair way to being caught between two fires without the possibility of escape: for that general had indeed entered Macedonia, but he had forgotten to keep open his communications with Thessaly. Fortune saved him: the garrison of Tempe capitulated without a blow; but Perseus had taken up a second position, little less strong than the first, upon the river Enipeus (*Vythos*), and Philippus could advance no further. He maintained his ground however, and there went into winter-quarters to await the arrival of his successor, the consul for 168 B.C.

§ 7. This was Lucius Aemilius Paulus, a man who combined the old Roman virtues with all that was praiseworthy in the new Greek culture. He was "the only Roman to whom no man dared offer money." Consul in 181 B.C., he had been defeated by the Ligurians, and had avenged his defeat brilliantly; in Spain he had experienced a similar reverse and subsequent success. Younger and less capable men had outstripped him in the race for office, and he had for some years lived in retirement amongst his literary protégés, chief of whom was Terence. He was now, in the State's time of need, called again to the consulship which had been refused to him at a less perilous season; and at sixty years of age he undertook the conduct of the war

which had baffled the consuls of the last three years. He performed his task in fifteen days.

Meantime Philippos was making further use of his talents for diplomacy. Rome was weary of a policy which ruined other powers only for the aggrandisement of Pergamus and Rhodes; she was feeling her way towards the open avowal of a new policy which should transfer to herself the plunder of the nations she subdued. Already at the outbreak of the war the Rhodians were conscious of an impending change. Their suspicions were confirmed by the refusal of Rome to make use of the ships and men which the Rhodians and Pergamenes hastened to place at her disposal: clearly, the Senate desired to be under no further obligations to these allies, particularly now that the course of the war had altered for the better. That war damaged the Rhodians, for it caused a cessation of commerce, in particular of the timber and salt trades with Macedon, of which the Rhodians had practically a monopoly. They ventured to point out the fact to Philippos; whereupon the latter saw his way to furnishing the Senate with the excuse which it desired for interference with Rhodes. He gave the Rhodians to believe that their fleet made them formidable to Rome: they had but to offer their mediation between Rome and Macedon and the war would be brought to an end. The conceited Greeks believed the tale, and sent a pompous message to the Senate to the effect that, unless peace were speedily arranged, they would take their own measures towards compelling it. The Senate replied by stripping them of their recent acquisitions in Lycia and Caria, a forfeit representing a revenue of 120 talents yearly.

§ 8. Paulus could not venture to attack Perseus' position, but by keeping up a constant appearance of so doing, he gave to his *legatus* Scipio Nasica time to make a detour and surprise the fortress of Petra which guarded the road from Macedonia into Thessaly past the northern foot of Mount Olympus. Perseus' position was thus a second time turned, and he was forced to fall back upon Pydna (north of *Katerini*). Hither Paulus at once followed him, and here, on the 23rd of June, 168 B.C., was fought the battle of Pydna. The Macedonians fought bravely, but their first

success was the very cause of their ultimate defeat: they pressed upon the retreating Romans until they found themselves upon broken ground, which threw the phalanx into disorder. The Roman troops forced their way in wherever a gap occurred, and turned the battle into a bloody rout. Scarce a man of the phalanx escaped: of 43,000 troops of all arms, Perseus had not one at his command when he fled from the field to his capital of Pella. He would have resisted still, had his people stood by him; but the towns threw open their gates to Paulus, and Perseus was forced to take sanctuary with his queen and children at Samothrace (*Samothraki*). Thence he sent a letter begging for peace, and on receiving the reply that nothing would suffice save unconditional surrender, he gave himself up to the praetor Octavius, whose fleet lay off the island. He lived to grace Paulus' triumph; he died within five years' time, none knew how, a prisoner at Alba Fuentia in the land of the Marsi. Of his sons, the elder, Philip, soon followed him; the younger, Alexander, for many years made a living by working as a clerk in Alba.

§ 9. The settlement of Macedonia was left to Paulus and the customary commissioners (167 B.C.); the basis of their regulations being the determination of the Senate to prevent for ever the revival of the Macedonian monarchy, yet still to leave the country free. The entire land was divided into four cantons, between which there was to be henceforth neither trade nor intermarriage. There was to be no army save what small force sufficed to keep in check the barbarians of the northern frontier. All who were known to favour the late king's cause, or had held office under his rule, were deported to Italy and there kept in free custody. For the rest, the towns and cities retained their municipal liberty, their own laws and their own magistrates, with the one proviso that, in lieu of the taxes which they had before paid to the king, they should henceforth pay half the amount to Rome. The whole sum thus paid yearly was one hundred talents. Paulus did all he could to create the impression that the Romans had fought, not against the people of Macedonia, but against her king, and the people could surely not complain of ill-usage. Nevertheless, this settlement, seemingly

so mild, was of a nature to paralyse the nation for ever by destroying that free intercourse between the several parts of the land which alone creates unity and a national character.

Illyria was treated in the same way: it was split into three independent divisions, with the same restrictions as to intercourse, and with a similar imposition of a yearly contribution, amounting to the half of its former taxes while free. There was no plunder for the soldiery, and they murmured loudly; therefore Epirus was handed over to them to pillage, in requital for that long course of wavering which had culminated in its joining Perseus. Upon one and the same day seventy Roman companies appeared before the seventy cities of the Epirots, sacked and fired all, and made prisoners of 150,000 souls, who were forthwith sold into slavery; and though this hideous barbarity returned to each legionary 200 *denarii*, and twice that sum to each of the cavalry, yet the army were still so far from satisfied as to do their best to deprive Paulus of his triumph. He triumphed in 167 B.C., and so immense was the sum which he paid into the treasury, that, coupled with the annual revenue from Macedonia, it enabled the government to do away with the *tributum*, one of the two taxes which alone fell upon the citizens.¹ For three days the troops, spoils, and captives, defiled before the eyes of Rome. It was the greatest triumph she had yet seen and a fitting close to the wars which were not fought for plunder.² Henceforth money was to be the motive for all her conquests. We shall not hear of Paulus again. On the eve of his triumph died one of the two sons who still bore his name; the second followed within a few days. Two others he had, but these had passed by adoption into other households: one was now a Fabius: it is by the other that Paulus is best known, for this son was adopted by Scipio the son of Africanus Major, and is known to the world as Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Minor, the man who rased Carthage.

¹ The other was the *Vicesima manumissionis*, a tax of one-twentieth (*i.e.*, five per cent.) on the value of all slaves manumitted. It was not abolished until late in Imperial times.

² "Now was established," says Polybius, "the progressive extension of the Roman dominion" (III. 4).

§ 10. In the year of the battle of Pydna (168 B.C.), Antiochus Epiphanes, after five years of war, found himself all but master of Egypt,¹ where two sons of the late king, Ptolemy Philometor and Ptolemy Euergetes II. (surnamed the Fat), were rivals for the throne. The annexation of Egypt by Syria was a danger to Rome, for it would add immensely to the strength and resources of Antiochus, it would give him control over the Egyptian corn-supply which was yearly becoming more essential to the city, and it would above all interfere with the extension of Roman commerce in the eastern Mediterranean. The Senate accordingly, on the strength of its informal protectorate over Egypt, sent Popilius Laenas as its envoy to inform Antiochus that he would not be suffered to occupy Egypt. Popilius delivered his message with such blunt menace that Antiochus forthwith promised to quit Egypt, and did so. Evidently there was nothing for Rome to fear in the direction of Syria.

In 163 B.C. the joint Ptolemies quarrelled: Philometor, the elder, was expelled, and at once appealed to the Senate, and that body was able to restore him to his throne without a blow. The other, Euergetes, was allowed to retain the petty kingship of Cyrenaica.

§ 11. Meantime, the commissioners were busy with Pergamus and Rhodes. The Senate had altered its policy, as has been already explained: it had raised up those two powers to countervail the enmity of others; now that Syria and Macedonia had alike ceased to be feared, there was no longer any need for them. The loss of Lycia and Caria was not the greatest which the Rhodians suffered: they were by special clauses of the recent peace (168 B.C.) prohibited from supplying salt to Macedonia or purchasing timber there, while the trade of the eastern Mediterranean was taken out of their hands by the creation of a free and more central port at Delos under Athenian control. Within a few years Rhodian commerce was a thing of the past. It

¹ He had gained possession of the open country by the battle of Pelusium (170 B.C.), and the subsequent capture of the rightful king Philometor; but he was unable to take Alexandria, where Euergetes had been declared king. Both these were sons of Cleopatra, daughter of Antiochus the Great, and of Ptolemy Epiphanes, whom the Senate took under their protectorate in 191 B.C. On the withdrawal of Antiochus the two brothers agreed to reign conjointly; and on hearing this the Syrian again invaded Egypt, where Laenas met him.

is easy to see the influence of the Roman merchant-class in these arrangements, for the only fault of the Rhodians was their success in trade.

Eumenes lived to experience the miseries which his time-serving conduct had deserved. There was erected about him a circle of petty principedoms owing their positions to Roman generosity, and suffered, if not actually encouraged, to insult him. Thus Prusias of Bithynia was presented with the navy of the conquered Perseus: Paphlagonia, hitherto a Pergamene dependency, was declared independent; the Galatians, who had also been in dependence, invaded Eumenes' territory, and were shielded from his vengeance by the pretence of embassies which effected nothing; and finally the kings of Pontus were rendered more powerful by Rome, so as to serve as an additional menace to Pergamus. Eumenes would have paid yet another visit to the Senate to plead his case in person, but on landing at Brundisium (*Brindisi*) he was informed by a quaestor that, by a significant coincidence, there had just been passed a *Senatus consultum* forbidding foreign princes to have audiences in Rome. He died in 159 B.C.

§ 12. To Greece itself the overthrow of Macedonia brought no peace, for the Romanising party commenced to plunder and murder all who were suspected of anti-Roman leanings, and as always with such Reigns of Terror, the mere greed of plunder and personal animosity came to be the sole motives for violence. It was mainly to save them from their countrymen's violence that the Senate in 165 B.C. deported to Italy a thousand of the leading patriots of the Achaean League. The ostensible excuse was that an inquiry should be made into their conduct; but the exiles were quartered in out-of-the-way villages of the peninsula, and there forgotten for seventeen years, and their protests only met with the answer that they would find it best to remain quiet. Amongst them was Polybius the historian.



CHAPTER VII.

THE SUBJUGATION OF GREECE.

§ 1. The new policy of the Equites.—§ 2. Roman non-interference in Syria and Egypt.—§ 3. The Fourth Macedonian War.—§ 4. The Achaean War.—§ 5. Settlement of Greece.

§ 1. WITH the reorganisation of Macedonia and Illyria the Romans shook off the last of their hesitation, and fully realised the sweets of conquest: in the same year the legions talked of refusing a triumph to Paulus because his generalship had given to them too little spoil. The two facts are significant of a change of policy marking the decay of the rule of the Oligarchy: henceforth the criterion of all policy is to be its value in money; there is to be no more fighting for fighting's sake, or for the safety and honour of the Roman name, save in the extremest emergencies: if drawn at all, the sword is to be drawn in defence of moneyed interests, for the acquisition of new and wealthy lands to tax and plunder, or for the removal of any who ventured to compete with Roman merchants in the markets of the world. Henceforth the policy of the Oligarchy is money-making, and instead of the rule of the nobles—selfish indeed, but vigorous, and on the whole successful—we have that of the Equites. The Senate still rules in name, but the Equites are the wire-pullers. We have seen their influence in the downfall of Rhodes, and the humiliation of Egypt and Syria: we shall follow it now on a further and ever bolder course of injustice, oppression, and self-seeking. The new policy has two articles only—Monopoly and, consistently therewith, Peace at any price. War is detrimental to commerce; therefore there is war only

when monopoly demands it or security makes it imperative. Insults which even the nobles would have chastised with vigour are now ignored entirely: better to pocket pride and profits than spend time and money in the defence of so worthless an ideal as honour. There must no longer be mere safe-guarding of the peninsula, no longer that policy of protection of which the one aim was to prevent the rise of dangerous neighbours: henceforth there is to be annexation. The end was the profits which accrue from subject nations and the undisputed commerce of the world; the means were of the basest so long as they were also of the cheapest.

Why did the nobles concur in this policy? Because the itch for wealth was upon them too; because, themselves precluded from the profits of commerce, their dealings as secret shareholders in Equestrian companies identified the interests of the two orders; because the rising spirit of the popular party made such an alliance still more necessary; because the new style of living rapidly exhausted the richest estate that was not made to multiply by investment; and because the same self-indulgent Hellenism dreaded every exertion and every risk, and made each succeeding generation more unwarlike and indolent and incapable than the last.

§ 2. It was in the East that this new principle of *laissez faire* was first exemplified. Antiochus Epiphanes died in 163 B.C., and his son Antiochus Eupator, being only a minor, was placed under the guardianship of Cnaeus Octavius. In the following year (162 B.C.) one Demetrius murdered Octavius and usurped the throne, to which, incredible as it might seem, the Senate acknowledged his right. In the same year the two Ptolemies were again at war for the possession of Cyprus. Rome did not interfere except to send the customary embassy, and the island eventually remained a dependency of Philometor of Egypt. In 161 B.C. occurred the great revolt of the Jews under the Maccabees against the domination of Syria. The Senate so far listened to their appeal for protection as to make a treaty with them, but beyond this nothing further was done.

§ 3. In dividing Macedonia into four divisions the Senate

had sought successfully to enfeeble the country by disunion. So miserable was the state of affairs that thence, as from Africa, repeated embassies had been sent to Rome to plead for interference and for a more satisfactory settlement. In 151 B.C. the Macedonians had invited Scipio to settle their differences, but he had preferred to go to Spain with Lucullus; and somewhat later the nation heard of a pretender to its throne—one Andriscus, a fuller of Adramyttium in Mysia, who professed to be Philip, that son of Perseus who was known to have died at Alba. This man threw himself on the support of Demetrius, now King of Syria, and was by him betrayed and sent to Rome, where he was so carelessly guarded that he escaped to Thrace 149 B.C. He was now more successful. He defeated and killed Juventius Thalna the praetor, and made himself master of all Macedonia and of most of Thessaly. It was not until the close of 148 B.C. that the new praetor, Q. Caecilius Metellus, assisted by the navy of Attalus II. of Pergamus, drove him out and compelled Byzes of Thrace, with whom he had taken refuge, to give him up. With the exception of an insignificant outbreak in 142 B.C., when another pretended son of Perseus made his appearance, the country caused no further trouble to Rome. Macedonia was reorganised as a province, not as a mere dependent state. To it were attached the Roman possessions in Epirus as far as Scodra, and the islands off that coast; and the praetor who annually took up the government was regarded also as the overlord of Southern Greece. The tribute remained as it had been settled by Paulus in 168 B.C., and the towns were suffered to retain their own local government; but the four confederacies and their synods disappeared, and henceforth there was no national power of Macedonia. The road, already an old trade-route, from Dyrrhachium (*Durazzo*) to Thessalonica (*Saloniki*), henceforth served as a military road, and received the name of the *Via Egnatia*.

Such treatment was unjust, for the Macedonians had lent no support to Andriscus and had done what they could to resist him; but it was what the Equites desired, for it gave over to Roman trade the entire wealth and fertility of the land. The *publicani* fell upon it at once, and the success of

their initial extortions here gave a fatal impulse to their future greed. Had the Senate fulfilled the terms of its own arrangement, and protected its subjects from injustice, Macedonia would have been in far better case than either in its fourfold disunion or even in the so-called liberty of its regal days; but the Senate only connived at extortions which its own members shared, and the unhappy country continued to be amongst the foremost, as it was the earliest, of hunting-grounds for greedy governors and greedier *publicani*.

§ 4. At once the Equites followed up their new policy. While already hounding on the legions against the obstinate despair of Carthage, they saw an easier prey within their reach: Corinth was the centre of Grecian trade, and, from her position on the Isthmus, the medium of all traffic between the east and west, and so she would continue to be while her harbours were open and while Greece was free.

It is not too much to say that they fomented the war which was to achieve the desired end, just as they had done in Africa, and the character of the Greeks was such as to require but little incentive to offence. Since the fall of Perseus the Achæan League had gathered new confidence, and when in 150 B.C. the Senate at length consented to restore the three hundred survivors of the thousand hostages deported to Italy in 165 B.C., they came back to inflame with resentment the already restless Greeks. In the year 149 B.C. Diaeus was president of the League, and in order to conceal some misdoings of his own he induced the Achæans to attack Sparta. The Spartans appealed to Rome: the Achæans did the same: but the Senate would not give a direct answer, and only promised to send an embassy which would decide the matters in question. In 148 B.C., notwithstanding the protest of Metellus who was in Macedonia, Damocritus, the Achæan general, invaded Laconia and defeated the Spartans. The next year (147 B.C.) the long-expected embassy was sent to Greece. It brought a decree of the Senate that the League should be broken up, and that Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Orchomenus, and Heraclea were to be independent. On hearing this the Achæan assembly at Corinth broke out into bitter denunciations of

Rome, and the chief of the envoys barely escaped ill-usage. A second embassy, headed by Sextus Julius Caesar, was more moderate in its demands, and tried hard to patch up a peace between the League and Sparta. All these efforts were in vain. Critolaus, the new president of the League, urged his fellow-Greeks to war, averring that the troubles in Africa and Spain were already beyond Rome's control, and that the opportunity must not be lost.

In the spring of 146 B.C. Metellus sent envoys to bid the Greeks refrain from attacking Sparta. The vehemence of Critolaus moved the meeting of the Achaean League at Corinth to fury. War was at once declared against Sparta, but as that city offered no resistance the forces of the League were moved into Thessaly to reduce Heraclea (or Oeta) to submission, that town having taken advantage of the Senate's orders to declare itself independent of the League. Metellus moved southward to protect it, and on the mere report of his approach the Greek army fled so speedily that it was already in Locris when the praetor overtook it. There, at Scarpheia (not far from Thermopylae), he utterly routed it; few reached Peloponnesus, and Critolaus was never seen again. Diaeus resumed the command, enlisted 16,000 slaves, and endeavoured to stimulate patriotism by murdering all who spoke for peace. Before Metellus could strike again the consul L. Mummius arrived on the Isthmus, and gave battle at Leucopetra. The Achaean army fled with but little resistance—it was not half so numerous as that of Mummius—and with it Corinth fell without a blow into the consul's hands. He removed all the famous works of art from the city, and reduced it to ashes (146 B.C.), and for this easy victory he took the usual *agnomen*—Achaicus.

§ 5. Whether Achaëa—that is, Greece—now became technically a province is disputed; certainly it did so in all but name. The towns were isolated, intercourse forbidden, and all semblance of the League suppressed; the supremacy in administration and justice was vested in the Praetor of Macedonia, and each community paid a fixed *stipendium* for the soil it cultivated. Nevertheless, they remained “free” in so far that they possessed still their own laws and were

governed by their own citizens, from whom were elected oligarchic councils which everywhere replaced the old republican governments. Only isolated districts like that of Corinth, and parts of Boeotia and Euboea, became domain-land of the Romans.

In Corinth fell yet another rival to the monopolies of Roman commerce, for that city had been from ancient times the centre of Grecian trade, for which indeed her position, commanding the Aegean and Ionian seas alike, fitted her admirably. Her traders now transferred their activities to the new mart already established by the Romans at Delos to rival the commercial powers of the Rhodian League. In the same year Illyria was likewise reduced to the condition of a province.

The year 146 B.C. witnessed the triumphs of Mummius and Scipio, each for the destruction of "a city of ancient fame." Mummius was a Roman of the old school, harsh but honest; he got little wealth from his campaign, and died so poor that the State dowered his daughters. He believed he did his duty—emulated Scipio, perhaps—in rasing Corinth; and he flooded Rome and the neighbouring towns with the masterpieces of Greek painting, sculpture, bronze-working, and pottery, giving a fresh and mighty impulse to the rapid inroads of Hellenism. Few pitied the city that was the victim of his triumph: both he and his troops knew the value of plunder, although it serves the turn of a later-day moralist to speak of the conqueror and his men as ignorant innocents who then for the first time set eyes upon the wonders of Grecian culture—

"Tunc rudis, et Graias mirari nescius artes,
... miles."

Exactly a century later Julius Caesar raised Corinth once more from her ashes, and colonised her site with his veterans; and her rapid return to splendour showed the futility of the Equites' selfish struggle against the laws of geographical evolution.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE.

- § 1. Quarrel between Carthage and Numidia.—§ 2. Roman Jealousy
—§ 3. Outbreak of the Third Punic War.—§ 4. Site of Carthage.
—§ 5. The Campaign of 148 B.C.—§ 6. Fall of Carthage.—§ 7.
Settlement of Africa.

§ 1. BY the peace of Zama (201 B.C.), Syphax king of the Massaesyli (*Oran* and *Algiers*) had been set aside, and his kingdom given to Rome's ally Massinissa king of the Massyli (*Province of Constantine*), in order that this prince, owing his crown and its continuance to Roman patronage, might stand as the rival of Carthage and a spy upon her every act. Massinissa was well aware of the purpose for which he was made a client of the Senate, and he fulfilled it to the letter. Under the veil of native patriotism he fanned into vigorous flame the hatred with which the Libyan tribes regarded their late oppressors, while at the same time, by introducing more settled modes of life amongst his subjects, he gave to his kingdom a solidity and strength heretofore unknown amongst the African peoples. Carthage was by treaty forbidden to make war upon Rome's allies, and could but look sullenly on at the growing strength and insolence of these neighbours whose wishes and interests alike prompted them to aggressions upon the conquered Carthaginians. Partly by winning over the native tribes, partly by armed force, Massinissa extended his rule over the larger proportion of the territories left to Carthage, and completely encircled the city on the landward side. The Carthaginians did what they could—sent embassies to complain before the Senate; but that body, without perhaps

in the earlier days wishing to see Carthage destroyed, yet allowed her wrongs to go unchecked. So long as they were busy with wars in the East they contented themselves with making promises of redress which they never meant to keep, for there was ever present to their minds the danger that Carthage might once again rise in arms and unite with Philip or Perseus or Antiochus—a fear not altogether groundless, as has been seen. When the danger was past, there was no longer any pretext at concealment of their approval of Massinissa's conduct.

§ 2. Hannibal rescued his countrymen from the results of the defeat which they had brought upon him, and reformed the government, but his activity led to his exile. His reforms bore fruit when their author was banished: already, in 195 B.C., Carthage had found herself rich enough to offer to pay down in one sum the remainder of the war-indemnity due to Rome, and the Senate heard with misgivings other accounts of her returning strength. The national bent for commerce still found scope, and the Carthaginian merchantmen again crowded the seas as before and ventured to rival those of Rome. This was the great offence: the Equites would brook no rivalry, and they harped incessantly upon the fears of the nobles. Amongst the latter there were two parties: one, headed by the Scipios, was content to see Carthage prosperous so long as she was peaceful: the other, led by Cato, cherished an almost puerile fear of the nation which had reared Hannibal. This was the party which had persecuted Hannibal and forced him to exile, and now it threw itself entirely into the arms of the Equites. At some date between the years 171 and 157 B.C., Cato had acted as an envoy upon one of the many embassies which constantly passed to and fro between Africa and Rome, and he had seen in their reality the signs of that renewed vigour which he had all along dreaded. Thenceforth, no matter what the question upon which he was called to speak in the Senate, his invariable epilogue was *Delenda est Carthago*, until at last he had roused in all men's minds a terror like his own.

And still Carthage endured alike senatorial deceptions and Numidian insults, with such patience as marks the Semitic

peoples. She was aware of her peril, but disunion prevented her acting while there was yet time. One party desired to establish a united Numido-Phoenician Empire; another, that of the patriots, would throw off the yokes of Rome and Massinissa alike; a third, the party of that same selfish nobility which had thwarted Hannibal, was bent only on maintaining its own supremacy by the meanest submission to the Senate. There were times when Macedon, Greece, Asia, Egypt, and Spain, might each or even all have been roused to one united effort for the overthrow of Rome; but the opportunities were let slip one by one, so that when patience at last gave way to despair, Carthage was left to struggle alone.

§ 3. In 193 B.C. Massinissa seized the port of Emporiae and the province of the Lesser Syrtis, and his attitude for the next forty years was one of persistent aggression. In 154 B.C. a section of the patriotic party headed by Hasdrubal came to the front, expelled the Numidian party, and when Massinissa attempted to restore these fugitives, resisted him by force of arms (150 B.C.). In so doing they broke the treaty with Rome by warring against an ally of that city. Although assisted by some Numidians who had revolted from Massinissa, they were not successful: Hasdrubal was incapable, and suffered himself to be routed by an inferior force. After some further conflicts the Carthaginian army was blockaded in the desert and forced to surrender at discretion. Massinissa now seemed to have Carthage at his mercy, but the Romans resolved to interfere, and the Carthaginians in a panic put the leaders of the war party to death, and sent commissioners to Rome offering to make any reparation for their violation of the treaty. The consular armies for 149 B.C., were already armed under the command of Lucius Marcius Censorinus. The envoys offered to submit unconditionally, and were promised their liberty and possessions provided that they surrendered three hundred of their noblest children as hostages and awaited the further orders of the consul on his appearance in Africa. The keener-sighted of them knew what was meant by these last words, but they surrendered the required hostages and still hoped on. The consul, to whom Utica had at once opened its

gates, bade them next give up all their munitions of war : two thousand catapults and two hundred thousand stand of arms were handed over. Finally he bade them quit their city and withdraw to a new site ten miles from the sea. To quit the coast was to lose their commerce—all that was left to them. As one man they flew to arms, tore in pieces all who spoke of surrender, and strained every nerve to replace the munitions so treacherously lost. When, after thirty days, the consul appeared before the walls, he found them manned and armed anew ; where he had expected instant submission, he found that he must lay siege to one of the strongest cities in the world.

§ 4. Carthage occupied the extremity of a kind of headland running eastward into the Mediterranean, indented deeply on either side by lagoons, so that the neck of the peninsula, across which ran the outer wall of the city, was of but narrow width. In addition to this outer wall, there was a triple interior wall, so thick and lofty as to embrace within itself stalls for three hundred elephants, stabling for ten times that number of horses, barracks, store rooms, and magazines of all kinds. It was at its lowest part forty-five feet in height ; and this measurement was increased by lofty battlements and still loftier towers. Within this inner wall lay the citadel, Byrsa, fortified with equal strength, and commanding from its elevation the outer waters of the Gulf of Tunes and the inner area of the southern lagoon, the Lake of Tunes, alike ; while close beneath its eastern walls lay the two harbours of the city, the one known as the Mercantile Harbour being a natural basin, the other, the Cothon, a huge artificial dock of circular form, built to accommodate a navy of two hundred and twenty sail, and having in its centre a small round island where was the residence of the admiral. On the seaward sides alone was Carthage even partially assailable ; and it was from the Lake of Tunes, on the southern side of the city, that Censorinus led his attack, while Manius Manilius commanded the army which lay in front of the outer wall for the purpose of cutting off all supplies from the landward or western side.

§ 5. The year passed without material success on either

side. The Carthaginian generals Himilco Phameas, and Hasdrubal, a grandson of Massinissa, showed themselves energetic; and Massinissa, who had hoped to win Carthage for himself, declined to send up to the consul the reinforcements which were desired. When he died, towards the end of the year, the royal power was divided between three of his sons, Micipsa, Gulussa, and Mastanabal. Of these Gulussa, who had the command of the army, furnished a strong force of cavalry to the Romans; but beyond this advantage, and the desertion of Himilco Phameas to Scipio Aemilianus, who was serving under Censorinus as a tribune, there was nothing gained when L. Piso, consul, took over the command in 148 B.C. He proved no more successful than his predecessor. The siege of Carthage was practically given up, and two of the Numidian princes, Micipsa and Mastanabal, showed signs of discontent. Moreover, the outbreak of another Macedonian war made the Senate uneasy. They required little inducement to allow the election of Scipio to the consulship in order that he might end the war; though, by the *Lex Annalis* of 180 B.C., he was ineligible for that office, being only thirty-seven years of age, and although he was a candidate for the aedileship only.

§ 6. Early in 147 B.C. the new commander arrived in Africa, just in time to rescue the forces of Mancinus, the Roman admiral, from destruction. He soon restored discipline and confidence, justifying the latter by the speedy surprise of Megara, a suburb at the north-west angle of the city, and by constructing a huge mole to block the entrance of the Mercantile Harbour, into which the light vessels of Bithyas, a Numidian chief, contrived continually to carry supplies in spite of the vigilance of the fleet. At the very moment when the mole was completed the Carthaginians opened a new outlet from the Cothon eastwards to the sea, and it was owing to their own remissness that they did not at once attack and destroy the unprepared Roman fleet. When at last they gave battle they were too crowded to manœuvre with success, and were defeated with heavy loss. The blockade was securely established; famine completed the struggle. In the spring of 146 B.C. C. Laelius, the friend of Scipio and now acting as his admiral, forced his way into

the Cothon, while at the same time the triple wall was carried because there was no longer strength to man it. The remnant of the populace, after fighting from roof to roof, were driven by the flames of the burning city into the Byrsa and there surrendered. Hasdrubal, seeing that further resistance was useless, threw himself on Scipio's mercy, while his wife slew herself and her children. The city was rased; not one stone was left upon another. The very site was cursed by Scipio, and when Caius Gracchus endeavoured to recolonise it twenty-four years later, his failure was attributed to that curse. Under Augustus it was once again peopled, and the Carthage of the Emperors was little less populous, if less strong, than Tyrian Carthage, which thus fell utterly seven hundred and seven years after its reputed foundation.

§ 7. The territory of Carthage became the Roman province of Africa, governed by an annually appointed proconsul. It needed but slight defence, for the allied kingdoms of the three sons of Massinissa—Gulussa, Micipsa, and Mastanabal—who had divided their father's inheritance, encircled it and protected it from assault by land. Such towns as had aided Rome, including Utica, became free cities; such as had submitted during the course of the war became tributaries paying an annual *stipendium* for the lands still left to them and retaining their own local government; all such as had held out to the last, like Carthage, were rased, and their territory leased to tenants as Roman domain-lands. The place of Carthage as a commercial centre was taken for the present by Utica.

The fall of Carthage left the Roman Equites without a rival in the Western seas, and poured into their purses all the wealth of Africa, rich crops of grain and wine and fruits, precious marbles from Atlas, valuable citron woods and ivory, and the produce of the entire slave-market of Numidia and Mauretania. Herein the younger Scipio completed his grandfather's work, and like him won the name of Africanus. Cato had not lived to see his hopes fulfilled: he had died in 149 B.C.

CHAPTER IX.

THE WARS AGAINST VIRIATHUS AND NUMANTIA.

§ 1. Outbreak of War with the Spanish Tribes.—§ 2. The Massacre of Galba.—§ 3. The War with Viriathus.—§ 4. Submission of Hispania Ulterior.—§ 5. The War in Hispania Citerior.—§ 6. The Siege of Numantia.—§ 7. The Slave War in Sicily.

§ 1. IN striking contrast to the ease of other conquests was the history of the Roman arms in Spain, where war again broke out in 153 B.C.

For sixteen years the Pacification of Gracchus (178 B.C.) remained a reality, although the extortions of the praetors provoked numerous complaints, and two were even compelled (171 B.C.) to go into exile to escape condemnation by a specially appointed senatorial commission. At length the Belli, a Celtiberian tribe, were reported to be fortifying their capital of Segeda, contrary to the terms of Gracchus' peace, and uniting with it several neighbouring townships. Bidden to desist, they declined, allied themselves with the neighbouring Arevaci about the head waters of the Durus (*Douro*), and successfully beat off the forces of Q. Fulvius Nobilior, consul, 153 B.C., inflicting on the Romans a loss of six thousand men. In order to commence the campaign the sooner, Fulvius and his colleagues had entered office on January 1st, instead of on March 15th, heretofore the usual date; and from henceforward the solar and civil year coincided. Fulvius was thrice routed, with the loss of ten thousand men, and Further Spain joined the revolt: Terentius Varro was defeated and slain, and the succeeding praetor, Mummius, the conqueror of Corinth, lost (in 152 B.C.) nine thousand citizen troops before he could assert his authority

against the Lusitanians. Matters went rather better in the next year, owing to feuds amongst the Spaniards themselves, whereby the submission proffered by the Numantines and others was declined by the Senate on the representations of other tribes. The Celtiberi, however, purchased peace from the consul Marcellus for six hundred talents of silver, and when Lucullus, the consul for 151 B.C., arrived, he found no opportunity of fighting. The levying of his legions had given rise to extraordinary scenes in Rome, where the citizens had come to dread the dangers of the Spanish war. Men declined to enlist, the consuls endeavoured to constrain them, the tribunes supported the recalcitrants and arrested the consuls. The difficulty was only solved by Scipio Africanus, who volunteered to serve as a tribune or *legatus* in the army of Lucullus, and by his reputation drew together the requisite number of troops. Lucullus, like most other commanders of this era, looked on war only as a means to wealth. To go home without fighting was to return without booty. Accordingly, as the Celtiberi were protected by treaty, he attacked the Vaccaei without excuse or authority, sacked Cauca (*Coca*) on its capitulation upon terms, and murdered its twenty thousand defenders. He then advanced upon Intercatia, which was induced to surrender to Scipio; and finally, after an assault on Pallantia, north of the Durius, was forced to retreat ignominiously.

§ 2. In 151 B.C. Servius Sulpicius Galba, praetor designate of Further Spain, rescued the praetor M. Atilius Suranus from the Lusitani, but was defeated immediately after with the loss of 7000 men at Carmene. In the next year, when praetor, he revenged himself by an act similar to that of Lucullus at Cauca: having induced the Lusitani, on the promise of settling them peacefully in new lands, to assemble in three bands at an appointed time, he attacked each band separately while unarmed, and massacred all with the exception of seventeen persons. Galba was impeached on his return, but acquitted, in spite of the indignant eloquence of the aged Cato: the wealth of the murdered Spaniards was more than enough to buy him off.

§ 3. Amongst the fugitives from Galba's massacre of

the Lusitani was one Viriathus, distinguished by an activity and courage that was national, by a genius for command which the Romans rarely found in an enemy, especially a barbaric one. It is in 149 B.C. that this man comes forward as the leader of the Lusitani, at a time when Rome was too busy in Africa and Macedonia to spend much energy on the Spanish wars, always unpopular with the legions, popular only with commanders who could find no other field for plunder.

Vetilius, praetor in this year, followed up the remnant of the Lusitani until they were on the eve of surrender on the promise of being settled on new lands. Viriathus, one of their number, warned his countrymen to beware of Roman promises: he bade them remember how Galba had kept faith with them, and offered to lead them to a place of safety if they would follow him. They did so. Viriathus kept in play the entire Roman army with a handful of horsemen, while the rest of his countrymen made good their flight to Tribola, where he shortly joined them. This first success gave him an immediate influence. He surprised Vetilius and drove him off with a loss of 4000 Roman troops, forcing him to retire into winter quarters while it was yet summer. The same fortune met the efforts of C. Plautius, 148 B.C., and his successors Claudius Unimanus and C. Nigidius. The whole of Spain south of the Hiberus was ravaged by this guerilla chief, whose successes drew new forces continually to his standards, and whose bearing attached them all to him by simple affection. The legions were utterly demoralised: three hundred Lusitani drove off a thousand Romans with a loss of a third of their number. One Spaniard, straggling, was beset by the remaining seven hundred: his prowess kept them all at bay, and he escaped on foot and at walking pace.

§ 4. In 145 B.C. the Senate made a new effort to retrieve its disgraces. Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus and C. Laelius went respectively to Further and Hither Spain. The former was the elder brother of Scipio Africanus—that is, each was an Aemilius, son of the victor of Pydna, but become one a Cornelius, the other a Fabius, by adoption. Fabius found great difficulty in raising two legions for so distasteful

a service, and when raised they consisted of men untried and young. He spent a whole year in training this force, and in restoring the courage and discipline of his men; then, as proconsul, he advanced into Lusitania and gained some successes, though the Arevaci of Numantia broke out into rebellion (144 B.C.). Fabius' successor, Quinctius, was utterly foiled, and Viriathus again overran the whole of Further Spain (143 B.C.); and finally the consul Fabius Servilianus, who succeeded Quinctius, was, after alternate reverses and successes (142 B.C.), defeated and forced to make peace with Viriathus, acknowledging him as an independent chief (141 B.C.). The treaty was ratified by the Roman government, but as though they had not yet had enough of disasters in Spain, the Senate allowed Q. Servilius Caepio, consul 140 B.C., to resume the war. Viriathus' forces were now few; he was compelled to offer terms, but the negotiations were interrupted by a violent mutiny of the legions who threatened Caepio's life. That general now resorted to the aid of bribery: he induced some of Viriathus' friends to murder him. The Lusitani held out for another year under a new leader named Tautamus, but he lacked the genius of the lost chief, and on his falling in battle (139 B.C.) they made peace. So ended for the present the wars in Further Spain.

§ 5. There still remained a fierce struggle in Hither Spain where the commencement of the Numantine War is dated usually from the revolt of the Arevaci already mentioned (144 B.C.). In 143 B.C. the consul Q. Metellus Macedonicus (the conqueror of the pseudo-Philip) defeated the tribe, and followed up his victory by laying siege to Contrebia, which he took after some loss. Q. Pompeius, consul, succeeded him in 141 B.C., and was beaten at every point until he consented to treat with the Numantines. The envoys arrived in the Roman camp shortly after the coming of the consul for 139 B.C., Popilius Laenas; and Pompeius, ashamed of his conduct, disowned the treaty. The case was referred to the Senate, and Pompeius narrowly escaped being given up, like those who made the treaty of Furculae Caudinae, since the State was resolved not to recognise the treaty. The war continued. In 137 B.C. C. Hostilius Mancinus the

consul was again driven from his lines about Numantia, and after a fruitless attempt to escape was compelled, like Pompeius, to offer terms to which he swore adhesion, though the Spaniards would not trust him until his quaestor Tiberius Gracchus had done the same. They respected Gracchus for the sake of his father, the Pacifier of Spain. Mancinus was at once recalled, and the other consul, M. Aemilius Lepidus, disappointed to find the war over, attacked the Vaccaeï without authority, as Volso had attacked the Galatians. His excuse was that they had sent supplies to Numantia. He was routed with the loss of 6,000 men, was recalled, and fined.

Meantime Mancinus had been indicted for his conduct in making peace without the sanction of the Senate and people. In spite of the oath, the Senate refused to acknowledge the agreement; Mancinus was condemned to be given up to the Numantines, who refused to receive him. Gracchus was saved from the same ignominy by the vote of the people. For three more years the useless struggle went on, the difficulty of levying legions for the war grew annually greater, and in 134 B.C. the state played its last card by entrusting the command to Scipio.

§ 6. Only the great personal influence of Scipio induced volunteers to come forward. What few men Italy could supply were needed in Sicily, where the slave war was in full career, and Scipio refused to take any who were levied against their will. He took also a picked company of his clients, whom he formed into a body-guard from which sprang the famous Praetorians of the Empire, taking their name from their duty of guarding their commander's tent, the *Praetorium*. Micipsa, one of the sons of Massinissa, sent him men and elephants. Among those serving under him were Jugurtha the Numidian, the famous C. Marius, and Lucilius the satirist.

Many months were spent in restoring discipline in the old Spanish legions and in drilling the new. Scipio was determined to reduce Numantia not by siege but by blockade. Having ravaged all the surrounding district, and so cut off all supplies, he drew his lines round the town, never accepting battle though it was often offered. At the close

of 133 B.C. the town fell. The few who had still maintained life by eating the bodies of their dead countrymen refused to surrender; they fired the town and perished almost to a man. In Scipio's triumph of 132 B.C. there walked but fifty Numantine captives, and these had been taken prisoners during the course of the siege. Ten commissioners from the Senate aided the conqueror in settling the provinces of Spain, which soon became more Roman than any other of the dependent countries. Only on the north and north-west survived some small tribes who still refused to accept the yoke of Rome. The conquest had been disastrous, marred by defeats and acts of disgraceful treachery and cruelty, a long list of horrors; but it was effectual. Until Sertorius (80 B.C.) transferred to Spanish soil the party quarrels of Rome, the peninsula lay quiet and prosperous, for the far-away Cantabri and their fellows were too few and weak to disturb the peace of the lowlands where the Romans settled.

§ 7. While the government thus feebly and tardily asserted itself abroad, fresh troubles had arisen at home, where the inherent evils of a slave-owning community had already reached their gravest form. We shall have to speak in another chapter of the economic causes and results of the employment of slave labour in Italy and Sicily: for the present it will be enough to say that, while slaves were in Italy more generally employed only as herdsmen, in Sicily on the contrary they were employed also in the cultivation of corn-lands and were consequently far more numerous. As a rule, slave labour is, and was, useless for anything but the most mechanical drudgery, but in fertile Sicily the soil was so generous that it needed only hands to sow the seed and reap the harvest. Nature did the rest: what she could not do even slaves were capable of doing adequately, though on the less fertile lands of Italy there was required the constant attendance and labour of free-men to win any return from the soil. Sicily was peopled with slaves. There they toiled in gangs chained neck and neck together, housed at night in sheds fit only for cattle, starved, overworked, tortured for a whim or murdered for a jest, their bodies thrown into their master's fishponds to feed the eels which would to-morrow be served at his table.

A slave had no rights, and the Romans—least of all, the large landowners of equestrian rank—were little inclined to be merciful and indulgent. Even Cato, an honest man and conscientious for a Roman, sold his worn-out slaves in the market—it does not do to ask for what end. But even slaves had passions—passions ensavaged by cruelty into the likeness of those of a wild beast. The Roman knew and owned that he had “as many foes as slaves.”

Already the State had found it needful to put down slave risings on some six occasions,¹ yet no effort had been made to check their cause and so cure the disease. In 135 B.C. the slaves were more numerous than ever, and doubtless more oppressed, for cruelty grows with indulgence. One Damophilus of Enna drove his 400 slaves to rebellion. They murdered him, seized the town, summoned their *confrères* to join them, and soon 200,000 ruffians, brutalised by ill-treatment, held possession of the length and breadth of Sicily, headed by Eunus, a Syrian juggler, and his abettors, Cleon and Achaeus. Responsive risings occurred in Italy; but fortunately the Straits of Messina shut off the one party from the other. Lucius Hypsaesus and three other praetors were defeated, and the same fate met even the consul, C. Fulvius, on his first arrival. Then L. Piso raised the sieges of Messina and Tauromenium and saved the island, 134 B.C., and the war became a mere man-hunt, for there was no idea of organisation in the servile host. By the close of 132 B.C. the last of their number was executed as the rest had been. One consul alone, P. Rupilius, had crucified 20,000 of his prisoners. Eunus, who had styled himself “King Antiochus,” was captured, and died in prison.

¹ There had been isolated disturbances in Bruttium and Lucania amongst the populace reduced to serfdom after the Punic War (see below, p. 94); and the danger of such risings was so real that for many years there was annually a large force under arms in those districts. There had also been risings in Etruria, the home of a peculiarly arduous and brutal form of slavery; and as recently as 139 B.C. there had been a rising in Sicily.

CHAPTER X.

RELIGION.

§ 1. Introduction of Foreign Elements into Religion.—§ 2. The Bacchanalia and the Decree of 186 B.C.—§ 3. Religion as a Political Weapon of the Government.—§ 4. Decay of Religious Sentiment.—§ 5. The Visit of Carneades.

§ 1. THE old national religion of Italy was neither beautiful nor demonstrative ; albeit the religion of a people with no power for abstract thought, it was itself a religion of abstractions. The gods of the Italians were powers only, not simply creatures with human traits and features and super-human powers, as were the concrete deities of the Greeks. They were in the main gods of abstractions such as virtue and wisdom, or rural and agricultural deities—gods of the seasons, the crops, the flocks, and the various operations of husbandry ; and their worship was grave and unimpassioned, without the imagination which makes either the saint or the fanatic, yet wholly sincere, all-pervading, and bound up with the very existence of the household and the State. A Roman believed that gods and government were inseparable : when he conquered a city he believed that he conquered and took to himself its deities no less than its spoils.

It followed that his conquest of the world meant his acceptance of every creed of the conquered. The influence of Hellenism had already found analogues in the Roman Pantheon for all the great gods of the Greek Olympus, before ever the Roman legions overran Greece ; thereafter was transferred to the Roman divinities the entire mass of mythology, attributes and ceremonials of their Hellenic counterparts, and when the conquerors came into contact with any deity heretofore unrecognised in Rome, such deity

was not seldom installed out of hand amongst the divinities of the city.

There were numerous other motives for such tolerance, besides the fundamental Italian identification of creed and state, or the Roman predilection for all things Hellenic. In the first place, vulgar superstition was abetted by the sensuality of the Eastern form of worship, which offered great attractions to a people who had hitherto suppressed their love of excitement, but found its indulgence pleasant under the guise of a debt to conscience. In the second place, the old Italian gods were falling into oblivion, partly because of their becoming gradually Hellenised, but more because of the rapid disappearance of that free agricultural population to whom they had been real and serious objects of reverence. Thirdly, these alien divinities, with their very human attributes and very human cults; were so much more comprehensible to an unimaginative people like the Italians. And fourthly, the influx of so many foreigners to Rome made the influx of foreign deities an inevitable consequence.

There were other reasons too, both political and personal: the introduction of such a cult as that of *Magna Mater* furnished the government with a seemly excuse for earning a little cheap popularity by the institution of new games and festivals, while it also furnished the nobility with a wide and fashionable field for public munificence, in the building of new temples; and finally, it flattered the national vanity to see all the world's deities collected beneath the dominant shadow of the national Jupiter of the Capitol. Thus might argue those who sought excuses for Rome's desertion of the faith of her fathers; for the populace it was enough that these new creeds meant new and specious opportunities for indulgence, licence, excitement, and vice. So vicious were some of these cults that the Senate had repeatedly to interfere on behalf of morality, notably in the cases of the cults of the Egyptian *Isis* and of *Bacchus*.¹

§ 2. In the year 186 B.C., the Government, and indeed the whole State, was thrown into a condition of gravest alarm by the discovery accidentally made, that the worship of

¹ Temples of *Isis* and *Serapis* at Rome were destroyed by order of the Senate as early as 220 B.C.

Bacchus had established itself secretly throughout Italy. Of Oriental origin, and characterised by so flagrant a disregard for all decency and morality that the very name of its ceremonial had become a byword, this cult had early made its way into Greece, and from thence passed into Italy, where it speedily found proselytes in plenty. Without delay was issued the famous decree *De Bacchanalibus*, visiting with death all males who had become converts to the abominable thing, handing over all female converts to the mercy of the family tribunal according to Roman law, and giving to the consuls and their officers fullest powers to hunt out and punish the offenders. Copies of the decree were sent to all the cities of Italy, and the Senate and magistrates of each commanded to enforce its provisions—a striking instance of the summary way in which Rome treated her allies. Undoubtedly the real question at stake was the right of secret meeting, but the question of morality was not yet utterly ignored: at any rate, the result of the decree was the execution of 7000 persons in Rome alone, the flight of many more, a plausible vindication of morality, and the publication of a further decree forbidding the secret assembly of more than five persons at a time for the purposes of religious observance. The cult of Bacchus was scotched for the moment, but within ten years' time it was again in full vigour in many parts of Italy.¹

§ 3. Religion was converted also into a most valuable means of government. No political or public measure could be undertaken without first consulting the omens, a process pertaining exclusively to the great religious Colleges of Pontiffs and Augurs. Originally solely patrician, these had been gradually thrown open to the plebeians; but, like every other office of value, they had now passed into the hands of the ruling class, the nobility, and therefore could be trusted to interpret their omens and portents and Sibylline leaves alike in the interests of the nobles. The populace had made efforts to weaken the power of this weapon by transferring to themselves the right of filling up vacancies in the colleges, in lieu of the old system of co-optation, whereby

¹ The text of this decree (N.B.—it was not a *lex*) is inscribed upon a brazen tablet discovered in Calabria, A.D. 1640.

any vacancy in the circle of a *Collegium* was filled up by the choice of the survivors.¹ The measure failed of its aim, because only well-to-do candidates were forthcoming as a rule, and what little there was of danger in this direction was rendered nugatory by the *Lex Aelia et Fufia* of 156 B.C., which gave to the presiding magistrates complete control of every comitia. The text of the law was simply that such magistrate should personally "observe the sky" (*caelum observare*): the gist of it was that he—himself of course one of the governing clique—could annul or prevent any vote of the people detrimental to the government by simply reporting the omens unfavourable (*obnuntiare*). It was a new form of veto.

§ 4. In all public matters religion seemed to maintain its authority, but already it was a puzzle to thinking men "how one augur could meet another without laughing." Whatever the mob thought of old formulas, the nobles measured them at their practical value. In private life there was simply no religion beyond the letter of the law, the gods were regarded merely as useful things by which to swear false oaths, and if any one had qualms of conscience, he believed they could be satisfied by the building of a temple, the offering of a statue or a sacrifice.

§ 5. In 161 B.C. a decree of the Senate, passed probably by the influence of Cato, banished all philosophers from the city. In 153 B.C., however, the Athenians, who had been condemned to an impossible fine for an attack on the neighbouring town of Oropus, despatched three of its most famous philosophers to plead for them before the Senate. These men, notably Carneades the Sceptic, took the opportunity to lecture publicly; and so formidable did their success appear that, in 151 B.C., all philosophers and rhetoricians were again expelled from the city. In 140 B.C. the same course was taken with the so-called mathematicians—that is, astrologers. But the crusade against freethinking was doomed to be a failure when its pretended leaders were themselves also the freest of freethinkers.

¹ This was the *Lex Licinia de Sacerdotiis*, of 145 B.C. Rejected in this year, its provisions became law at length in 104 B.C.

CHAPTER XI.

HELLENISM AT ROME.

§ 1. Early bias of the Romans in favour of Hellenism.—§ 2. Characteristics of the Hellenism of 200 B.C.—§ 3. Changed Conditions in Rome.—§ 4. Advance of Hellenism.—§ 5. Its Degradation.—§ 6. Sumptuary Laws.—§ 7. Slavery and Hellenism.—§ 8. Hellenism in Education and Rhetoric.—§ 9. Hellenism and Religion.—§ 10. The Effect of Greek Philosophy on the Roman Character.

§ 1. *"Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes
Intulit agresti Latio, . . .
Serus enim Graecis admovit acumina chartis,
Et post Punica bella quietus quaerere coepit
Quid Sophocles et Thespis et Aeschylus utile ferrent."*

So says Horace (Ep. II. i. 156), and so too said all Romans, from Cicero onward, who regretted the old state of things, the golden age of the early Republic. And with every allowance for the feeling which makes men of every age "praise the bygone times," the Romans' regrets were most sadly justifiable.

It is a law of humanity that a higher civilisation must prevail over a lower. A conquering, but intellectually less developed, race will adopt the refinements of the more developed people they overcome. It was so with the rough, unintellectual Romans when they came at last into full contact with the civilisation of Hellas,¹ and the more so because the conquerors started with a prejudice for things Greek. The legend which made Rome, like many other

¹ This applies, of course, to the yet more luxurious civilisation of the entire East—the "Hellenistic" outcome of the conquests of Alexander over pure Orientalism.

towns of Italy, an offshoot of the Trojans or the Homeric Greeks, although not yet elaborated as afterwards by Vergil and his fellows, had long fostered a feeling of attachment to Greece. Cultivated Romans believed they had a duty to perform in cherishing all that was left of Grecian nationality, arts, and manners; and mistaken as he was, Flaminius was entirely sincere in his desire to restore the liberties of Greece.

§ 2. The Greek genius had already attained its fullest development, when in 338 B.C. the battle of Chaeronea put an end to the national independence. Thenceforward the motherland was to be the servant of Macedon, as her Asiatic colonies were to be the servants of the Seleucidae, until both should pass under Roman domination. But municipal liberty, independence in politics, and unfettered participation in public life, were the very essence of the Hellenic spirit: when these were lost, lost was all that was noble and vigorous in the whole. Deprived of that which had thus far been their very excuse for existence, the Greeks of the Captivity lost all stimulus to exertion, and sank into a lethargic existence, the object of which was sensual indulgence at whatever cost. They would live merrily while they could, and a merry life meant to them only the gratification of every passing appetite. It was this reckless self-indulgence which swallowed up alike the manhood and the means of Greece, and drove her to the beggary which refrains from no device, however vile, whereby it may purchase a moment's pleasure. The Hellenism of Flaminius' day had no merit but the memory of past greatness, no trust in gods or man, no honour, no energy, and no ambition. It was the glorification of appetite: pleasure at any price, but pleasure in some form, no matter how depraved.

§ 3. The Romans, schooled in poverty to self-denial, and overwrought by the terrible struggle with Hannibal, suddenly found themselves masters of the world's riches. After Hannibal, nothing could stand against them; they had but to demand it, and whatever the world could give was theirs. They flung labour to the winds, and set themselves to spend what they had won without labour. To them every pleasure

was as yet a novelty, and every vice seductive. And here was Greece ready to lead the way in every form of vice, whispering that such indulgence was Greek, and therefore worthy of them that wished to walk in the footsteps of ancient Hellas.

§ 4. The advance of Hellenism in Rome was spread over many years. In Cato's early days there was still a widespread scruple about the public manifestation of Greek sympathies; the time of his middle life was marked by a fierce struggle of the new party—the Liberal Graecising party—against the old Conservative party, of which he was the leader. The former prevailed, and so general was the triumph of the Liberals that even Cato himself was vanquished, and took up the study which he had fought against. Yet he did not thereby do violence to his principles, for his struggle had not been against what was good in Hellenism, but against what was bad; and knowing how incapable were his uneducated countrymen to see what was bad and separate it from what was good, he had no choice but to discountenance all Hellenism equally. After him came others who recognised the correctness of his judgment, such as the younger Scipio, but they had not the power to do what Cato had failed to accomplish. There followed the double result that, while all life and thought became Hellenised, the name of Hellenism became a by-word of reproach. Even in Cicero's day men of mark were at pains to apologise for and depreciate the extent of their intimacy with the works and ways of the Greeks.

§ 5. In its best days the civilisation of Hellas was refined and elevating: it studied the pleasures of mind and body in such a way as to beautify both.¹ The Greek degraded it by making mind subservient to body; the Roman completed the ruin so begun. The Greek justified his latter-day indulgences by the help of philosophic casuistry; the Roman, who had neither the will nor the power to see the falsity of such philosophy, accepted its teaching without question, and carried it out with all the coarseness that results from the combination of utter want of taste with

¹ Cp. the words of Pericles in Thuc. ii. 45, *Φιλοκαλοῦμεν μετ' εὐτελείας, καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἀνευ μαλακίας*.

unlimited command of money. What he understood was the animal part, and this he took because he liked it; what he did not understand was the intellectual part, and this he pretended to like because it was Greek.

Greek life was pervaded by the Greek sense of art. In his best days the Athenian's house was furnished with all that art could provide in the way of plate and pottery, beautiful stuffs for hangings, and beautiful work in metal and wood for couches and tables; but all was in most perfect taste, and charming to the eye. Most excellent of all was the wit and wisdom which the guests provided, and the edibles were the least important item in the feast. Transferred to Rome, the whole was vulgarised; it was done for display and valued at its cost. Gluttony and drinking became characteristics of a Roman gentleman: he spent fortunes upon dishes whose only merit was their rarity, and upon *articles de luxe* more costly than beautiful; so long as he had plate enough he did not care for its quality, and rather than be without wit of some sort he hired a parasite who would undertake to amuse the company in return for a dinner. Cooks came to be the most expensive of all slaves; dancing and singing became necessary accomplishments. It was not until two hundred years had gone by that such style was acknowledged at its true vulgarity, but meantime its development may be traced by sumptuary laws whose very recurrence is the best proof of their failure.

§ 6. It had been found necessary to restrict the extravagance and luxury of women as early as 215 B.C. (*Lex Oppia*). In 181 B.C. was passed a *Lex Orchia*, limiting the number of guests who might be entertained at one banquet. Twenty years later the *Lex Fannia* named a set limit of cost for banquets given under various circumstances, the highest legal cost being 100 *asses* for each guest; and a little later the *Lex Didia* extended the same provisos to the whole of Roman Italy. But then, as always, what rich men deemed an outrage in the poor they admired in themselves:—

Atticus eximie si coenat, lautus habetur;
Rutilus insanus.¹

¹ Juvenal xi. 1.

§ 7. Nor did the new style bring any profit to that class of artisans and traders which to-day provides for its wants. This costly furniture in metal, wood, and stuffs, was rarely manufactured in Rome : it was plundered from the conquered provinces ; or if any of it were of home make, it was the output of the crowds of slaves who formed the great man's *familia*.¹

The products of Greek art and skill had a new value set upon them, but art and literature ceased thereby to be spontaneous : they became industries plied to meet the demand of wealthy Romans. The Greek who could carve or sculpture or paint, or who possessed a wide knowledge of his nation's science and literature, could not thereby hope to earn a comfortable living, but he could be sure of being a valued slave and well treated accordingly. Educated slaves, in particular, could find easy occupation as keepers of the libraries which now came into fashion, copyists of the books required for such libraries, amanuenses and secretaries (for the wealthy Romans grew to think it essential to dabble in literature of every kind), keepers of their masters' accounts, physicians, and, above all, teachers of their owner and his children.

§ 8. The children were henceforth educated more in Greek than Roman style. They still went through the exercises of the Campus Martius—riding, running, swimming, and military sports—but to the old-fashioned list they added games with the quoit and hoop, borrowed from the Greek palaestra. Indoors their chief text-books were Homer and his fellows, for the sufficient reason that there was as yet no Latin literature worth the name for them to study. For the rest, they required Greeks to instruct them in the language of Hellas, its philosophy, and particularly its rhetoric.

The practice of declamation was the chief care of every well-born youth, and when he entered at last upon public life, he utilised it in the ceaseless warfare of the law-courts. He must first make his mark by the successful conduct of

¹ For a contrasted picture of the old and new styles, see Juvenal, *Sat.* xi., and in particular *cc.* 56—128. See also Vergil, *Georgics* ii. *cc.* 458—473 ; Horace, *Odes* ii. 15 and 18, iii. 24, and *Sat.* ii. 2. 120, *joll.* Martial v. 78, and Juvenal xi. 65—76, contain an old-fashioned Roman *menia*.

some indictment, of which the credit was proportionate to the position of the person assailed. Hence arose the Roman genius for law and lawyers' problems, hence came their love of litigation; and hence too sprang the unscrupulous spirit which, seeking only personal advancement, found its means in vexatious indictments of the paltriest and falsest kind. This also was borrowed from the Greeks, but it was borrowed in its completeness; there was no scope for a Greek to make a living as advocate of the wrongs of others, for the Romans came to look upon this as the sole noble pursuit, and they passed a law, the *Lex Cincia* of 204 B.C., expressly forbidding an advocate to take fees for his services—that is, precluding any but the wealthy from the Roman bar.

§ 9. The Greek had commenced to doubt his religion long before the days of his decline; when the Romans came into collision with Greece, her faith was entirely dead. There was maintained, of course, a show of reverence for the old creeds, but these, too, had shared in the general state-bankruptcy, and the old gods were little more than names, their temples rapidly crumbling into ruins, while of their people many were avowed atheists, many so-called pantheists, others Euhemerists,¹ the majority indifferent or sceptics. The Romans were ever tolerant of religious beliefs, and long ago they had commenced to enlarge their own circle of Italian divinities by foreign importations. Now they had identified their old national gods one by one with the gods of Greece: the Roman name was kept in official language, but the vague outline of the Roman deity was filled in from the legends and myths and attributes of the Greek Olympus. This would have been of small moment if it had been all; but, unluckily, with the Greek legends came Greek explanations thereof, Greek views of religion, and in fine Greek want of religion. Henceforth the Romans only maintained their national religion as we maintain the pageantry of a coronation—as a ceremonial useful for impressing the vulgar with a sense of majesty, useful too for purposes of government,² pleasant as a diversion,

¹ That is, rationalisers—those who explained away all that is reverend in religion, as did Euhemerus of Messene, temp. Alexander the Great. See p. 132.

² As in the case of the *Lex Aelia Fefia*. See p. 80.

traditionally proper, and serviceable as a veil for ostentatious liberality. But faith in the gods was a thing of the past.

§ 10. Greek philosophy was answerable for this. The Romans took that philosophy, as they took everything else which they failed to understand, without comprehension of its two-edged power. Wisdom is power to the wise, but destruction to the foolish; and the Romans, absolutely unknowing of any philosophical training, were foolish indeed in matters requiring abstract intelligence, however soundly practical in matters of daily life. To them philosophy would have been dangerous had it been a philosophy of construction and belief; it was inevitably perilous when it was, as now, merely a philosophy of destruction and scepticism. Speaking generally, the thought of Greece had settled into three several schools: the school of Epicurus, by far the most popular, bade men pursue pleasure as the aim of existence; that of the Stoics bade them not battle against fate, for fate ruled the world, and the way in which man could most avoid collision therewith was the way of utter selfishness; the school of the Sceptics bade its disciples believe nothing. Both the Epicurean and the Stoic were capable of lofty realisations, but both were too easily perverted into the most heartless egoism, while Scepticism was merely a high-sounding title for the despair of them that could find no peace in any other creed. With such tenets the result was inevitable: Epicureanism could find specious arguments to defend any vice and every crime, so long as it appeared to bring pleasure with it; Stoicism could find excuse for any brutality so long as it left the individual without inconvenience—so long as it was useful—and condemned all human sympathy as so much folly and vexation of spirit; Scepticism said, “Do as you will, for there is no such thing as right or wrong.”

These remarks are needful to explain the sudden collapse of all that was good and true and honourable in the old Roman character. That it should lapse now and again, and gradually decline and change, was to be expected, for such decline is a law of humanity; but the sudden and complete downfall of the traditions of centuries, the social rottenness which seized upon every section of the community from

highest to lowest, and ran its course with no efforts to prevent or cure it save such as might be made by isolated disciples of the *prisci mores*, or by the insincere shamefacedness of men who plotted evasion while they professed reform—these are explicable only by Rome's blind assumption of all that was Hellenic, alike in deed and word and thought, without wish or power to sift out the good from the bad.

CHAPTER XII.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

§ 1. Social Results of the Hannibalic War.—§ 2. The Latifundia.—§ 3. Ruin of the Small Farmers.—§ 4. Attractions of Service in the Legions.—§ 5. Pauperism in Rome.—§ 6. The Division into Rich and Poor.—§ 7. Marks of Honour for the Senators.—§ 8. Political Results of the Hannibalic War.—§ 9. The Italian Communities.—§ 10. Their Punishment and Rewards.—§ 11. Restrictions as to the Franchise.—§ 12. The Government becomes a Timocracy.—§ 13. Degradation of the Populace.—§ 14. Instruments of Corruption—Festivals and Games.—§ 15. The Gladiatorial Combats.—§ 16. The *Venationes*.—§ 17. The *Frustrationes*.—§ 18. The *Donativa*.—§ 19. Sources of Revenue.

§ 1. WHEN Scipio at last triumphed over Hannibal, seventeen years of desperate and continuous war had made great changes in Rome and Italy, both social and political.

Socially the most patent result was the depopulation of the peninsula. It was estimated that four hundred townships had been utterly ruined, and amongst these were necessarily the chief cities of the land, for which Roman and Carthaginian had struggled most eagerly, such as Capua and Tarentum. In course of time many of these recovered something of their former prosperity, but for the present the desolation was terrible. At Cannae alone had fallen 80,000 Italians; the Senate after that battle mustered but 123 members out of a complement of 300; the total sum of the Italian losses during the war was put at 300,000 fighting men, and Rome herself was computed to have lost one-fourth of her burgesses.

Such loss of life meant loss of labour: there were not left hands to till the soil. The scarcity of labourers rendered unprofitable the old style of farming which busied

itself mainly with the growth of corn and other yearly crops. Moreover, during the years of Hannibal's invasion, when his troops destroyed or took for themselves the bulk of the produce of the Italian farms, there had sprung up a new trade which brought to Rome the corn of Egypt and Sicily. The foreign grower found himself able profitably to grow, ship, and sell in Rome, at a price which would not cover the cost of working the less generous soil of Italy. The Italian farmer was undersold.

§ 2. The natural result was that the landowner laid down his lands in pasturage and took to rearing cattle. The first experiments in this new departure were in Bruttium and Picenum, and other places where the remnant of the population had, in punishment for aid rendered to Hannibal, been reduced to serfdom. Slave labour is rarely reliable, and rarely skilled; but even a serf can be utilised as a herdsman, and grass-farming requires a comparatively small number of employés. Hence the origin of those immense grass-farms¹ which abetted the ruin from which they arose.

The close of the war saw the Roman marts flooded with slaves who could be bought in at figures merely nominal, and during seventy years of continuous foreign conquest the supply never failed. These were utilised in preference to free labour, which requires a heavy outlay in wages. The remnant of the old farming class found itself face to face with bankruptcy; there was no profit to be made on corn-growing, while grass-farming can pay only when conducted on a scale far beyond that of their small holdings, and they had no means to buy either more land or the cattle wherewith to stock it. They lost or sold their farms at any sacrifice, and became, some of them mere labourers without homes and with precarious employment, some desperadoes, some soldiers; many drifted as beggars to Rome.

§ 3. There was not wealth enough left in the country to enable the small holders to tide over for a time and gradually conform themselves to the new state of things. Upon them had fallen the whole force of the Carthaginian attack, destroying alike their crops, their stores, their plant, and

¹ *Latifundia*.

their houses. Nor was there money to be advanced by wealthy houses as in normal times, for commerce had been at a standstill for seventeen years, and if the poor were beggared the rich were impoverished. Thus Italy was filled with bands of starving ruffians, many of them mere run-away slaves, but many more once thrifty, honest farmers. Murder, robbery, and violence were everywhere, and not the execution of thousands could stay the evil.

§ 4. There was left, indeed, one honourable resource: these men who had fought so many years in the legions, and who were now disbanded to find their homes laid desolate, their kinsfolk scattered or dead, their fortunes ruined, might return to the standards and there remain. There was at least the hope of pay, however small, in return for one's labour, and the prize money of Scipio's troops was proof that soldiering, if successful, had great rewards to offer. Hence dates the rise of the idea of service as a means of livelihood, and hence the first germs of a standing army.

§ 5. In Rome itself all classes alike had suffered materially as well as morally. Those who had enjoyed for so long the licence of camp life had lost taste for orderliness of life in the family and the Forum. True they were all weary of war, but even when they realised that they were beggars with no other means of subsistence, they shirked further service. Henceforth Rome's wars were to be fought for her more and more by the dependent Italians who had so well proved their valour against Hannibal. The old theory that every citizen was *ipso facto* a soldier was quietly set aside, and the populace posed as the self-made capitalist who could afford now to take his ease and make others work for him. Nor was this feeling at all mitigated by the influx of the destitute and reckless from all parts of Italy. They came in thousands, but, once within the walls of the city, they ranged themselves with the true burgesses against the non-Roman world without. Pauperism in Rome advanced in strides, and with it came the inevitable falling off in morality. The old Roman *gravitas* and *virtus* were henceforth things of the past, and that mob came into being which was one day to rule Rome.

§ 6. There had always been rich and poor, but the two

classes had been but the extremes between which came many grades of value. Henceforth they are to stand apart as social antagonists—those who have money and therefore everything, opposed to those who have not money and therefore nothing. The reason is simple. In the general ruin of fortunes, whether invested in land or in commerce, only the richest capitalists could survive, and these now stood alone as a close body of marked men who found in their wealth at the close of the war a *political* power heretofore unknown. These were the men who saw fresh avenues to money-making in the direction of grass-farming, and consequently bought up the small farms which the old yeomanry were forced to dispose of at any sacrifice. It was to their interest to discourage Italian corn-growing, because they were largely interested in the foreign corn-trade: they could well afford to purchase any quantity of slave labour; and they could refuse the loans which were necessary to enable less fortunate landowners to maintain their position, or could demand an impossible interest. Thus the land passed into the possession of an ever-narrowing circle of owners, all men of great wealth, and therefore influential in the State. These grew richer day by day, while the mob of Rome grew poorer as a larger number of the ousted and bankrupt country-farmers surrendered their holdings, and flocked to the city to share in the pitiful proceeds of the *sportula* and of *ambitus*.

§ 7. The barrier of separation between the two orders was not merely one of sentiment: it had its outward symbols, just as the old patriciate had its tokens; and in giving to these a new and real significance, society retraced its steps of the past three centuries, doing away in fifty years with that equalisation of the orders which had required so long a time to establish itself. The old patrician dignitaries had their curule chairs and staves, their purple-bordered togas and tunics, their golden finger-rings and amulets, and their silver harness; but the growth of equality had extended most of these from one dignity to another until they had come to be the insignia merely of senators and equites and their sons—insignia, that is, of wealth. Here for a time the development ceased: those who found themselves

in possession of these insignia at the close of the Second Punic War not only jealously guarded them from further extension, particularly from the continual encroachments of the freedmen, but they invented new and more arbitrary distinctions for themselves. For instance, in 194 B.C. Scipio Africanus carried a bill by which separate seats were reserved for the Senators in the theatre and circus. But the chief symbol of the new nobility was the *imagines*, the waxen masks or busts of those members of a house who had borne curule offices. These decorated the atrium of the noble when alive, and were carried in his funeral procession when dead. To possess any *imagines* was equivalent to a patent of nobility, and *vice versa* to be without them was to be excluded from the select ranks of the nobility. In their mean jealousy of this most envied distinction the nobles used every effort to prevent others from attaining to curule office and thereby bequeathing the *ius imaginum* to yet another household. Such a man was spoken of contemptuously as a *novus homo*, a *parvenu*, and for the most part the coalition of the nobility sufficed to keep their numbers very few. There occur in this period a few instances of non-nobles advanced to nobility, such as Cato; but on the whole the nobility was more exclusive and more solidly impenetrable at this date than at any other period. Its solidarity only broke down under stress of national peril or intestine strife, and thus far it was able to make a shift of competency in meeting danger abroad and maintaining peace at home.¹

How to amend such a state of things was a problem which as yet troubled no one. It was not until the mischief was done that a remedy was sought for, and then it was too late. One preventive might have been found in a tax upon all imported corn so prohibitive as to leave the market open to Italian growers. Another might have been found in

¹ The custom of taking *agnomina* from the name of conquered towns or countries is another example of the craving of the nobility after distinctions. Instances occurred long before this, the first being the name Messalla (from Messana),² but Scipio the Elder was regarded as the real founder of the practice :—

Qui domita nomen ab Africa

Lucratus rediit (Hor. C. iv. 8, 18).

Thenceafter we have Paulus and Metellus Macedonicus, Mummius Achaicus, Scipio Numantinus, and many others.

a tax upon slaves. Neither was attempted, if even thought of; and had any such proposal been made its failure was foredoomed, for, as will be seen, legislation was now exclusively in the hands of the interested parties, the wealthy capitalists.

§ 8. Politically, the result of the Hannibalic war was the degradation of Italy from the position, generally speaking, of an ally to that of a subject.

Up to this period a large number of the Italian towns had enjoyed the *civitas sine suffragio*, that is, all rights and privileges of a Roman burgess excepting the right of voting in the comitia. Above these ranked the *Nomen Latinum*—those old cities of Latium which had not yet received the full franchise, and scattered communities, the so-called Latin colonies, incorporated on the same footing. Next came a few important cities who stood to Rome in the relation of independent and autonomous allies, with no other duty than that of providing troops in case of war. Highest of all came the burgess-colonies—those towns, mostly colonies from Rome, which possessed the full *civitas Romana*. The various grades were but slightly separated; every facility was offered for an Italian to make his way, if he wished it, from the lowest to the highest; and it was in the assurance that the complete franchise would soon be theirs that the Italian allies so stoutly stood by Rome.

§ 9. After the war, there came a policy entirely new, a policy of exclusiveness: Italy was to be taught her place, and while justice demanded severity in some quarters, no feelings of gratitude should stand in the way in others. Those towns or districts which had sided with Hannibal were mercilessly and effectively chastised. Capua was depopulated, and the Campanian lands, the richest in Italy, were confiscated to the state. The entire breadth of Bruttium, most of Lucania and Apulia, many districts of Samnium and the bulk of Picenum, were confiscated in the same way. The population was, in the most favourable cases, simply distributed amongst small villages; in less fortunate instances, they became serfs to whom was prohibited the right of bearing arms or of migration, as in Bruttium and Picenum; and in extreme instances they were

sold wholesale as slaves. The vacant lands became *Ager Publicus*, which was leased to tenants, preference being given of course to Romans. It passed mostly into the hands of wealthy grass-farmers, insomuch that Bruttium became a proverb for savage desolation, and Lucania and Apulia were known only for their sheep and herds. Only the fat Campanian lands maintained any appearance of culture. Allotments were made from the confiscated lands to the discharged legionaries: but these men had little taste now for the pleasures and toils of agriculture, and no means to combat the economic laws by which such small holdings were inevitably absorbed into the grass-farmer's *Latifundia*.

§ 10. After the question of punishment came that of reward, and this was soon disposed of. Not necessarily at once, but within a few years' time, the whole of those communities which possessed the *civitas sine suffragio* were advanced to the position of full burgess-towns (*lex Valeria*, 188 B.C.), and from this time forward there were created no new communities in this position.¹ And this was virtually the sum total of Italy's reward for her loyalty. Not only were the allied free communities left generally *in statu quo*, but there was initiated a systematic anti-Italian policy which degraded the *Nomen Latinum* to a position little better than that of the communities of Samnium and Lucania—a policy so marked that henceforward few if any allied towns cared to exchange this Charter of Federation for the once envied *ius Latii*. The entire peninsula parted into two hostile camps, that of the Roman citizens and that of the non-citizens, the allied free towns remaining neutral. To those Italians who had been punished with loss of all rights and liberties was given the name of *Dediticii*.

§ 11. The following will show the avowed and intentional degradation of the *Latinum Nomen*. In its original form the *ius Latii* had specially ensured the right of any one possessing it to migrate to Rome at pleasure: this privilege was excluded from charters conferring the *ius* subsequent to the year 268 B.C.; but there was no interference, nor could there legally be such, with already existing charters. But those causes which led the rest of the rural population to flock to

¹ Individuals might, of course, still be in possession of the limited franchise.

Rome, during and after the Second Punic War, operated not less markedly upon the citizens of the Latin towns, to such a degree that these threatened to become depopulated. Such depopulation meant inability to furnish the customary contingents for war—the one purpose for which Rome now valued her Italian dependants. Accordingly, a bill was passed expressly forbidding any Latin citizen to migrate unless he left children in his native town, a measure having the double object of encouraging large families and maintaining the numbers of the Latin population. But more than this, in the year 187 B.C. as many as 12,000 Latins then domiciled at Rome were summarily ejected and dismissed to their respective towns without compensation or warning; and ten years later a *Lex Claudia* (177 B.C.) repeated the process. The Senate may have had a further reason for such high-handed behaviour in the wish to check the influx into Rome of pauperism on the one hand and of a better class of independent voters on the other, but no excuse could justify the infringement of a right accorded by law and earned by years of faithful service.

Of similar purposes and effect was the speedy refusal to establish any further colonies with Latin rights. Thurii in Lucania was so colonised in 193 B.C.; Vibo Valentia, in Bruttium in 192 B.C.; but after the foundation of Aquileia (*Aquileia*) in 184 B.C. there were no Latin colonies planted in Italy, and it was only at a long subsequent date that any were created in the provinces.

Finally, how deep-rooted was the bias against any further extension of the Roman suffrage even in the early years of this period, is proved by that clause of the settlement of the Transpadane Gauls in 196 B.C., whereby they were incapacitated for ever from holding the *civitas Romana*.¹

§ 12. Not less marked were the changes within Rome, that is, at the seat of government.

Politically, three great facts present themselves: firstly, the world henceforth divides itself into Romans and non-Romans; secondly, the government becomes centralised in

¹ This exception was maintained even after the Social War, by which the bulk of the Cispadane Italians acquired the full franchise; but it was at last removed *de facto*, if not *de jure*, by Julius Caesar, 49 B.C.

the hands of an exclusive nobility; and thirdly, the proletariat (*see p. 104, note*) makes itself felt as a political power.

Thus far Rome had been to the peoples of Italy a mistress indeed, but still of their own kin. They had submitted but slowly to her sway, but they had consoled themselves with the hope of one day being enrolled as *cives Romani*. And for many years the Romans had followed up a policy seeming to justify that hope, as for instance in gradually admitting outlying communities to a full or partial share in the franchise, and in giving an honourable precedence to their old Latin allies. Henceforth this policy ceases, and is exchanged for that of reducing all Italy to the condition not of allies but of subjects.

The original government in Republican Rome had been that of patrician magistrates controlled by a patrician Senate. Gradually the qualification of birth was done away with, and the plebeians obtained a share in the government; but naturally it was only the more able and wealthier plebeians who sought office, while events soon proved that only the rich could attain it, so that the government came to be a timocracy—a government of the rich of both orders. It has been pointed out how years of warfare inevitably gave further power to the wealthy. Smaller capitalists sank, as sank the farmers and middle-class generally, into increasing insignificance, while the great moneyed houses grew proportionately greater. Holding all the choicest lands of Italy, working the commerce of Rome for their own advantage, and sedulously crushing all efforts of other men or peoples to acquire landed or mercantile property, this clique of the wealthy were masters of the finance of the world. The three hundred Senators and eighteen hundred Equites of the old constitution came to be simply a corporation of the richest men in the State, powerful enough to control every movement of legislature, finance, justice, and administration. By contrast, the rest of the citizens, precluded from all the advantages and profits of government, commerce, and social life, became year by year more differentiated and more impoverished, more spiritless and more discontented. The parties in the State were no longer those of the Patricians *versus* Plebeians,

but the party of the Privileged Rich *versus* that of the Unprivileged Poor. It was the ever-recurring strife of Capitalists *versus* non-Capitalists.

§ 13. Pauperism became general and extreme, and bred a number of mistaken poor-laws such as that which compelled the purchase of corn by the State and its distribution at nominal prices. And again, a starving populace afforded a ready and formidable ally to any wealthy man who cared to purchase its support. This habit of purchasing support led to the encouragement of every form of festival, games, and shows, and to the ill-advised custom of distributing largesses. It led too to the final overthrow of all political capacity in the populace by the increase of bribery. A voter who uses his right only to make money forfeits his right to use it, as he has forfeited his self-respect. The *populus Romanus* became totally unfit for any share in the government, but the interests of the Oligarchy compelled them to humour the populace with the belief that it was still a factor in the State, because only by means of this same populace could the Oligarchs maintain their exclusiveness.

§ 14. Foremost amongst engines of corruption were the great festivals and games (*Ludi*). In the old days, excepting the Latin Festival (*Feriae Latinae*), the Great Circus Games (*Ludi Romani*) were the only ones officially recognised, and what other holidays the populace enjoyed were either such non-official vacations as the Saturnalia or the occasional *iustitia* attending upon triumphs, public thanksgivings, and similar festival dates, at which some form of dramatic exhibition was the customary entertainment (*Ludi Scenici*). In 220 B.C. however, Gaius Flaminius, being a candidate for the consulship, but assured of the fiercest opposition from the nobles whom he had contrived to offend, instituted the *Ludi Plebei*, thereby winning the votes of the comitia. Within the next four years, when the State was in the throes of the Hannibalic War, were instituted the Cerealia (*Ludi Cereales*), partly with a genuine desire to propitiate Ceres and earn her help, partly as a means of ingratiating the government with the war-weary populace. With these two purposes—the purchasing of support for a candidate or for the government at large—there were soon

inaugurated others. The games of Apollo (*Ludi Apollinares*) 212 B.C., of the Magna Mater (*Megalesia*) 204 B.C., of Flora (*Floralia*) 173 B.C., were all State festivals under the management of the Praetor Urbanus or the Curule Aediles; and their political value was immense, for as they had to be paid for out of the private funds of those magistrates and were exceedingly costly, they debarred any but the wealthy from seeking these offices; and inasmuch as the *Lex Annalis*¹ required candidates to stand for office in a fixed sequence, to preclude a man from the tenure of the aedilician—the first in the sequence—was equivalent to excluding him from all curule office whatever.

On the other hand the wealthy nobles took to indulging the populace with special *ludi* of their own private provision, with the hope of thus securing the popular vote; the natural result being that such *ludi* became increasingly frequent, and also increasingly extravagant, as noble candidates came to rely more upon their wealth than their merits, and more and more zealously to outbid their rivals. Whereupon the people—that is, the voters and the proletariat alike—naturally came to learn that they had a certain value and to demand a sufficiently high price for their support; and so well did they insist upon this that it became possible for a rabble of many thousands to make a living and find amusement while living in utter idleness and beggary.

§ 15. The programmes of the *ludi* had come to be more varied now: the old dramatic representations still went on of course in the theatres, while the circus was the scene of races of horses or chariots, and of certain old-fashioned survivals in the way of fox-baiting and similar amusements; but in 264 B.C. there had been introduced a new sport which had by the close of the third century B.C. become a *sine quâ non* of every Roman holiday. This was the gladiatorial combat. Originating, like the Roman drama, in Etruria, where the sacrifice of human beings was the customary mode of doing honour to the dead, such combats were at

¹ The *Lex Villia Annalis*, carried by the tribune L. Villius in 180 B.C., fixed the minimum age for the Quaestorship at 36; for the Consulship, at 43. Between these came the Praetorship, at 39. The Aedileship was tenable at 27. This was merely the legal sanction of established custom.

Rome also confined at first to the private *ludi* which were usually celebrated at the funeral of a citizen of rank; but the taste for such exhibitions speedily became too strong to wait for the chance of a great man's obsequies, and before many years had elapsed no programme of a public show was deemed complete without its gladiatorial combats. Condemned criminals, prisoners of war, or slaves, furnished ample materials, and during this period at least the spectacle of a freeborn citizen degrading himself to the amphitheatre was rare, though destined to become common enough somewhat later. It needs not be pointed out what must have been the result of the constant indulgence in such scenes of brutality by a people never disposed to any feelings of sentimental mercy or regard for human life. The mob's delight in bloodshed was paralleled in high life by the conduct of generals who put whole tribes of Spaniards to the sword,¹ and sold whole peoples into slavery. Never perhaps did one nation shed so much blood and show so utter a disregard for every feeling of pity and sympathy and humanity, as did the Romans during this period.

§ 16. By the side of such excitements as were to be found in the combats of men with men, the wild-beast fights (*venationes*), which were introduced in 186 B.C., were comparatively humane and elevating. The three continents were ransacked to furnish these shows, in which lions, panthers, elephants, and bears, were pitted against others of their kind, or later against human beings; and the noble who could by dint of gold bring into the arena some strange and savage beast—a rhinoceros or tiger, for instance—was sure of the popular favour. After the year 168 B.C. the aediles were constrained to include at least some sort of *venatio* in the programme of the *ludi* which were entrusted to their management.

§ 17. Of similar character were the free gifts of grain (*frumentationes*), which were to develop into a yet more formidable instrument of electioneering. The government

¹ Something of this barbarity is perhaps referable to the decree of 181 B.C., which, in the hope of putting a stop to the increasing number of claimants to triumphal honours, stipulated that such claimant should in all cases furnish proofs of having slain not less than 5000 of the enemy in pitched battle. But the words "in pitched battle" might be variously interpreted, particularly as the whole of the claimant's troops were interested in securing him the honour of a *triumphas*.

had always been held answerable for the provisioning of the city, and from the government's point of view this duty was much simplified by the establishment of a regular corn-trade with foreign ports, however much this might be to the damage of the Italian farmers. All that the government undertook was to have in hand a sufficiency of corn at a very low price; but quite apart from the accidents of bad weather, which might prevent the arrival of the corn fleets, there was rapidly growing up a population too poor even to pay the nominal price asked for the government grain. To gratify these, wealthy men began to undertake on their own account free gifts of grain—a form of largess heretofore reserved for the government only, and for very exceptional occasions of public festivity; and this became increasingly frequent as competition for popularity became more keen. Towards the close of this period there had already begun to be heard the demand for free grain-doles all the year round, but it was left to Caius Gracchus to make a definite advance towards that democratic dream, and thereby to put the seal upon the demoralisation and insolence of the Roman rabble.

§ 18. Another form of indulgence again was the distribution of prize money (*donativa*) to the legions at the close of a successful campaign. Occasionally such gifts were extended to the whole populace; and to the same effect was the abolition of the *tributum* after Paulus' triumph in 167 B.C. But strictly speaking *donativa* fall to the soldiery only, and the rapid increase of their amount soon came to be little less than the surrender of the entire spoils of a campaign to the troops employed in it. The four hundred *asses* with which Scipio Africanus rewarded each of his legionaries on the day of his triumph, were raised by Manlius Volso (189 B.C.) to four hundred and twenty *asses*, by Paulus to three hundred *denarii* (168 B.C.); and a century later Pompeius distributed one thousand five hundred *drachmae* apiece to the men who had fought with him against Mithradates. It was small wonder that military service became popular when its rewards were so high.

§ 19. To pay for such expenses, there were first the plunder of the conquered nations—between the years 208 and

167 B.C. there were paid into the Treasury nearly £40,000,000; secondly, the so-called voluntary gifts, usually in the shape of gold crowns, offered by cities and peoples whom the Senate yet suffered to be independent at least in name—Manlius Volso displayed two hundred of them in his single triumph; thirdly, after 146 B.C., the revenues of the whole of the provinces; fourthly, the proceeds of the *vectigalia*, customs-dues, rent of public lands and pastures, salt-monopoly, etc. Whatever the beggary of the lower classes, the State and the Oligarchy had funds enough. No *nobilis* ever thought of appearing in public without an enormous retinue of clients, no longer the old-fashioned retainers who maintained their self-respect while they gladly did service for a master they respected, but a rabble of hangers-on having no aim and no tie save that which centred in the *sportula*—the daily dole of money or food with which the *nobilis* purchased their lackeyship; but the purse of a Fabius or a Cornelius was long enough to meet this daily tax with ease, to purchase the votes of a whole comitia on occasion, to buy the silence of an enemy or the verdict of a jury, and yet leave a fortune to the next generation.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE SENATE AND THE OPPOSITION.

§ 1. Reform of the Comitia Centuriata.—§ 2. The Proletarii.—§ 3. Bribery and Corruption—The Rural Voters.—§ 4. The Freedmen and their Votes.—§ 5. Encroachments of the Senate.—§ 6. The Tribune.—§ 7. The Censorship.—§ 8. The Equites.—§ 9. Senatorial Control of Legislation.—§ 10. Weapons of the Opposition.—§ 11. Justice.—§ 12. The Executive. Magisterial Insubordination.—§ 13. Finance.—§ 14. Decline of Military Efficiency.—§ 15. Distaste for Service.—§ 16. Decline of Generalship.—§ 17. Signs of the Coming Revolution.

§ 1. AT some unknown date¹—probably prior to the commencement of the Second Punic War—there had been an important alteration in the constitution, by which the Comitia Centuriata was organised on a tribal basis. The date and precise nature of the change are alike unknown. According to Mommsen the *classes* of the Centuriata were retained in name, but were now made equal in respect of the number of their votes,² while the eighteen equestrian centuries still remained separate. Whatever the exact circumstances, the resultant fact is that henceforth the Comitia Tributa and the Comitia Centuriata comprise the same constituents, and the principle was that of “one man, one vote.” The assembly had *in appearance* ceased to be controlled by

¹ 241 B.C., the time when the thirty-five tribes were completed, is the date given by Ihne.

² A probable explanation is as follows: the thirty-five tribes were each divided into five classes of citizens, ranked as in the Servian constitution, according to their property. Each of these five divisions was subdivided into two centuries, one of *seniores* and one of *juniores*. On this supposition the Comitia Centuriata would now consist of three hundred and fifty centuries, of which seventy belonged to the first class, seventy to the second, and the same number to the third, fourth, and fifth classes.

wealth. The Centuriata was summoned to decide upon questions of peace or war, upon questions involving the life and liberties of a citizen, and for the election of the higher magistrates, the consuls, praetors, etc. The Tributa, on the other hand, elected the minor magistrates, and passed laws.

§ 2. The census of 159 B.C. gave a total of 338,000 citizens. Many of these were of course members of the thirty-one rural tribes, and not resident in Rome, while of the actual residents only a very small proportion possessed any quantity of property.¹ By far the larger number were, at least at the close of this period, *proletarii*,² that is, persons possessing the full franchise, but no ratable property. The alteration in the distribution of wealth had constituted the nobility and Equites as a class of capitalists in a city of paupers. Of this class again, the Equites, members of the great mercantile houses, who utilised their wealth for the purposes of business or investment, were far the larger number, while the minority were the *nobiles*, whose wealth was unproductive,³ or at best invested only covertly and in the names of members of the equestrian order. These filled the Senate, and shared between them all the offices of the State and all public emoluments. The Equites, being rich, acted of course as members of the senatorial party in all questions of politics,⁴ voting in their eighteen centuries. The mainstay of their wealth was the farming of the provincial taxes,⁵ and their name had by the close of this period ceased to have any military significance whatever. The great mass of the resident burgesses were penniless: shut out from trade by want of capital to counteract the equestrian monopoly, and by the cheapness of labour, where everything was slave-

¹ In 100 B.C. there were only 2000 persons in all Rome who had any property at all. In Caesar's day three-fourths of the entire population were state-fed paupers.

² Identical with those anciently called *capite censi*, the lowest class in the Servian census, whose property fell below 12,500 *asses* (old value) in worth. They were excluded from military service (until the time of Marius, 107 B.C.), except in cases of emergency, and from the burden of the *tributum*. The name *proletarii* (from *proles*) expresses the fact that they could fulfil nothing but the primary duty of citizens—that of rearing children for the benefit of the State.

³ By the *Lex Claudia* of 218 B.C., which aimed at excluding the Equites from the Senate, senators were forbidden to engage in transmarine trade.

⁴ Gracchus first gave them separate interests, segregated them from the *nobiles*, and made them the third party in the State.

⁵ See below, p. 123.

made, they could hope for nothing but a hand-to-mouth living by industry, and sank rapidly and inevitably into a condition of absolute pauperism. Nevertheless, they had their votes to sell, and by the sale of these they earned a livelihood: the price was sometimes the hard cash of simple bribery; sometimes a gift of corn, wine, or oil; again, games and spectacles; and each could secure the profits of the *sportula* by joining the *clientèle* of a noble.¹

§ 3. At this era, and for the remaining years of the Republic, electioneering became the daily life of Rome; and as office depended upon wealth, bribery and corruption in every form made rapid strides. As early as 358 B.C. there had been enactments against the canvassing of voters (*Ambitus*), and a *Lex Cornelia et Baebia* of 181 B.C. renewed all previous enactments with additional rigour and precautions. Bill after bill proved futile, and even the *Lex Gabinia tabellaria* of 139 B.C. (introducing the secret ballot in election of magistrates), and the *Lex Cassia tabellaria* of 137 B.C. (making the same innovation in the law courts), only serve to mark the need of reform rather than its efficacy.

The intelligent voters indeed were those who voted least often, the members of the rural tribes who still preserved something of their old independence and honour, and had less need to sell both for a pittance. But the trouble of leaving their occupations and making long journeys to Rome for the purpose of recording a vote, the growing distaste which they felt for any association with the city rabble, their manifest impotence against the elaborate machinery of exclusion and influence wielded by the nobles, and the not idle dread of offending some too powerful landowner of their neighbourhood, all tended to discourage the appearance of the rural tribules. Their attendance became less and less frequent, and available only on occasions of exceptional gravity (*e.g.*, the proposal of an agrarian law); while the sovereignty of the comitia, and with it the

¹ The task of reclaiming these "free and independent" paupers was often essayed, but never with success. Gracchus' colonisation schemes met with no support, because the populace preferred beggared indolence to a competence earned by labour; and before Gracchus' time other colonies had been deserted by their *coloni* almost as soon as founded.

control of the world, tended more and more to pass into the hands of the urban voters, the pauper hirelings of the nobility. It must be borne in mind that the burgess-body still contained these two antagonistic parties of voters—the ever-decreasing, but still worthy, rural voters, with such of the city residents as yet maintained their independence, and the ever-increasing and wholly corrupt rabble of the urban tribes. The fact is marked by the recognised moral superiority of the rural over the city tribes: the *liberti* struggled continually to establish themselves in the former, and were as often *degraded* to the latter.

The decline of the rural vote was equivalent to the disappearance of that middle-class which alone can give stability to a State. By the time of the Gracchi Rome had no middle class; and it was one of the first aims of those reformers to erect one out of the equestrian body. Further, the absolute control of the nobles over the city tribes, by dint of bribery in its various forms and by intimidation, explains how it came that the seemingly momentous change in the organisation of the comitia which in theory did away with the political value of property, in fact had no effect upon the oligarchic monopoly of power.

§ 4. The freedmen (*liberti*, *libertini*¹) were an additional lever in the hands of the nobles. A slave who by his wit or skill or industry had earned it, might be manumitted by his master, and thenceforth stood to the latter in a relation little different from that of a client. He owed to his lord certain annual payments and whatever further bodily service the lord chose to exact, and if he proved contumacious he might be reduced again to servitude. Inasmuch as only the rich could afford to keep slaves in any number, and few but the rich would care to manumit them, the *liberti* were exclusively the dependents of the senatorial and equestrian sections. Now, though the *libertinus* was ineligible for either office or military service, he possessed in full the *ius suffragii*, and so did his sons; so that the

¹ The name *libertus* signifies the free-man in relation to the lord (*dominus*) who manumitted him; the name *libertinus* belongs to the freedman in reference to his position in the State. The sons of a *libertinus* were by birth free (*ingenui*) and full citizens (*cives*); but it was long before the taint of enslaved ancestry was forgotten or forgiven.

entire household of a freedman was naturally at the disposal of the original lord in any question of suffrage. As the number of slaves increased, so did the number of freedmen, and the latter soon came to have a very marked weight in the comitia. Hence arose a constant struggle: on the one hand, the lord and the *libertus* wished the latter to be enrolled in the rural tribes because these were more honourable than the urban tribes, because the nobles had already all necessary control over the urban tribes by means of their clients and by bribery, and because on the contrary their influence with the rural tribes was weak and would be much enhanced by the admission of their *liberti* thereto, for the latter could be relied upon to vote whenever the lord wished it; on the other hand, the party of reform objected to the corruption and debasement of the rural tribes by the admission of *libertini* to whom the brand of past slavery always attached, they wished to preserve the independence of the rural tribes, and they insisted on confining the freedmen to the four city tribes, where their votes, however great their numbers, could only affect the suffrage of those tribes.¹ The history of the quarrel is in brief as follows: Appius Claudius, the censor of 312 B.C., admitted the *libertini* to all the tribes: Q. Fabius, the censor of 304 B.C., restricted them to the four city tribes, but subsequently the procedure of Appius Claudius was reverted to. Thus in 241 B.C. (at the date of the reform of the comitia) they received the *ius suffragii* without restriction as to tribe; in 220 B.C. they were confined by C. Flaminius to the four city tribes. In 169 B.C. the question became a burning one: Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, one of the censors, wished to refuse the right of voting to all new *libertini*, and even attempted to remove from the electoral rolls those who had been admitted by previous censors. His colleague, Appius Claudius, protested; and after much wrangling it was agreed that every freedman who had a son of more than five years of age, should

¹ Each tribe possessed one vote only at the comitia, but this vote was determined by those of the whole number of tribunes in that tribe. Thus, at this date every poll involved two acts of suffrage, one that by which the opinion of each tribe was discovered, the other that by which the opinion of the majority was determined from the whole number of the tribal votes.

remain in the tribe in which he had been entered by the last censors; that the owners of landed property of upwards of 30,000 sesterces should be entered in the country tribes; all the rest in one of the city tribes. After this a more liberal policy was pursued, and the efforts to enforce restrictions became more spasmodic and ineffectual.

§ 5. There was yet one other way in which the nobles indirectly controlled the populace—namely, by ignoring it. The constitutional history of this period is marked by a gradual usurpation on the part of the Senate of powers which originally belonged to the people only. Such a development was inevitable as a result of the decay of the middle class and the disappearance of the independence of the voters. The usual comitia, composed only of the urban tribes and the *libertini*, were incapable of any serious appreciation of political questions, and recognised their own incapacity as much as did the nobles. On the other hand the perils of the Hannibalic War had disorganised the machinery of government, and had allowed the Senate to trench unconstitutionally upon the prerogatives of the comitia; but the energy and final success of the Senatorial dictatorship—such it had virtually been—had given to that body a new dignity in the eyes of the people. It had indeed usurped, but the end had justified the means. Thenceforward, even when the immediate perils of an Italian war were removed, the spread of Roman power abroad led to an increase and complexity of business which could not possibly be dealt with by an ignorant and untrained body of paupers, farmers, and shopkeepers. The need of one central governing body of ability and experience, and of less unwieldy dimensions than the comitia, became daily more evident: this body was found in the Senate, tacitly indeed, but not less really. The comitia exercised an imaginary freedom in electing magistrates, but for the rest did what the Senate desired. Originally, the theory was that the people made laws which the Senate approved or threw out: now the Senate made laws, and the people approved them, or if it declined to do so its approval was dispensed with. Occasionally the people asserted its powers, as when it prolonged the command of the elder

Africanus in 202 B.C., but as a rule it was content to acquiesce in the domination of the Senate.

§ 6. Thus far we have spoken only of non-official means whereby the control of the nobles was made absolute. The official means were fewer, but sufficient: they were the Tribunate, the Censura, and the Equestrian vote.

The Tribunate had come to be the strongest weapon of the nobility. The office had acquired a new value so great that it was sought by the noblest of the wealthy plebeians, and therefore increasingly difficult of access to poorer candidates. Originally intended to screen the poor, it had come to be controlled, like every other magistracy, by the rich, and the tribune was now by virtue of his office entitled to a seat in the Senate, and was even allowed the right of *relatio*¹—two very good reasons why the nobility should wish to exclude *novi homines* and possible reformers from an office which tended to vulgarise the aristocratic Senate, and to create an Opposition within that body. Of course it happened that there were often elected tribunes who were both non-noble and democratic; but the Oligarchy had nothing to fear as long as it had even but one representative amongst the ten. It was a patrician, Appius Claudius, who (as Livy tells us) first invented the plan of playing off one tribune against his colleagues; and this, from being the recognised legal method for checking tribunicial contumacy or aggression, had now brought the office entirely over to the side of the rich.

“The tribuneship of the time had no longer the revolutionary character it once possessed. It was a high magistracy, to which were due the best laws of the time—the *Villia* (180), the *Voconia* (169), the *Orchia* (181), the institutions of permanent tribunals (149), the establishment of the ballot. . . . They asked in 188 for the suffrage for Fundi, Formiæ, and Arpinum . . .; they caused the sale of corn at a low price to the people; and in the space of twenty years they were instrumental in founding twenty-three colonies. At their instigation the aediles prosecuted the farmers of the public pasture lands, the usurers and their Italian confederates. Finally the Valerian law was again solemnly renewed, the tribune Porcius Lecca obtaining a decree, in 197, that no citizen should be beaten with rods.” Duruy, vol. ii., p. 287 (*English Translation*).

¹ Introducing a matter for discussion in the Senate.

§ 7. The *Censura* was a safeguard of the nobles, for it was filled up by tradition only from the ranks of consulars, and none but the wealthy could hope to attain it. It was therefore to all intents and purposes a co-optative office, like all the other curule magistracies, and could be expected to be exercised in the interests of the nobility. It might be utilised in various ways: notably, to the Censors was committed the periodical revision of the lists (*album*) of Equites and Senators, with free right to erase therefrom any member whom they should deem unworthy—a right tantamount to that of expelling any one whose policy or honour made him obnoxious to the oligarchy, and checked only by the fact that succeeding Censors were at liberty to set aside a previous censorial *nota*; by the prescriptive obligation of the Censor to make formal statement in writing of his reasons for “noting” in each particular instance; and by the proviso that such *nota* was valid only in case both Censors agreed upon it. This last check had a real value when the State parties were those of the patricians and the plebeians, and when the two Censors were by law required to be representatives of both parties: but it was of small moment now that parties were altered, when the struggle was that of the rich against the poor, and when both Censors were inevitably elected from the ranks of the rich alone.

Now and again there stood up Censors who did their duty in the old-fashioned style, defying the united opposition and certain enmity of the oligarchy. Thus Cato, in his censorship of 184 B.C., erased from the senatorial album the names of no fewer than seven senators, and deprived a still larger number of equites of their horses,¹ yet this was at the very beginning of the oligarchic decline. His honesty in leasing the public taxes to the *publicani* was admirable, but so offensive to the *equites* that the Senate was induced to declare the leases void and order a fresh auction—a proof of the difficulties which beset the reformer's path, even at a

¹ A famous instance of Cato's severity, of the need of such severity, and of the difficulty attending its exercise, is that of Lucius Quinctius Flamininus. A favourite slave of his complained loudly that his master had left Rome for his province of Cisalpine Gaul (192 B.C.) before the celebration of some gladiatorial games; and Flamininus, to gratify the boy's lust for bloodshed, with his own hand murdered a Gallic chieftain who had opportunely presented himself as a suppliant. The next Censors restored Lucius to his former dignities.

period when the anti-oligarchic party was still numerous and influential. But what it came to was this: the class which most needed reform from the Censors was the class which governed, and from which the Censors were as a rule nominated; the Censors therefore had an interest in condoning the shortcomings of their fellow-nobles¹; and if by chance they preferred honour to interest, the nobles revenged themselves by an opposition possibly successful at the time, and by lifelong persecution afterwards. Cato was impeached no less than fifty times.

§ 8. The exclusiveness of the Oligarchy, and the secret of its power, is best stated by Duruy: every magistrate became *ipso facto* a member of the Senate, and none but members of the Senate were able to obtain office. That is, the entire field of official influence was occupied by the senatorial families on the principle of co-optation, and the governing Oligarchy therefore consisted of not more than the three hundred senators, and their families, out of a burgess population of more than three hundred thousand. But there was another class in the State which possessed wealth and therefore weight—the Equites, or rich non-senatorial houses, far exceeding the Oligarchy both in collective wealth and numbers. It was the policy of the Senate to keep the Equites socially excluded from the ranks of the nobility, but politically upon the side of the nobles, and to widen the gulf between them and the poor. The mere fact that the Equites represented the great mercantile houses, the circulating capital of the State, was itself a bond of sympathy with a nobility founded on wealth alone; and how the Equites acquired the bulk of their wealth from the provinces, how the Senate connived and abetted thereat, will be explained in the next chapter. For the present, it must be remembered that the Equites possessed eighteen votes in their centuries² in the Comitia Centuriata, and further possessed funds enough to buy up the whole of the poll, so

¹ There was, in many cases, the further bond of kinship: small and exclusive oligarchies tend, by intermarriage, to become virtually a single family. However, we hear of a censor erasing the name of his own brother from the senatorial album in 176 B.C.

² Up to the year 129 B.C. these eighteen centuries were virtually filled up from the nobility, because those who made their way into office, and therefore into the

that they formed a most valuable pillar of the Senate. Indeed, so far was this the case that when C. Gracchus attacked the Oligarchy, his chief weapon was found in turning the Equites against the Senate.

With such machinery did the Oligarchy set themselves to govern the world in an oligarchic way, that is, in such way as should keep all the honours and profits and powers of empire solely in their own hands in its three several branches of Legislature, Justice, and Executive.

§ 9. The methods of legislation have necessarily been already implied in this chapter. Briefly to sum the facts: The power of making laws (*leges*) was vested solely in the popular comitia as of old, but with the following limitations:—

(i.) The Tribunes and other magistrates who possessed the right to summon the comitia were now usually members of the nobility; or, at any rate, the nobility could always rely upon the veto of one or more Tribune for defeating an objectionable or popular motion.

(ii.) Failing this, the right of *obnuntiatio* (see p. 80) enabled the Senate to dissolve or declare void any comitia.

(iii.) Having full control of the administration of justice, the nobles possessed an *in-terrorem* power sufficient to deter any would-be antagonist by dread of subsequent prosecution.

(iv.) The urban tribules could be readily terrorised or bribed by the nobles: the less amenable rural tribules rarely came to the polls in any appreciable numbers.

(v.) The resolutions (*senatus consulta*) of the Senate acquired a force practically equivalent to that of laws.

§ 10. Against so formidable an array of limitations the opposition could utilise but two constitutional weapons:—

(i.) The collective weight of the votes of the rural tribules, difficult to reach, and equally hard to protect from intimidation.

(ii.) The Tribunes' power of retaliation, by which they could block all business whatever, and even place the

Senate, usurped the privilege of retaining their places as members of these centuries and voted accordingly, while a majority of the remaining places were filled by various members of their families. In that year a bill was passed in the Comitia to compel such persons to give up their public horse on entering the Senate, and thereby to deprive them of their vote in the eighteen centuries.

consuls under arrest, until their particular object was conceded.

It was only the good sense of both parties which prevented for the present such collisions of the Oligarchy with the popular party as afterwards led to civil war, anarchy, and the establishment of monarchy.

§ 11. In regard to the administration of justice, the judicial magistrates were the two resident praetors (*urbanus* and *peregrinus*), until press of business led to the establishment of Standing Commissions (*quaestiones perpetuae*). This change was established by the *Lex Calpurnia* (149 B.C.) which appointed a *quaestio* for the trial of cases of malversation and extortion in the provinces (*de repetundis*). Subsequently the larger number of criminal cases were relegated to various other Standing Commissions.

The power of life and death, the final authority in criminal cases, was vested solely in the people assembled in the Comitia Centuriata, according to the *Lex Valeria de provocatione* (509 B.C.), which was confirmed by the *Lex Porcia* (197 B.C.). But as it was impossible for this cumbrous method of procedure to be frequently used, the custom arose of delegating the investigation of criminal offences to select bodies of jurymen (*iudices*). A praetor or his deputy magistrate presided over the court, and from the verdict there was no appeal to the people. These jurymen were from the beginning chosen exclusively from the senators, and this privilege was continued in the composition of the new *Quaestio de Repetundis*.

§ 12. The Executive consisted of the old officers—consuls, praetors, aediles, quaestors, tribunes, and extraordinary officers such as *legati*, *tribuni militares*, etc.—entirely under the control of the nobility, from which most of them were chosen. The aim of the *Lex Villia Annalis* (180 B.C.) was to prevent too many honours falling into the hands of one man; though, as has been said, it served also to prevent *novi homines* from attaining office. In a similar anti-individual spirit it was enacted that no consular should present himself for a second consulate until the expiry of ten years, and prescriptive usage laid similar checks upon the other magistracies. Such efforts, however, marked the

fact that the nobles were already aware of the danger inherent in all oligarchies—the danger that their magistrates should get beyond control. Their own conduct when in a body they usurped the functions of the people was destined speedily to be paralleled by that of individual members of their own body. Instances of magisterial contumacy become increasingly frequent throughout this period: the elder Scipio refused to submit to a judicial investigation of his brother's conduct; Popilius refused to obey the *senatus consultum* against him; the allotment of the provinces gave rise to constant and scandalous quarrels of the rival consuls with each other and with the Senate; and candidates for triumphs quite commonly disregarded the Senate's refusal to grant the desired honour. Of like nature was the growing spirit of insubordination which led commanders constantly to exceed or set aside their orders, and to behave more as princes than as servants of a government: so Volso made war on the Gauls (189 B.C.), Mancinus made peace with the Numantines (137 B.C.), and many other officers utilised their commands solely with an eye to their personal profit and security. The Senate of course possessed the right and power to repress any such insubordination, and had it been wise it would have done so: but each noble was ready to condone the offence which he hoped shortly to be himself able to commit, and so long as all shared the resultant profits there was small risk of any real chastisement of the offender; while, on the other hand, if office was to be determined by nobility rather than by capacity, the pity of other ill-doers or incapables was sure to overrule the anger of the few who were both honest and able. The encroachments of a non-noble were beset by countless difficulties: he must have wealth enough to defy the bribery of the nobles, influence enough to get his name inserted on the list of candidates which the Senate had usurped the right of revising, a sufficient following of rural voters to outweigh the oligarchic control of the urban tribes, and enough of courage and influence to meet successfully an interminable series of malicious indictments in the law courts. Cato had all these, and yet his life was one long struggle.

§ 13. Modern governments are controlled by the power

of the people to grant or withhold supplies ; as every act of government requires funds to effect it, the popular control of finance amounts virtually to the control of the State. At Rome there was no such check upon the Senate : every question of finance had throughout the republic been dealt with by the Senate only, and so it continued to be. Indeed, in view of the character of the comitia of this period, it is manifest that any interference of the people in financial questions must have led to the gravest abuses : popular control is good only when the people are worthy and able to exercise it, and the Roman proletariat was neither the one nor the other. A time came when Tiberius Gracchus roused the mob to interfere in this direction, and the result was fatal to his objects and to Rome.

Meantime the Senate kept the keys of the state-chest (*aerarium*), fixed the amount to be paid in indemnities, tribute, and taxes,¹ and received the proceeds through the medium of their officers the quaestors, whose number was now increased as conquest extended, so that each province and each army on active service should have its respective collector and paymaster. Mention has been already made of the vast sums paid into the treasury during the early days of this period : subsequently, when the Eastern and African conquests were reduced to provinces, the receipts became, nominally perhaps, less on the average, but more in the total, while the expenses of the government certainly did not increase in proportion, for there was no payment of Roman magistrates and actual working expenses were defrayed by the subject peoples. The chief burden upon the treasury was the payment of the legions, but it rarely happened that a campaign was not made somehow to pay its cost, so that there was, or ought to have been, a constantly increasing amount of bullion stored in the Temple of Saturn.² Another heavy item was the repayment to

¹ In Italy after the year 168 B.C. there still continued the old *vectigalia*—(1) rental of public land (this was constantly evaded, rent-tenure passing quietly into freehold ; and a law of 165 B.C. specially remedied this state of things in respect to the *Ager Campanus*, the richest portion of the whole *Ager Publicus*) ; (2) rental of pasture lands (*scriptura*) ; (3) mining-leases ; (4) the profits of the salt-monopoly—beside the tax on manumissions (see p. 55).

² It amounted, however, to less than £1,000,000 in 157 B.C., despite the immense sums paid in during the preceeding forty-five years.

the burgesses of the *tributum* levied during the Hannibalic war. Large sums of money were expended upon public works such as roads and aqueducts, and upon the restoration or maintenance of these as well as of temples and other buildings; but it cannot be doubted that even larger sums never found their way into the treasury at all, but into the private coffers of the nobles. There was something wrong when a military command, however disgracefully fulfilled, came to be the high road to fortune. As for the universal and almost open malversation of the provincial governors and the *publicani*, these have still to be spoken of.

§ 14. As regards military matters, the period is one of general decay in officers and men alike, of which examples have been given already. At Rome itself, all classes shared the growing dislike of military service, insomuch that it was often a matter of grave difficulty to raise the requisite citizen-legions, while the Equites soon ceased to have any military value, and the armies were recruited more and more from the allies, who furnished indeed the whole of the cavalry. This was one of the main causes of the depopulation of Italy, not so much because of the deadly character of the wars of the period, as because war was so lucrative and so continuous as to prove far more profitable than the old-fashioned habit of campaigning for a summer and returning to one's farm for the winter. Such a system was indeed out of the question now that transmarine provinces required permanent military occupation, and though the policy of the government was to build up the necessary fighting materials for each province out of the ranks of the subjects themselves, such a process required time, so that for many years the garrisons of the armed provinces had to be drawn direct from Italy, and this too at a time when the war with Hannibal had left that country well-nigh stripped of its adult population. The period saw the establishment of what was virtually a standing army.

§ 15. More destructive still was the moral result of continuous warfare in foreign lands: it rendered the soldier unfit to resume the orderly life of a citizen or the patient toil of a yeoman, and it created a class of men whose vices required money to satisfy them, while they refused to earn

it by any labour save that of war—the class of men who were ready to fight for any one on any plea, so that they might get plunder, but who had little taste for any service that was dangerous or unprofitable. The Spanish wars in particular present frequent instances of military insubordination; Paulus' troops endeavoured to prevent his triumph because they considered themselves ill-paid; the legions at Apollonia mutinied in 181 B.C.; Scipio's life was endangered by his own troops at Numantia.

To remedy the distaste for service—specially prominent, of course, amongst the upper classes—a clause of the *Lex Villia Annalis* required that none should canvass a magistracy unless he could prove service in ten campaigns; but the rich came to consider their obligation discharged if they had accompanied a commander upon one or two campaigns, not as active men-at-arms, but as “tent-fellows” (*contubernales, comites*) of their leader. To the poorer was held out the promise of allotments at the expiration of the full term of service, but though they might sometimes enlist on the strength of this promise, they had long ago lost all desire for a country farmer's life by the time that their term of service was over. But the real cause of the want of recruits was the want of qualified citizens, for the economic revolution had beggared most of the class who formed the legions¹ in earlier days, and there were none to replace them, while the old regulation which forbade the enlistment of *proletarii* was still in force. Rome's armies grew continually weaker until Marius did away with that rule.

§ 16. Even if there had been material enough, good soldiers would have been useless without good leaders, and such were growing daily rarer—an inevitable result of the dislike of the rich for service. While every noble looked forward to acting as a general and thereby acquiring plunder, few knew or cared how to conduct a campaign. The disgraceful

¹ Duruy puts the number of qualified citizens at from 160,000 to 180,000 at most (including, of course, the *entire* burgess-body within and without the city), and says that 40,000 Romans were constantly on active service at this period—that is, one-eighth of the whole citizens (320,000). The legion consisted of 6,000 foot, and the average number of legions enrolled yearly from 201 to 167 B.C. was eight (48,000 men, but the number was at times as high as thirteen (78,000 men). Of these, however a large number were levied from the *socii*—“In recent years, amongst modern powers, the proportion has been one soldier to every hundred inhabitants. . . . At Rome the proportion was one in eight.”

conduct of the third Macedonian war and of the war with Viriathus afford capital instances of the incapacity of the senatorial commanders. Of the few generals who were successful—Cato, Gracchus, Marcius Rex, the Scipios, Paulus and Flamininus—not one was brilliant; their victories were due to the merest common sense at best, and often to mere good fortune. We have spoken already of the growing independence or contumacy of these leaders, of their rapacity and cowardice and pitiless delight in bloodshed, and of the vanity which made them claim a triumph for every petty success even though they had to celebrate it in defiance of the Senate in the solitude of the Alban Mount.

§ 17. There were not wanting signs of the coming revolution when the poor should turn the tables upon the rich, and in turn seek to monopolise the government. That event occurred in 133 B.C., but it was the outcome not of political but of social discontent—not an uprising of the non-privileged such as had worked itself out two hundred years before, but the more terrible revolt of the starving and the reckless. The submerged thousands lacked a leader and a policy alike; the former they found at last in Gracchus, but the latter they never had, because they were incapable of carrying it out. Hence the few occasions upon which the populace endeavoured to assert its claims or rights were spasmodic and disconnected, and therefore futile. Amongst them we may mention the bill which aimed at destroying the senatorial control over the polling value of the equestrian centuries, by compelling any one who became a senator to surrender his commission, and ergo his vote, in the Equites; the bill which endeavoured to popularise the great priestly colleges: and those which introduced secret ballot in all comitial and judicial procedure. But the fatal clog upon any democratic movement was the senatorial control of the tribunate. In moderation such control was the safeguard of the constitution; its abuse was just as fatal. The end came when Tiberius Gracchus, himself a tribune, asserted the rights of the populace by deposing from his office a fellow-tribune, who, quite within his rights, persisted in supporting senatorial exclusiveness. Gracchus carried his point at the moment, but from that date the entire Constitution of Rome was doomed.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PROVINCES.

§ 1. Meaning of the term *Provincia*.—§ 2. The Governors of the Provinces.—§ 3. Position of the Border Kings.—§ 4. Organisation of the Province.—§ 5. The *Lex Provinciae*.—§ 6. Duties of the Governor.—§ 7. The Taxes and the *Publicani*.—§ 8. The *Negotiatores*.—§ 9. The Salary of the Governor.—§ 10. His Staff—Quaestor—Legati—Comites.—§ 11. Oppression of the Provincials.

§ 1. ROME's first province was Sicily (241 B.C.); her second, Sardinia and Corsica (238 B.C.): how and when she added the provinces of Hither and Further Spain (197 B.C.), Illyria (167 B.C.), Macedonia (148 B.C.), and Africa (146 B.C.) has been stated at large. It remains to show briefly how the provinces were organised.

Firstly, the term *Provincia*¹ means primarily a "sphere of duty." Any public magistrate possessed his *provincia* in so far as he had any specified duty, if it were only the charge of the public roads or of the forests. Now, when Sicily was annexed, the charge of the island was entrusted to a praetor: it was his *provincia*, and, after him, the *provincia* of his several successors. It was an easy transition which led the Romans to speak of Sicily as itself a *provincia*, and so the term came to mean specially a territory acquired by conquest and governed by officers from Rome.

§ 2. These governors were at first praetors. To the two city praetors were (227 B.C.) added two others who should act for the year as governors respectively of Sicily and of

¹ Some derive the word from *pro-vinco*—"conquest": others from *providentia*. The latter is, perhaps, the more likely of the two.

Sardinia with Corsica. In 197 B.C. there were added yet two more praetors for the two Spains. As the number of the provinces increased, it became customary to send out as provincial governors the two consuls and two city-praetors also, at the close of their year of office. The latter were styled respectively proconsuls and propraetors. The Senate decided which provinces were to be administered by the various magistrates. The distribution of the provinces gave rise to frequent jealousies as we have seen, to open quarrels on occasion; and it was always a cause of corruption and intrigue.

The Senate decided also what troops were needful in each province, and fixed the sum necessary for their support to be paid out of the treasury. Some provinces were heavily garrisoned, others scarcely at all. At the present date the provincials were not usually called upon to provide contingents for the Roman armies: their duty was to pay for the protection which Rome pledged herself to give against all other enemies. In theory, Rome's gift was the universal *Pax Romana*, and it was but right that those who enjoyed it should pay their share of the cost of its maintenance.

§ 3. The means whereby Rome maintained her acquisitions were simple but sufficient. Primarily, of course, there was the Roman army of occupation, or the threat of it, to prevent alike internal revolt and external insult. The latter was guarded against also by the elaborate system whereby outlying princes were made clients of Rome: petty sovereigns or states lying upon the skirts of the Roman provinces purchased peace from Rome by becoming her allies; and such alliance forced them to defend Roman interests against all men, for while Rome alone was strong enough to help them in distress, she was strong enough also to revenge to the uttermost any remissness on the part of her clients. The latter, in fact, came to be Roman spies and outposts, upon whom fell all the risks and duties of guarding the frontiers.

§ 4. Against internal disaffection the surest safeguard was the Roman policy of isolation—*Divide et impera*. There was to be no such thing as unity in the province, save in the common dependence of the whole upon Rome. The

several communities of each province were taught to disown all connection with their neighbours, and there were special enactments forbidding the intercourse of one township or district with another, whether in marriage or trade or inheritance, and any breach of such rule was sternly punished. On the other hand, each community was taught that its hopes of receiving privilege and favour rested upon its individual merits, so that each became interested in showing itself more officious and more loyal than its fellows. The Roman system put a premium upon espionage between one township and another.

Finally, the great military roads by which each new province was at once opened up; the garrisons established at all needful points, growing up subsequently into Roman towns; the influx of Roman settlers to occupy the conquered lands; the still more far-reaching influx of Roman traders and money-lenders (*negotiatores*): all these were so many additional elements in the safe keeping of the province.

The customary board of ten commissioners, who regulated each province upon its first formation, drew up a broad constitution for the whole, based in the main upon the existing state of things. It was no part of Rome's method to coerce where there was no need, and she saved herself the trouble of enforcing forthwith a new state of things. Speaking generally, the only change was that the conquered people now paid its taxes to Rome instead of to native rulers. For the rest, it kept its religion, its social customs, its local laws and forms of local government: but the Romans gave it to be understood that they favoured a government modelled upon that of an Italian *municipium*—the government of a local senate and two annual executive officers (*decuriones*)—and there was consequently from the first a tendency for the provincial towns to adopt that form of government, and so far to conform to one common type.

§ 5. That code of general rules which the commissioners framed, embodying the bulk of the local law and custom, was known as the *Lex provinciae* of each particular province. It was not essential, but it was certainly expected, that each governor would act upon it as far as possible.

§ 6. The governor, whatever his rank, held office for one

year only, unless his command were prolonged by special decree. So soon as he set foot in his province, his predecessor lost all official powers, and the same thing happened to the new comer when, in turn, the next year's governor arrived. For the year, however, the governor was an autocrat. True, he was the representative of the Senate, and bound in theory to act upon the instructions of that body; but in practice even the right of making war and peace was usurped by these sovereigns of a year, and if a Volso or a Mancinus could so act with impunity, lesser acts of insubordination were not likely to be punished. Ostensibly each governor's conduct was liable to impeachment upon the close of his year of office, as his public account-books were subject to audit; but, as will be seen, justice rarely reached the offender. The provisions against malversation were complete, but there was no getting them to work.

Upon receiving notice of the province which he was to administer, the governor-elect issued his Edict, setting forth in general terms the attitude which he intended to take in matters of law; for possessing alike the *imperium militare* and the *imperium iudiciale*, it was as supreme judge that he especially appeared to the provincials. In his edict, therefore, he gave a kind of warning as to what cases he should take especial cognisance of and with what effect; and as he generally saved himself the trouble of working out the matter independently, and adopted either *in toto* or with slight alteration the edict of his precursor, these *Edicta Tralaticia* came to be, as it were, epitomes of provincial procedure.

The governor was bound to make a complete circuit of his province during the course of the year for the purpose of doing justice; and for this end there were selected certain important towns as centres of assize, whither the residents in the corresponding district must bring for judgment such cases as came within the cognisance of the governor. The assemblage of litigants to these centres was known as a *conventus*, and the term was subsequently extended, exactly as was the term *provincia*, to signify the district attached to such centre. A certain number and kind of cases remained

in the jurisdiction of the local courts ; but all such suits as involved a Roman citizen, or such as involved property exceeding a certain amount, were tried before the governor's court. If there were in the province any towns which could show a free and independent alliance with Rome, within such the governor had no jurisdiction whatever. The governor chose his jurors from the citizens of the particular *conventus* ; he possessed the power of life and death, excepting, of course, as regarded Roman citizens ; and from his verdict there was no appeal. There were but two safeguards against abuse of power on his part apart from the moral safeguards of his own high character and sense of duty and justice—namely, the fact that a successor could reverse any act of the preceding governor, and that such abuse of power might afford a handle to subsequent impeachment at Rome.

§ 7. But though morally Rome's first duty was to secure peace and justice for her subjects, in point of fact it soon came to be a recognised maxim that the provincials were merely means to money-making. Each province was at its settlement assessed in a certain tribute (*stipendium*). In the case of Sicily this was paid mainly in kind, being the tithes of certain varieties of produce ; but in the majority of cases it was a definite annual money payment, as in the case of Macedonia.¹ Now, if the *stipendium* were in the form of tithes, its amount would vary according as the season was good or bad, and in any case its collection would be a matter of many complications and much delay. Accordingly the Government from an early date, adopted the simpler plan of farming the tribute : a company (*societas*) of wealthy Roman speculators would agree to pay yearly a stated sum to the treasury for a certain number of years, in turn collecting for their own purses the tithes of the province so farmed. If the season were good, they would make a profit ; if it were bad, they would lose, unless they found means to recover from the provincials an unlawful

¹ The heads of assessment were two : (a) *tributum soli*, a land-tax levied from all occupiers of the conquered territory, which by right of conquest had become the *publicæ ager* of Rome ; (b) *tributum capitis*, a poll-tax levied on the property of such as were not occupiers of land. There were also, of course, the customary *vectigalia*—harbour-dues, customs, etc.—which were levied in Italy also.

amount. Here then was the excuse for extortion ; and from being the exception it rapidly came to be the rule. The government got its money without trouble from the contractors, who were almost invariably men of equestrian rank ; the latter sent their agents (*publicani*) into the provinces with orders to squeeze from the people whatever they dared. And this came to be whatever they could, for though in theory the provincials might bring an action against their oppressors, and though as early as 149 B.C. the *Lex Calpurnia* had instituted a special court for the trial of the numerous cases of extortion, yet such a course was fraught with endless expense, probable disappointment, and certain reprisal in the future. The extortioner might be condemned, but very little of his spoils was refunded to the plundered : much more frequently he employed his spoils to secure his acquittal by bribery, and the suitor lost time and money alike ; while the plunderer's companions in iniquity would be sure to make life a burden to the suitor for his temerity. Of course the governor had the power, and was in theory bound, to prevent the extortions of the *publicani*. Being himself of senatorial standing, he was in law supposed to have no trade-interests, and therefore to have no sympathy with the views of the speculating *equites* : but as a matter of fact he was often himself the holder of shares in some tax-farming *societas* ; still more often he was bent on making money for himself out of his province ; and he would therefore connive at oppression, either because he had a personal interest in it, or because he was guilty of similar cruelties himself. And even if he were the most honest and honourable of men, to attempt to check the malpractices of the *publicani* was fraught with grievous peril to himself : it was certain to result in an impeachment upon his return, and the wealthy *equites* would spare neither money nor conscience to secure the overthrow of one who set an example of justice and integrity so fatal to their own interests.

§ 8. In those provinces of which the tribute was an annual money-payment there was less room for organised extortion, but even here the speculators found their profits. The payment of the tribute was sure sooner or later to bring one or other community into difficulties and arrears,

particularly if the governors abused their powers and made exactions on their own account, as was usually the case. Thereupon the Roman money-lender came forward, offering money at ruinous interest, and when the community was once in the *negotiator's* grasp its case was hopeless. It had to submit to every injustice under threat of worse, and the cruelties practised by the lenders were incredible. In brief it came to this, that governor and speculator were in league: each condoned in the other the offences which he practised himself, while the home government, and the senators who sat as jurors¹ in the *Quaestio de Repetundis*, refused to punish the misdeeds which each hoped to perpetrate in turn when appointed to the governorship of a province. The treatment of the provinces was an abomination, resulting too frequently in the desolation of prosperous cities and fertile lands; and it was not until the days of Augustus that Rome gave to her foreign subjects anything better than utterest misrule.

§ 9. The governor had no salary properly so called; but that he might have no reasonable excuse for plundering his subjects, the Senate made out for him an estimate of his expenses, and gave him an order for this amount upon the Treasury. The estimate was usually liberal, and there was a special law forbidding the governor to buy anything in his province, from a natural dread that he might use his power to obtain at his own price whatever he purchased. It was understood, however, that the governor should, when travelling, be provided at each halting-place with certain cheap necessities—fodder for his own horses, and salt² for himself. But apart from the governor's power to make things unpleasant if he fancied himself treated with too little ceremony, it was inevitable that the provincials should seek to curry favour by costly presents. The visit of the governor was not a whit less expensive to a Roman provincial town, than to-day is the visit of Royalty to one of our country towns, and it had the misfortune to recur at least once a year.

¹ It was this league of the senatorial jurors with senatorial offenders which C. Gracchus endeavoured to destroy by transferring the right of acting as jurors to the *equites* (123 B.C.). The remedy was worse than the disease, for it gave to the speculators an unfailing weapon against all who declined to subserve their exactions.

² Whence our English word salary (*Salarium*, salt-money).

§ 10. The governor's staff was limited. If his province were unarmed he had, besides his lictors and mere body-servants, none but the single quaestor and the three procurators who formed the regular complement of each province. If, on the contrary, his province were armed, he would have with him a certain number of *aides de camp* (*legati*), and a retinue of *attachés* (*comites contubernales*).

The quaestor was the financial agent of the Treasury and keeper of the public accounts for the province. Like all other magistrates he was elected annually, and he held the keys of such part of the public moneys as by the Senate's will was appropriated to the expenses of the governor for that year. Into his hands also were paid all sums intended for the Treasury. He was, in fact, so entirely Comptroller of Finance that the governor had no reason to touch one coin of the public money. Herein lay the possibilities of a vigorous and effective check upon malversation, whether on the part of the governor or of the *Publicani* and *negotiatores*, for it was little to the interest of the quaestor that either should occur, seeing that his books had to undergo a rigorous audit at the end of the year. But, like other securities for good government, its use was nullified by feelings of sentiment or by connivance in guilt.

The *legati* were the most important of the remaining officials. Their numbers varied according as the Senate thought fit, and that body reserved also the right of naming them. As a rule, however, they were selected at the pleasure of the governor whose staff they were to form, and whom they were to represent in the field. Nominally there would be one *legatus* for each legion in the province, but if need arose, the quaestor might be empowered to act as a commandant.

Finally the *comites* were merely young men of good position, who were sent by their families to learn the arts of war and administration beneath the care of a favourite commander, usually a personal friend. They had no official position whatever, but while they were powerless to do positive good to the provincials, they could do a vast amount of harm. It depended very much upon the governor: he restrained them or not, as he pleased.

§ 11. We have no detailed picture of the life of the provincials in these early days of Rome's supremacy. It is not until the days when Verres outraged Sicily that the evils of the Roman rule are brought into full view; but from Verres' doings we can gather what his colleagues and his predecessors did, and we can understand how it came about that the very richest lands in Europe and Asia Minor and Africa could not support the heartless, reckless, improvident drain put upon them by that oligarchy of money-makers in whom was centred their destiny. To get a governorship was synonymous with getting a fortune: it was the one remedy for bankruptcy. "One-third to purchase my acquittal when tried for extortion, one-third to be shared with those who winked at my malversation, one-third—*itself* a fortune—to keep me wealthy for the rest of my days:"—such was the dream and confession of the Roman noble who was not ashamed to allow that, with him at least, a governorship meant plunder and nothing else.

CHAPTER XV.

LITERATURE.

§ 1. The Saturnian Metre.—§ 2. Influence of Greece on Latin Literature.—§ 3. L. Livius Andronicus.—§ 4. Naevius.—§ 5. Ennius.—§ 6. Origin of the Latin Drama.—§ 7. The Fescennine and Atellan plays.—§ 8. Greek Influence on the Drama.—§ 9. Pacuvius.—§ 10. Accius.—§ 11. Latin Comedy—Plautus.—§ 12. Caecilius.—§ 13. Terence.—§ 14. Afranius. § 15. Development of Historical Writing.—§ 16. Cato.—§ 17. Oratory—Literary Characteristics of the Period.—§ 18. The Circle of the Scipios.

§ 1. "THE Latin literature which has come down to us is of later date than the commencement of the Second Punic War, and consists almost exclusively of works fashioned on Greek models. The Latin metres, heroic, elegiac, lyric, and dramatic, are of Greek origin. The best Latin Epic poetry is the feeble echo of the Iliad and Odyssey. . . The Latin tragedies are bad copies of the masterpieces of Sophocles and Euripides. The Latin comedies are free translations from Demophilus, Menander, and Apollodorus. The Latin Philosophy was borrowed, without alteration, from the Portico and the Academy; the great Latin orators constantly proposed to themselves as patterns the speeches of Demosthenes and Lysias."¹

Previous to the conquest of Magna Graecia (270 B.C.), which brought Rome into direct contact with Greek writings, there had flourished in Latium a native literature consisting of ballads such as are always found developing spontaneously, amongst peoples of Aryan race, with a vigour proportionate to the military vigour of each nation. We have no fragments of these ballads, but they are alluded to by Ennius and Cato as already lost and regretted—by Fabius Pictor as still surviving amid the country folk; and they are mentioned also by Cicero, by Vergil, and by Horace. Their subjects

¹ Macaulay's Preface to the *Lays of Ancient Rome*.

were the great deeds of bygone men, and the legends of Romulus and the building of Rome; and their metre was the so-called Saturnian¹ verse. Niebuhr saw in these the relics of a golden age of native minstrelsy, but his conclusions are not generally accepted. Macaulay quotes as an English example of Saturnian metre the line

“The queen was in her parlour eating bread and honey.”

The same metre was used by earlier Greek writers, and probably, though not certainly, it may have been derived from a Greek source. If so however, its foreign origin was early forgotten: Naevius was the last poet to employ it, and he did so as a protest against the influx of Greek metres.²

§ 2. As we have it, Roman literature is mere imitation, more or less disguised according to the gifts of the particular author. Usually the imitation was frankly avowed, especially by professional writers. Those who did not profess literature as a means of livelihood were often at pains to conceal their debt to Greek authors, but not even Cato, the soul of the opposition to Hellenism, could altogether escape the influence of Greece.

Two chief causes operated towards the rapid spread of the Hellenistic style—the desire for amusement, and the need of a literature for educational purposes. On the one hand, the new culture demanded a field in which to train and discipline the mind; on the other, all classes were eagerly on the look-out for novel entertainments. The first want was met by the professional schoolmaster, the second by the professional playwright. It was not to be expected that a true inspiration could come from such motives. Even the secondary motives which actuated such men as the Scipios and their *protégés* were little less material: a Scipio patronised an Ennius or Terence, not because the *protégé* was a great poet, but because he was

¹ Saturnus was the Italian god of the seed-time (*sevo*), whence Italy is known as *Saturnia tellus*. Later, this deity was identified with the Greek Cronos, and the adjective *Saturnius* came to signify anything archaic.

² It was, like all early metres, exceedingly rough, but in its most regular form it consisted of two halves, the first of which was in upward or iambic rhythm, the second in downward or trochaic. It is found in old epitaphs—*e.g.*,

“Cornél- | ius | Lucí- | us || Scípi- | ó Barb- | átus,”

a line from the epitaph of the conqueror of Samnium, who died 280 B.C.

artist enough to use Greek models with skill in the interest of the Hellenising party or in the glorification of his patron; the *protégé's* motive was inevitably to curry favour by his talents, the more so as the lot of a literary man at Rome without patrons was hard and unprofitable. We have in this period only two writers who can be called independent—Naevius, showing his independence by his satires upon the great, and Cato.

§ 3. The first professional Grecist was a slave named Andronicus, brought by M. Livius Salinator from Tarentum in the year 275 B.C. at the age of ten years. His intelligence ultimately won him his freedom, and he was thenceforth known as L. Livius Andronicus, taking his patron's *nomen* according to the custom of later times. He made a livelihood by teaching, and was at once brought face to face with the difficulty of finding a Latin literature which might provide him with school books. He solved the problem by turning into Latin the works of the Greek writers which lay ready to his hand—it would have been too much to expect a hard-worked schoolmaster to *invent* a literature for his pupils. Livius showed judgment in selecting Homer's *Odyssey* for his first experiment: he turned it into barbarous Saturnians, without one redeeming feature of sound or sense or inspiration. He even mistranslated so flagrantly as to prove that he was not a true Greek by birth, but more probably an African. He next undertook to provide dramas for the Roman stage, and translated a considerable number of Greek tragedies for the purpose, adopting the Greek metres. His first play appeared in 240 B.C., and in the year 207 B.C. his genius was rewarded by a commission to write on behalf of the State a poem commemorating the victory over Hasdrubal at the Metaurus. He died in 204 B.C. Even in Horace's boyhood his *Odyssey* was still a text-book in Roman schools, and that poet had not very pleasant recollections of it:—

“Non equidem insector delendaque carmina Livi;
Esse reor, memini quæ plagosum mihi parvo
Orbilium dictare; sed emendata videri
Pulchraque et exactis minimum distantia miror.”¹

¹ Ep. II. i. 69.

§ 4. Gnaeus Naevius was a contemporary of Livius, born about 269 B.C. and dying about 199 B.C. He was a native of Campania, and served during the First Punic War as a *socius*. At about twenty-five years of age he commenced his literary career as a dramatist (235 B.C.), and for several years was an active writer. Like those of Livius, his works in this direction were mainly translations, but they were characterised by a vigour of action, a smoothness of language, and an Italian humour, entirely wanting to Livius' laboured caricatures. He was better as a comedian than as a tragedian, and he so far followed the traditions of the old Greek Comedy as to get into trouble with the great statesmen of his time, notably with the *gens Metella* and with Scipio Africanus. Even imprisonment could not check his freedom of opinion, and he was forced at length to leave Rome. In so doing he lost a sphere for his dramatic productions, but his exile stirred up a patriotism which had thus far lain dormant. He turned his mind to epic writing, and during the years of his residence at Utica he put together the first Latin Epic, a history of the First Punic War. The work is wholly lost, but nearly two centuries after Vergil was not ashamed to borrow from it various scenes and lines of the *Aeneid*, the crowning monument of Roman epic. The visit of Aeneas to Carthage, and the story of Dido, are creations of Naevius, not of Vergil. Naevius recognised sadly the change which was coming over Italian literature—the decay of the old native style, and the complete domination of Greek influences; and as a protest against it he employed the Saturnian metre in his epic. His championship was futile, and he knew it; and in the epitaph which was to be cut upon his tomb he confessed himself the last of the old school:—

“ Mortales inmortales flere si foret fas,
Flerent divae Camenae Naevium poetam.
Itaque postquam est Orcino traditus thesauro,
Obliiti sunt Romae loquier Latina lingua.”

He was still read and quoted in the time of Horace—because he was antique, says the critic:—

“ Naevius in manibus non est et mentibus haeret
Paene recens? Adeo sanctum est vetus omne poema.”

Although in point of time beside our period, it is necessary to speak of the foregoing writers because of their immediate connection with those belonging more strictly to the time of the Oligarchy. Naevius, in his attacks upon the nobility, represents the last efforts of the popular party to resist the Oligarchy, the last struggles of the patriotic conservatives against the Hellenising liberals.

§ 5. The next writer of fame is Quintus Ennius of Rudiae in Calabria (239-169 B.C.), whom Cato brought from Sardinia to Rome in 204 B.C. He had served with distinction in that island, and now established himself as a teacher of Greek in Rome, receiving in 184 B.C. the *civitas* through the influence of his patrons. These were the Scipios and their circle, the party of liberal aristocracy, whose aim was to encourage in every way the introduction of Hellenism, and the development of a cosmopolitan feeling in place of the old-fashioned patriot-bigotry of the Romans. It was by a poem in praise of Scipio Africanus that Ennius first came into notice, and the patronage which he so acquired was continued after Africanus' death by Scipio Aemilianus, the new head of the party, and his friend Laelius. Another of his friends was M. Fulvius Nobilior, by whom he was taken to Aetolia in 189 B.C. as a witness of his exploits. With these and the other nobles of the party of progress, Ennius read and wrote and spoke Greek poetry and Greek philosophy, professing himself, with little consistency, something of a Sceptic, an Epicurean, and a Pythagorean, at one and the same time; while his free-thinking led him to publish a translation of the rationalising romance of Euhemerus, replacing faith with scepticism. The work by which he was best known was his *Annales*, an epic poem narrating the history of Rome from the earliest times down to the Second Punic War, so masterly that Vergil borrows from it repeatedly and the critics dubbed the author a second Homer:—

“Ennius et sapiens et fortis et alter Homerus,
Ut critici dicunt.”¹

The success of his eulogy of Scipio² was the excuse for

¹ Hor. Ep. II. i. 50.

² Hor. (Od. IV. viii. 18) says this did more for Scipio than did his victories. See the passage.

the subsequent custom which led the *nobiles* to entrust each his favourite poet or poetaster with the task of immortalising his achievements. In language he was vigorous and sonorous—Horace notices his dignified and somewhat heavy style¹—and made free use of coined words.² His genius made him a fit exponent of tragedy, but of his dramatic productions we shall speak in connection with other dramatists of this period.

Ennius was a great favourite, and he was consequently not a little conceited. In private life he was somewhat of a *bon vivant*, if we are to believe the scandal about him, that he only wrote tragedy when he was tipsy,³ or that, according to his own confession, he never wrote at all except when he had the gout. He died in the year preceding the battle of Pydna, and his effigy was sculptured in marble upon the tomb of the Scipios his patrons.

Amongst his writings were also *Saturae*, poetical medleys on a variety of commonplace topics, from which was afterwards to be developed the *Satire* of Lucilius, Horace, and Juvenal, but which had not as yet lost their original dramatic character.

§ 6. There had from the most ancient times been a rude variety of drama amongst the Italian peoples. At vintage festivals and similar holiday seasons, the chief entertainment of the population was something of this sort, and to very late times there were cultivated two varieties named, from the towns whence they were said to have been originally derived, Fescennine and Atellan farces.⁴ Upon these were grafted the Roman tragedy and comedy, such as they were, which were the chief literary production of the Oligarchic period. Two other varieties were named *Satura* and *Minus*, respectively: the former ceased to be dramatic in the days of Ennius, and after fifty years of abeyance revived in the form of the genuine Roman *Satire*: the latter only came to the front in the last century B.C., and is therefore outside the scope of this chapter.

The Fescennine and Atellan farces were in origin identical

¹ Sat. I. x. 54; A. P. 259.

² Hor. A. P. 56.

³ Hor. Ep. I. xix. 7.

⁴ From Fescennium in Etruria, and Atella in Campania.

—extempore performances by holiday-making villagers, and characterised accordingly by a good deal of very broad humour and coarse personality. The two, however, differentiated to some extent at an early date, the one taking from Etruscan influences a markedly sensual and indecent character, the other, in Oscan hands and possibly affected by the neighbourhood of the Greek cities of Magna Graecia, tending towards a more elaborate artistic finish; the development in either case being aided by the fact that while the Fescennines remained exclusively in the hands of the lower classes, the Atellan farce came under the patronage of the better class of Oscan nobles, who carefully prevented the intrusion of any professional element which might "pollute" the performance, as Livy phrases it. The Italians never had much of dramatic taste: so long as they had sufficient buffoonery and personality, they easily dispensed with plot, fine language, and moral precept; and to the last the drama remained with them only an amusement and not at all a means of instruction.

Both forms of the native drama early made their way to Rome, but it was not until 364 B.C. that they received the sanction of the government. In that year a definite sum was set apart to meet the cost of erecting a stage and providing players during the three days of the Latin games. The sum was small, the stage a mere platform, the players as rude as might be expected from the times and from the small encouragement accorded to them. Nevertheless, the annual performances came to be a matter of some importance, and the aediles, to whom fell the duty of providing them, gradually came to curry favour with the populace by going to voluntary expense in their production. There was no permanent theatre in Rome until the days of Pompeius Magnus, 55 B.C.: every attempt to establish one at an earlier date was frustrated by those who feared that the theatre was, as indeed it was in Rome, an instrument of degradation.

§ 7. The Fescennine plays, originally performed as dialogues, gradually passed into a low-class recitative, confined to wedding ceremonies. The original Saturnian metre was exchanged for others of Greek origin, and the whole

resultant was the Epithalamium or Nuptial-hymn—something which the better class tolerated only because it was so deeply rooted in the favour of the lower classes.

The *Fabula Atellana*, transplanted to Rome somewhat later than the Fescennines, retained its special characteristics much longer: indeed, it came to have a fixed set of characters analogous to those of an English harlequinade. But for two reasons it could not be very popular: firstly, it was confined to young men of good family, as has been said, although for such an one to take part in any other stage performance was to incur disenfranchisement and lasting disgrace; secondly, the government would not tolerate that freedom of speech which had been the most attractive feature of the Atellans in their original form. This restriction caused the total disappearance of the *Satura* from the stage, but the *Atellana* was kept up by the interest of the young nobles, and only disappeared when the *Mimus* replaced it.

§ 8. However, Fescennine and Atellan had proved that the Romans needed a drama, and had secured a State endowment-fund; and with these inducements it was easy for Livius Andronicus to make the experiment of producing tragedies translated from the Greek. The experiment was a success, and from that date there was no lack of dramatists for a century or more. They were, however, little but translators and adapters: there never was a genuine Italian drama which attained to any high degree of elaboration.

The new drama was divided into three kinds. The great bulk were merely Latin reproductions of a Greek play or plays, preserving the names and scenery unchanged, and altering only the language: these were known as *Palliatae*. In some cases, however, the dramatist was content to borrow his plot only, making the persons and scenes of his play alike Italian: such plays were known as *Togatae*. The third kind was named *Praetextatae*, and included a very few plays which clothed in dramatic dress more or less original some historical event of the Roman annals¹—Ennius wrote

¹ Instances are the *Romulus* of Naevius, and the *Brutus* of Accius or Attius. The latter was founded on the expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome.

some few such; but historical plays are rarely very successful, and they were least of all fitted to arouse the enthusiasm of a Roman audience. Indeed, that audience was always thankless, and though it would crowd to the theatre in default of other amusements, it would leave the finest tragedy or the most amusing comedy to witness a combat of gladiators, a *venatio*, or even a rope-dancer or juggler.

§ 9. The names of the chief dramatists of this, the Old School, are given by Horace (Ep. II. i. 55), who, after speaking of Ennius and Naevius, continues.

“Aufert

Pacuvius docti famam senis, Accius alti,
Dicitur Afrani toga convenisse Menandro,
Plautus ad exemplar Siculi properare Epicharmi,
Vincere Caecilius gravitate, Terentius arte.”

Ennius wrote both tragedies and comedies, but his fondness for long words and sonorous rhythms made him prefer the former, and while he lived his work was generally popular. Nevertheless, tragedy had even less attractions for the Romans than had comedy, and whereas we have abundant specimens of the comic writings of Plautus and Terence, we have nothing but the smallest fragments of any tragedy of the time. The favourite original was Euripides, whose style is as much more “human,” less grandiose and ideal, than that of Sophocles, as is the style of Sophocles than that of Aeschylus.

Pacuvius was nephew of Ennius. Born at Brundisium in 220 B.C., he early migrated to Rome, only returning to die at his native place in the year 132 B.C. He combined the professions of dramatist and artist, and was his own scene-painter. Moreover he was ambitious, and a great stylist, for his tragedies number less than a score during fifty years of writing, and he ventured to Latinise plays of Sophocles. The most famous of his works was the *Antiope*. He was a real poet, and Cicero even says he improved upon Sophocles; but his style was disfigured by the use of strange compounds and by redundancy. He wrote also one or two *Saturae*, but failed to prevent the extinction of the dramatic satire.

§ 10. Much later was Lucius Accius (or Attius), the son

of a freedman of Pisaurum (*Pesaro*) in Umbria. He was born the year before the death of Ennius (170 B.C.), was the rival of Pacuvius, and lived to see Cicero already thirteen years old (94 B.C.). Nevertheless his writing, which was voluminous, was quite of the archaic style. Horace calls him lofty, that is, somewhat high-flown in language; but his tragedies were the most popular of the day, and continued to be represented for generations after his death. Besides upwards of forty tragedies, he wrote a versified history of Greek and Roman drama—such works are known as *Didascalía*—and “Annals” in hexameter verse, recording the legends of Mythology. The list of his writings includes also two historical dramas (*praetextatae*), of which one dealt with the achievements of L. Aemilius Paulus. Accius was the last of the Roman tragedians.

§ 11. The list of comedians is longer. Besides the four mentioned by Horace in the quotation above given—Plautus, Afranius, Caecilius, and Terence—we have the names of Trabea, Licinius Imbrex, Luscius Lavinius (or perhaps Lanuvinus), Turpilius, Atilius, Juventius, Valerius, and Titinius.

Titus Maccius Plautus (254-184 B.C.), an Umbrian of Sarsina, earned his living at Rome as a miller, and wrote his comedies—forty at the lowest estimate, at the highest a hundred and thirty—during his leisure moments. He succeeded Livius and Naevius, of whose comedies we have already spoken, and was a rival of Ennius, and the high estimation in which his comedies were held is proved by the simple fact that we still have twenty of them entire. Translating and adapting from the Greek Comedy of Manners (new comedy), he made no pretence to originality, unless it was in the skill wherewith he would throw into one Latin play two Greek dramas, borrowing from each whatever seemed likely to succeed either in plot or character, by the process known as *contaminatio*. Like his fellow-comedians, Plautus frankly declared the source of his inspirations—usually Menander, Philemon, Diphilus, or Apollodorus—and candidly omitted whatever was merely witty to find room for what was simply farcical. He had no mission beyond that of providing amusement for his audience, and to his audience only rapid

action was amusing, so that the result is what we should call broad farce or burlesque. It is the varied dialogue which prevents us wearying of the monotonous characters and still more monotonous plot—for in comedy, as in the Atellan farce, certain types tended more and more to become constant. The theme is almost invariably the troubles of family life—penurious fathers and spendthrift sons, faithless lovers and jealous husbands, slaves who cheat every one and end with either the punishment of the cross or the reward of emancipation. There is always a love-affair, and very often a case of mistaken identity; and the general moral of the whole is that we should enjoy life at any risk, whether of honour or character or even life. Cato and his school had good reason to cry out against the new style in the theatres.

The prevailing Hellenism is vividly proved by the free use, in Plautus and his successors, of words of Greek origin, often purely Greek, which could only be allowable on the understanding that the Greek language was already very familiar in Rome. Their vocabulary contains many words which are not found in Ciceronian Latin, numbers of comic compounds of abnormal length, and the most complete collection of colloquial idioms which we possess. One of Plautus' favourite means to raise a laugh is to introduce every-day Roman expressions amidst scenes thoroughly Greek. Horace speaks with admiration of his delineation of characters,¹ notes his use of Greek words and compounds,² and complains that the older Romans were too long-suffering in their endurance of his bad witticisms.³

§ 12. Statius Caecilius, of whom Cicero thought very highly, was born in 219 B.C. He was not a Roman by birth, any more than were the other dramatists of this period, but an Insubrian Gaul, first a slave, and later a freed-man. We have none of his plays; from the titles which are preserved it seems that he was more true to his models than was Plautus, and therefore much more refined, so that it is not surprising to learn that his day of popularity only came when Plautus' powers were failing. He marks the

¹ Ep. II. i. 170.² A. P. 54.³ A. P. 270.

further advance of Hellenism, and prepares the way for the most refined and Hellenic of all the comedians, Terence. He died about 160 B.C.

§ 13. Publius Terentius Afer was, as his name implies, an African. He was born at Carthage (195 B.C.); became the slave of Terentius Lucanus, and was manumitted at an early age, for he was only twenty-nine years of age when his first play, the *Andria*, was produced by the aediles of 166 B.C. The aediles' choice is said to have been prompted by Caecilius' high opinion of the new poet. The play was a great and immediate success, and won for Terence the personal friendship rather than the patronage of Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius, the Crichtons of the day; and this friendship he retained until his death (159 B.C.), which occurred from shipwreck while on the way home from Athens, whither he had gone to study Menander in the original.

We have in all six plays of Terence, all borrowed either directly or by "contamination" from Menander, indeed Caesar spoke of the dramatist as a "split Menander"—*O dimidiate Menander*. He had to run the gauntlet of professional jealousy, especially that of Lavinius, who accused him of merely lending his name to what were in reality the compositions of Scipio and his coterie. It is quite certain that the Scipionic clique would have had nothing to do with Terence had his drama not embodied their own principles; equally certain that the poet wrote his own plays; and *primâ facie* probable that he derived from his patrons the encouragement, if not the direct suggestion, of his object. For Terence was less of a caterer for popular amusement than a writer with a mission to improve men's tastes and morals, doing for Aemilianus what Vergil did a century later for Augustus. The moral is readily seen in each play, but it is also most skilfully disguised: the writings of Terence combine, perhaps as perfectly as comedy can, the qualities which amuse and those which elevate. Moreover, albeit himself a foreigner, his language is simpler and more natural than that of any other writer, excepting perhaps Caesar. He never allows his debt to Greece to vitiate his style, and in fact he is to the drama what

Horace is to lyric poetry—at once most artificial and most unaffected. His “art” was of that sort which conceals art.

§ 14. Of Lucius Afranius, the fourth of the quartette named by Horace, we know very little. After the early death of Terence the Plautine style of comedy fell into decay, and there arose a new style (*togatae*), which chose its characters and scenes from Italian life. It was introduced by Titinius, and followed up by Afranius, with considerable success, and still more talent; but it was no more enduring than the old style of *palliatae*, we have no remains of it, and along with all other branches of this exotic drama it was destined to disappear before the rising attractions of the *Mimus*.

§ 15. Prose literature is always slower to develop than is poetry, and, at any rate in an uncritical society, it is more difficult to make attractive. Society at Rome could hardly be called critical as yet, for the circles of the Scipios were quite exceptional. It was for these circles, and for other advocates of Hellenism, that the first Roman historians wrote, and they therefore wrote in Greek. These were Q. Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus. They both took an active part in the Second Punic War, in which indeed Cincius was made prisoner, a fact to which he owed his exceptional knowledge of the movements and resources of Hannibal during the war. Both wrote a so-called History of Rome from the very earliest times—little more than a bare compilation from such State documents as the Pontifical Archives with their lists of events, portentous and otherwise, which called for the attention of the State Religion, and the Linen Rolls (*Libri Lintei*), containing mere lists of the annual magistrates; and they had access also to the family archives of the great nobles, in which would be recorded something that was truth under a cloak of exaggeration or misrepresentation. Their work, again, was shackled by the habit of chronicling events year by year, without any connection of cause and effect, or any attempt to draw from facts the lessons which alone make history worthy of study. Nor was there, as yet, any such thing as historical criticism to separate myth from fact.

§ 16. The first great writer of Latin prose was M. Porcius Cato. The latter part of his life was spent mainly in literary pursuits, and he left behind him a multitude of works on almost every subject known to the time. Hating Greek—he only began to study Greek literature at the end of his life—his style was entirely Roman and entirely his own: it was abrupt and sententious to the last degree, entirely unimaginative, and pregnant with information. His greatest work was entitled *Origines*, and dealt mainly with the earliest times of Rome and the surrounding Italian states, for Cato differed from other Romans of his day in this, that he regarded his own State not as one apart from all others, but as one amongst many. He was a cosmopolitan, but an Italian cosmopolitan: he drew the line at anything which lay beyond the bounds of Italy. After describing the habits, laws, customs, and antiquities, of the various Italian states, he wrote the history of the Second Punic War, in which he had seen service. We have nothing left of the book, but we may suppose that it showed the author's "brutal truthfulness," and that its errors, if any, were due only to the want of critical insight. One peculiarity about his historical writing was that he mentioned no Roman names, for some reason unexplained.

Cato was a farmer and a speculator, and he has left us a work, *De Re Rustica*, which embodies the results of his experience in regard to land and money-making. In its present form it is probably a late revision, but it is nevertheless remarkable for its archaic style, and is full of out-of-the-way words from rural life; but it is full of blunt common-sense, and it remained for years a text-book on its subjects. Besides instructions as to the culture of vines, olives, etc., it gives us valuable information as to the value of land, rents, the acreage of farms, the cost of working and stocking land under various sorts of cultivation, and full directions as to the purchase and treatment of slaves. There are various digressions on such matters as herbal medicine, and the management of women and children. It is, in fact, a Roman yeoman's handbook on "How to farm profitably." Cato was an orator of power, as was essential in any one who would enter public life. The enemies he

made gave him practice enough, for Cato always conducted his own defence when brought to trial, and always successfully. At the close of his life he collected the best of his speeches for publication, besides many which were inserted in the *Origines*, so that Cicero could study his style in some hundred and fifty orations. Lastly, Cato wrote and published a number of letters, mainly to his son, on every sort of subject—letters full of fatherly advice and epigrammatic wisdom; indeed, at a subsequent date, Cato's *Apophthegmata* were collected and edited as a separate book.

Amongst others who wrote history at this epoch were Gaius Acilius and A. Postumius Albinus. Nothing is known of them save that they wrote in Greek, the former during the prime of Cato's life (180 B.C.), the latter towards its close (150 B.C.). There was also a Fabius Maximus, who re-wrote Pictor's History in Latin, and a Calpurnius Piso, who wrote Annals.

§ 17. Like their tragedy, the historical writing of the Romans had a constant tendency towards a rhetorical form. Rhetoric was the one art which to a Roman's mind included all others, and was a *sine quâ non* with all alike. Nevertheless, it was only after the visit of Carneades (153 B.C.) that it came to be treated scientifically, and the great names of Latin oratory belong to the last century of the Republic. Besides Cato, we have during this era the two Scipios, Servius Galba, and C. Laelius. The latter was too polished to be vehement, and with a Roman audience only self-forgetful vehemence could find favour. Both he and Scipio Aemilianus modelled their style directly upon that of Demosthenes and his fellow Athenians.

Taken as a whole the period of Oligarchic rule was a time of literary empiricism in which most forms of composition were tried, few took root, many failed completely, and none grew rapidly. In a hundred years from Naevius' day there was not more change in the literary idiom of Rome, albeit so young and unformed, than occurs within a century's growth of our own now fully developed language. In Republican Rome literature remained always an exotic cultivated only for a casual festival or for the

salon, and it had no widespread and spontaneous vigour of its own. Mommsen's remark that the period of Rome's greatest vigour is precisely that in which she had no literature, has been quoted with approval by almost every writer on this subject since its utterance.

§ 18. Chief amongst the patrons of intellect in Rome was Scipio Minor. The elder Africanus had likewise patronised *litterati*, but he had not himself taken much share in their productions or philosophy. His son, in health an invalid, followed in the same track, so that Scipio Minor had already a kind of family tradition to maintain when he became by adoption the invalid's son. But he went further than did the others. Not only did he give his friendship to men of letters and philosophy, but he shared in all their various pursuits. In his villa met the Stoics Panaetius of Rhodes and Diogenes, Lucilius the satirist of the rising generation, and Terence, reciting or lecturing each to an audience which included most of the wit and ability of Rome—P. Rupilius and Caelius Antipater the historians; Mucius Scaevola the Augur, and Manius Manilius, another great jurist; C. Laelius, Scipio's comrade in many a campaign, whom men called *Sapiens* for his wisdom; and such men as C. Fannius, Furius Philus, and Spurius Mummius brother of Mummius Achaicus, all types of the best class of Roman gentlemen. Scipio himself wrote a little, and studied rhetoric for its utility; but it was mainly for its own sake that he and his fellows studied Greek literature—he knew all Homer off by heart—while in Greek Philosophy they tried to find rules for their guidance in social and political life. Scipio in particular was keenly alive to the perils which beset the State: he knew that the Government was decaying fast, and that the remedy, to be of use, must be speedy and drastic; but he could not go so far as did his brother-in-law and cousin Tiberius Gracchus, and it was for this that he was murdered (129 B.C.).¹ He would have none of the vices of Hellenism,

¹ He endeavoured to prevent the further execution of the provisions of Gracchus' Agrarian Law of 133 B.C., and was found dead in bed on the morning after his greatest effort. It is likely, but not proven, that his death was violent, and its motive revenge. Carbo, a leading partisan of Gracchus, was commonly believed to be the assassin.

and his own life set a pattern of Hellenic culture combined with Roman virtues before the eyes of his fellow-men ; in-somuch that even his hereditary foe Cato owned this, the last of the Great Scipios, the second of Vergil's "two thunderbolts of battle," to be the "one man of strength and wit amidst a world of shadow-figures."

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
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